会计师事务所“低价揽客”的博弈分析

本文从博弈论的角度对会计师事务所的“低价揽客”行为进行分析,认为“低价揽客”使会计师事务所在审计定价方面陷入“囚徒困境”,进而加剧了事务所之间的恶性压价竞争,降低了审计质量,加大了审计风险,导致事务所的人才流失,影响会计师事务所的可持续发展,并进一步分析了“低价揽客”的成因和提出了相关建议。     

国有资产流失的博弈论分析

在我国新旧经济体制的转轨过程中,由于种种原因造成国有资产大量流失。本文利用博弈论的“囚徒困境”模型分析了在国有资产博弈中国有资产所有者和国有资产经营者之间的博弈关系 ,从而得出结论 :我国目前在资产权益和收益方面的博弈总体上处于国家所有者的低级有规则合作与企业经营者的低级无规则合作博弈 ,向前者的中级有规则合作与后者的低级有规则合作博弈转轨时期。在这种博弈格局中存在不对称博弈规则 ;这种不对称的博弈格局是导致国有资产流失的一个重要原因。     

Resolving a dilemma of signaling bankrupt‐firm emergence: A dynamic integrative view

Research summary : Predicting the emergence of bankrupt firms relying on firm signals involves a stigma‐related dilemma. On the one hand, bankrupt firms tend to send positive signals through restructuring to decouple themselves from the stigma of bankruptcy. On the other hand, the preexistence of the bankruptcy stigma may reduce the signaling effectiveness of firms' restructuring efforts, making the outcome prediction difficult. We address this dilemma by developing a dynamic integrative view to extend signaling theory, arguing that subsequent signals from key external stakeholders can effectively help evaluate bankrupt firms' quality and reduce the ambiguity in interpreting firms' restructuring signals. Using a sample of U.S. public bankrupt firms under Chapter 11 reorganization, we find evidence supporting the argument. Managerial summary : Applications of signaling theory to predict reorganization outcomes are in their infancy. The dynamic integrative framework developed in this study is useful in identifying different types of signals and predicting outcomes of firms in crisis. The results of this study can be useful for various decision makers to predict the turnaround potential of bankrupt firms. Our results show that an increase in alliance partners, institutional investors, and securities analysts following a bankrupt firm predicts the firm's reorganization outcome. Moreover, firms that are able to gain positive attention from key stakeholders will also gain positive interpretations of their strategic efforts. Signals from alliance partners and institutional investors amplify the signaling effect of a firm's de‐diversification effort in predicting its reorganization outcome. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

发展新型农村集体经济的现实困境与机制创新——基于广西壮族自治区贺州市的思考

创新新型农村集体经济发展机制,是推动实施乡村振兴战略、决胜全面建成小康社会、实现农村治理现代化的重大现实课题。通过运用系统分析法、制度分析法发现:贺州市发展新型农村集体经济面临着认知困惑、能力困扰、效力困境等突出问题。因此,应有针对性地积极探索机制创新,着力强化主体作用实现、发展要素集聚、发展环境优化、工作推进等机制,推动新型农村集体经济做大做强,让村级集体收益成为保障乡村振兴战略深入实施的强大助力。     

Does the size of the action set matter for cooperation?

We use the voluntary contribution mechanism to investigate whether smaller action sets lead to higher cooperation rates. We find that this is the case for groups of four players.     

运用分享经济理论破解当前中国经济两大难题

当前,我国经济面临两大难题:一是财富和收入分配严重失衡,贫富分化日趋严重,已经出现两极分化现象；二是从2010年7月起出现新一轮通货膨胀,来势凶猛,蔓延迅速,可能酿成“滞胀”风险.目前,应让实行了数年的凯恩斯政策组合淡出,尽快进行微观经济运行机制重塑,在企业初次分配领域引入利益分享制度,在全社会推行企业净收入分成制和利润分享制的经济模式,以取代原有的工资制经济模式.     

The Ethical Rational of Business for the Poor – Integrating the Concepts Bottom of the Pyramid,Sustainable Development,and Corporate Citizenship

The first United Nations Millennium Development Goal calls for a distinct reduction of worldwide poverty. It is now widely accepted that the private sector is a crucial partner in achieving this ambitious target. Building on this insight, the ‹Bottom of the Pyramid’ concept provides a framework that highlights the untapped opportunities with the ‹poorest of the poor’, while at the same time acknowledging the abilities and resources of private enterprises for poverty alleviation. This article connects the idea of business with the poor to sustainable development and especially to the notions of inter- and intragenerational justice. These principles of justice can be linked with the ‹Bottom of the Pyramid’ approach directly through the Rawlsian principles to foster holistic thinking. On this basis, the article offers a normative-ethical reasoning of corporations’ possible responsibilities for the poorest of the poor. Today’s state of worldwide inequalities is likely to generate future tensions between the privileged western world and the uncounted mass of poor (let alone the ethical dubiousness of this status). However, it is at the same time problematic if not even impossible to improve the situation of the poor by simply copying the resource intensive western way of living to the ‹Bottom of the Pyramid’ due to the limited carrying capacity of the earth. After highlighting possible moral dilemmas which may occur through such a potential trade off, this article concludes with an outlook on how the concepts ‹Bottom of the Pyramid’ and sustainable development could be combined.     

Lying,Integrity, and Cooperation

While talk is cheap to some, it is expensive to others for whom moral considerations come into play. We employ a simple two-stage modified prisoner's dilemma game where integrity is endowed on a continuum to analyze when agents will lie in random economic interactions. If there is sufficient integrity in the population, all agents make a promise in the first stage to cooperate in the second. Some agents always lie, some always tell the truth, and some behave conditionally. Enhanced cooperation is a byproduct of integrity. In a second random interaction without the possibility of exit, some agents “switch” their behavior, that is, some who lied in the first period now tell the truth in the second (they've “reformed”), and some who told the truth in the first period now lie in the second (they've become “cynical”).     

In-class Simulations of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Game

The author developed a simple computer program for the in-class simulation of the repeated prisoner's dilemma game with student-designed strategies. He describes the basic features of the software and presents two examples for the use of the program in teaching the problems of cooperation among profit-maximizing agents.     

Evolution of repeated prisoner's dilemma play under logit dynamics

In an evolutionary set-up, we append an ecology of iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) game strategies, consisting of unconditional cooperators (AllC), unconditional defectors (AllD) and reactive players (TFT) with two repeated strategies that have received less attention in the evolutionary IPD game literature: the error-proof, “generous” tit-for-tat (GTFT) which, with a certain probability, re-establishes cooperation after a (possibly by mistake) defection of the opponent and the penitent, “stimulus–response” (WSLS) strategy that resets cooperation after the opponent punished for defection. An abundance of rock–paper–scissors like patterns is discovered in the 3×3 ecologies comprising Pavlovian and “generous” players. Interestingly, the evolutionary success of Pavlov seems to depend on the absence of unconditional cooperators in the ecologies investigated.