Drucker’s insights on market orientation and innovation: implications for emerging areas in high-technology marketing

In 1954, Drucker boldly declared that organizations have only two basic functions, marketing and innovation. While true for any organization, this insight is particularly pertinent for technology-based businesses. The complicated environment surrounding high-tech companies creates a great need for sophisticated marketing. Yet these companies continue to have under-developed competencies in marketing and in understanding customer needs. This essay explores Drucker’s insights with respect to two particularly salient issues for high-tech companies: developing and implementing a market orientation and break-through innovations. We review Drucker’s insights and synthesize them with the scholarly research on these issues. Finally, we discuss three emerging areas in high-tech marketing where academics and managers could build on Drucker’s insights to guide future research and practice: market driving, customer co-creation, and corporate social responsibility. These illustrative examples highlight that even today, Drucker’s writings continue to offer remarkable guidance to scholars and managers who are willing to take the time to reflect, understand, and incorporate his insights in the unique context of high-tech industries. Electronic supplementary material  The online version of this article (doi:) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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