Robust political economy

This paper introduces the idea of “robust political economy.” In the context of political economic systems, “robustness” refers to a political economic arrangement's ability to produce social welfare-enhancing outcomes in the face of deviations from ideal assumptions about individuals' motivations and information. Since standard assumptions about complete and perfect information, instantaneous market adjustment, perfect agent rationality, political actor benevolence, etc., rarely, if ever actually hold, a realistic picture and accurate assessment of the desirability of alternative political economic systems requires an analysis of alternative systems' robustness. The Mises-Hayek critique of socialism forms the foundation for investigations of robustness that relax ideal informational assumptions. The Buchanan-Tullock public choice approach complements this foundation in forming the basis for investigations of robustness that relax ideal motivational assumptions. JEL Code B53, P16, P26     

美国财政分权的效率分析

美国作为一个高度发达的市场经济国家,不但在经济发展领域里取得了令人瞩目的成就,而且在制度的设计、创新和发展等方面也有许多值得借鉴之处,美国财政分权体制就是其中之一.本文在分析财政分权效率的含义及要求的基础上,从美国政府问事权和财权划分明确且相互匹配、科学合理的转移支付制度、分权与制衡并存的预算机制、地方政府自治以及整个财政分权体制的法律依据等方面分析了美国财政分权高效的原因.     

Policy Discrimination with and without Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility

Can the Pareto criterion guide policymakers who do not know the true model of the economy? If policymakers specify ex ante preferences for agents, then Pareto improvements from a distorted status quo are usually possible, and with more commodities than states, one can implement almost every Pareto optimum. Unlike the standard second welfare theorem, planners cannot dictate allocations: agents must trade. Unfortunately ex ante preferences impose interpersonal comparisons. If policymakers merely aim to maximize some social welfare function then optimal policies form an open set; hence small changes in the environment do not necessitate any policy response. Planners with symmetric information about agents can sometimes intervene without making interpersonal comparisons.     

DEALING WITH UNCERTAINTY: ROBUST RULES IN MONETARY POLICY

We argue that in seeking to insure against model uncertainty, monetary policy makers are often ready to trade ex post performance for greater certainty in the outcome. They thus look for rules that although not optimal ex post, have certain properties that qualify them as robust. We apply first, Gul's approach of ‘disappointment’ aversion to describe policy makers' aversion to uncertainty and then define the properties the notion of ‘robustness’ entails. With these two tools we then link the desirability of such robust rules to the degree of policy makers' aversion to uncertainty. We thus show that provided such robust rules exist, a larger degree of disappointment aversion leads to a greater emphasis on robustness in policy implementation.     

Unemployment dynamics in an OLG economy with public pensions

Pension benefits in old age establish a disincentive to save in youth, thereby yielding lower levels of capital stock and the wage rate. As a result, the trade union has an incentive to change the composition of its two targets: employment and the wage rate. This paper develops a model that includes employment effects of public pensions via capital accumulation and union wage setting. Within this framework, we consider how contribution rates to the pension system influence the level and time path of the unemployment rate. It is demonstrated that (1) a higher contribution rate results in a lower unemployment rate, and (2) the economy with a high (low) contribution rate experiences monotone convergence towards (oscillatory convergence towards or a period-2 cycle around) the steady state. The author would like to thank an anonymous referee, Kazutoshi Miyazawa, and seminar participants at Osaka University for their useful comments and suggestions, and Masako Ikefuji and Hiroaki Yamagami for their research assistance. Financial support from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) through a Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B) (No.17730131), the Asahi Glass Foundation, the Japan Economic Research Foundation and the 21st Century COE Program (Osaka University) is gratefully acknowledged. All remaining errors are mine.     

论和谐财政的伦理精神

从伦理学看,不应该要求人们做其没有能力做的事,或者做出一种巨大牺牲是明显不合理的,在同利益严重冲突的情况下,要求那样一种牺牲甚至是完全不合理的。这种原则符合了理性到理性自我的概念,使自我主义和利他主义在和谐道德观基础上有机地联系起来。满足穷人基本需要的“消极”权利应该优先于富人奢侈消费的“积极”权利。财政分配道德上的优先性,不仅是和谐财政应该具有的内容,而且是从实质上调整贫富差距以实现社会和谐的迫切需要。     

论农村公共财政建设的制度环境与模式选择

公共品的层次性、成本补偿原理、均等化以及民主决策理论等是中国农村公共财政建设的一般理论基础。而农村经济制度、经济水平和结构、意识形态、民主水平等构成我国农村公共财政模式选择的现实制约条件。中国农村公共财政应是公共品供给体制上的分级财政、筹资体制上的向内倾斜型财政、决策体制上的民主型财政、管理体制上的法制型财政和反映农村社会经济变化的动态发展型财政。     

基层财政解困:一个财政体制变迁的分析框架

基层财政困难已影响到部分地方经济发展与社会稳定,是迫切需要解决的问题.基层财政陷入困境的最直接根源是财政体制不规范,事权与财权高度不对称.解困的根本出路在于规范政府间财政关系,进行财政体制创新.但财政体制变迁不能局限于边际微调,须考虑政府财政级次问题.本文提出推行"省管县"体制与撤消乡镇级政府两项改革,将政府层级由五级简化为三级,对应形成三级财政.并以这三级财政为架构,重新设计财政体制,合理配置政府间事权财权,以推动基层财政彻底解困.     

产业集群的驱动因素分析及政策建议

产业集群是一种世界性的经济现象。中国产业集群发展还在起步阶段,对产业集群驱动因素的分析,有助于发展、提升产业集群的竞争优势,加快区域经济的发展。     

Regulatory and environmental effects on public transit efficiency: a mixed DEA-SFA approach

This paper assesses the impact of regulatory and environmental factors and statistical noise on the efficiency of public transit systems within a DEA-based framework. Using a panel of Italian companies, we implement a DEA-SFA mixed approach based on [H.O. Fried et al. (2002) Journal of Productivity Analysis, 17(1–2), 157–174] to decompose DEA inefficiency measures into three components: exogenous effects, managerial inefficiency and stochastic events. Besides providing evidence on the determinants of input-specific efficiency differentials across companies, the results point out that managerial skills play a minor role, and emphasize the relevance of regulatory policies aimed at replacing cost-plus subsidization with high-powered incentive contracts as well as improving environmental conditions of public transit networks.