进入权理论下的会计师事务所股权设置

Rajan和Zingales提出了进入权理论，认为企业的权力来源于进入权，即对关键资源接触和使用的权力。本文结合会计师事务所的特征，在分析其关键资源的基础上，建议会计师事务所的股权应设置为财产股、岗位股、贡献股。     

谈谈编辑的职业道德

市场经济条件下，人们的思想、观念发生了深刻的变化，以权谋私，权钱交易，渗透到各行各业，如何进行行业自律，如何规范自己的道德行为，近在眉睫。做为从事新闻出版宣传工作的编辑在职业道德建设方面更应率先垂范，不仅要做传播化的使，更应做奠定职业道德的模范。     

中国会计改革模式探析

会计制度的形成受制于社会经济条件．基本经济务件的变化会引起制度创新的必要。中国的发展中大国的特点决定了其会计制度改革必须立足于本国的条件,在吸收先进国家经验方面。现阶段应更多地借鉴“欧洲大陆模式”而不是“英美模式”,因为中国的社会经济条件与前更为接近。     

会计源于财务的哲学演绎

财务属于物质范畴 ,会计属于意识范畴 ,财务先于会计产生 ,财务是会计的基础 ,会计是对财务的反映。因会计属于意识范畴 ,所以其只具有反映的单一职能 ,人们利用会计这一工具所反映的信息对客观存在的物质范畴的财务进行管理。随着人类社会实践的不断进步 ,财务日渐复杂 ,会计日渐完善。     

关于体验式培训的几点思考

体验式培训是一种新兴的学习方式和培训方式,文章通过对体验式培训的起源及其意义的介绍,从不同角度分析了体验式培训与传统教育培训的不同以及体验式培训在现代企业培训中的作用。     

创业投资机构对其支持企业IPO抑价度的影响

本文介绍了国外关于创业投资机构如何影响企业IPO抑价度的主要理论,在此基础上以我国的中小企业板上市公司为研究对象,通过比较分析发现与非创投支持企业相比创投支持企业有着更高的抑价度,进一步地研究表明该现象可用Am it et.al.[1]提出的逆向选择理论来解释。     

改革现行会计委派制 建立会计代理制

对于国有企业(及国家机关部门和事业单位)来说,建立“外派”会计制度是内在的要求,应该坚持做好。“外派”会计是财务监督会计,与企业内部管理会计并行不悖。不过,现行的会计委派制确实增加了企业经理人员和委派会计人员或财务总监之间产生对立或合谋的可能性,某种意义上成为政府干预企业的新机制、新形式,这影响到会计委派制的实际效果。而由会计师事务所等中介服务机构来充当企业的财务总监的会计代理制却能较好地隔离政府与企业,并在两者之间形成适当的平衡。     

Does Gibrat's Law hold among young,small firms?

According to Gibrat's Law of Proportionate Effect, the growth rate of a given firm is independent of its size at the beginning of the examined period. Aimed at extending this line of investigation, the present paper uses quantile regression techniques to test whether Gibrat's Law holds for new entrants in a given industry: that is for new small firms in the early stage of their life cycle. The main finding is that for some selected industries in Italian manufacturing Gibrat's Law fails to hold in the years immediately following start-up, when smaller firms have to rush in order to achieve a size large enough to enhance their likelihood of survival. Conversely, in subsequent years the patterns of growth of new smaller firms do not differ significantly from those of larger entrants, and the Law therefore cannot be rejected.JEL Classification: L11, L60Previous versions of this paper were presented at the 27th Annual EARIE Conference (Lausanne, 7-10 September 2000) and at seminars held between 2000 and 2003 at the Economics Department of Harvard University, the Catholic University of Milan, the University of Ferrara, the University of Bologna, the Bank of Italy, and Athens University of Economics & Business. We would like to thank Carlo Bianchi, Giuseppe Colangelo, Giovanni Dosi, Steven Klepper (Editor), Stephen Martin, Ariel Pakes, Aman Ullah and, in particular, Helen Louri and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments on earlier drafts. Financial support from MIUR (Year 2000; protocol #MM13038538_001; project leader: E. Santarelli) is gratefully acknowledged.Correspondence to: E. Santarelly     

Free Entry under Uncertainty

When focusing on firm’s risk-aversion in industry equilibrium, the number of firms may be either larger or smaller when comparing market equilibrium with and without price uncertainty. In this paper, we introduce risk-averse firms under cost uncertainty in a model of spatial differentiation and show that the impact of uncertainty will increase the number of firms in an industry. With increased uncertainty, the risk premium of the marginal buyer increases by more than the risk premium of the average buyer, so that the price increases by more than the risk premium. When turning to the free entry game, we find that the market generates too many firms.     

CPA职业道德博弈分析

本文运用博弈分析方法对CPA职业道德进行了分析,发现CPA职业道德状况是CPA审计市场诸因素的复合函数,分别运用不完全信息动态博弈和静态博弈方法,对CPA审计机制和CPA行业内部的诸因素对CPA职业道德的影响进行了分析,并提出了相应的治理对策。