HYPERINFLATIONS: THEIR ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT AND TERMINATION

Abstract. This paper summarizes and critically surveys research on hyperinflation. Appraisal and review of the literature considers the origins, development, termination, and the lessons to be learned from hyperinflations. The historical evidence as well as the econometric evidence is analyzed. It is concluded that while the lessons to be learned from such episodes perhaps have been overstated a number of useful implications may be derived from studying hyperinflations, such as an understanding of the forces which link monetary and fiscal policies to inflation, and policy makers'role in influencing individuals'expectations.     

金融市场有效性联立检验的再检验

在理性预期假定下,基于证券历史价格和收益信息,不能预测证券的未来价格,即市场是弱有效的。对市场有效性检验无效可能是关于基本价格或者正常收益均衡模型设定有误所导致,借助C-CAPM与行为金融模型可以对"市场无效性"进行解释。研究表明,市场有效性假说仅为一个理想范式,无论从有效性的联立检验角度,还是从非理性投资与金融市场关系的角度,都无法对现实的金融市场是否有效做出明确的判断。     

Estimating the effects of forward guidance in rational expectations models

Simulations of forward guidance in rational expectations models should be assessed using the “modest policy interventions” framework introduced by Eric Leeper and Tao Zha. That is, the estimated effects of a policy intervention should be considered reliable only if that intervention is unlikely to trigger a revision in private sector beliefs about the way that monetary policy will be conducted. I show how to constrain simulations of forward guidance to ensure that they are regarded as modest policy interventions and illustrate the technique using a medium-scale DSGE model estimated on US data. I find that many experiments that generate the large responses of macroeconomic variables deemed implausible by many economists – the so-called “forward guidance puzzle” – are not modest policy interventions. Those experiments should therefore be treated with caution, since they may prompt agents to believe that there has been a change in the monetary policy regime that is not accounted for within the model. More reliable results can be obtained by constraining the experiment to be a modest policy intervention. In the cases I study, the quantitative effects on macroeconomic variables are more plausible when this constraint is imposed.     

Costly information acquisition and the temporal resolution of uncertainty

This paper studies the choice of an individual who acquires information before choosing an action from a set of actions, whose consequences depend on the realization of a state of nature. Information processing can be costly, for example, due to limited attention. We show that the preference of the individual is completely characterized by a preference for early resolution of uncertainty, which becomes indifference when facing degenerate choices. When information acquisition is no longer part of the decision process, the individual is indifferent to the timing of resolution of uncertainty and she behaves according to the subjective learning model of Dillenberger et al. (2014).     

Contractual restrictions on insider trading: a welfare analysis

Summary. This paper analyzes the welfare effects of permitting firms to negotiate contractually the right to allow corporate insiders to trade shares in the firm on private information. A computational framework is employed to (i) analyze formally the effects of insider trading on managerial investment choice, the informational efficiency of stock prices, and the welfare of all investor types; and (ii) examine the effectiveness of various compensation schemes (such as stock and insider trading rights) to mitigate conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. I show that shareholders will typically choose not to grant insider trading rights to managers. This decision is socially optimal. Received: September 23, 2000; revised version: December 12, 2000     

高职学生理性核心能力素养培养的探讨——基于高职数学文化教育的视角

当前由一般竞争力到形成核心竞争力的培养过程中,存在着对核心能力素养培养认识的缺位,以及优化提升核心竞争力的能力不强等问题.核心能力素养是提升核心竞争力的要素,提高数学素养可培养学生理性思维的核心能力素养,而提高数学素养的有效途径是开展数学文化教育.     

THE ECONOMICS OF COUNTERTERRORISM: A SURVEY

We provide a review of theoretical and empirical contributions on the economic analysis of terrorism and counterterrorism. We argue that simple rational‐choice models of terrorist behavior – in the form of cost‐benefit models – already provide a well‐founded theoretical framework for the study of terrorism and counterterrorism. We also hint at their limitations which relate to the failure of accounting for the dynamics between terrorism and counterterrorism that may produce unintended second‐order effects as well as for the costs associated with counterterrorism and its international dimension. We reevaluate previously proposed counterterrorism strategies accordingly. Finally, in the light of our findings, we discuss interesting areas of future research.     

The influence of negative marketplace information on consumer attitudes toward a service establishment

Market information about service providers and retailers can significantly influence how customers view firms. Prior research indicates that the impact of such information (especially when it is counter to consumers’ initial views of a firm) is dependent upon the nature of the customers’ evaluations, as well as the nature of the information itself. The current study examines these issues in the context of attitudes toward, and negative reviews about, a service provider (a new restaurant chain). An experimental study partially supports prior research findings and suggests a new process using a validated measure distinguishing between hedonic and utilitarian dimensions of attitude. Implications of our results are provided for theory and practice.     

Rational inattention,multi-product firms and the neutrality of money

In a model where firms set prices under rational inattention we allow them to produce multiple goods. In addition to monetary shocks and firm-specific shocks, good-specific shocks affect firms, consistent with micro price data. When per-good expected losses in profits from inattention are held constant, monetary non-neutrality quickly vanishes as the number of goods per firm rises. This result is due to (1) economies of scope that arise naturally in the multi-product setting, where processing information is costly but using already internalized information is free, and (2) good-specific shocks.     

Linear Decentralized Control with Expectations

In this paper, we consider a decentralized discrete-time control model with expectations. There are as many decision-makers as scalar state (and control) variables, and each decision-maker forms an expectation on the impact that affects him/her. Using rational and naive expectations, we describe the stability conditions of the alternative expectations. Our results generalized earlier ones by Metzler and Lovell, from an inventory control model to an abstract model, and solve the problem of the generation of a feasible normal path presented by Kornai and Martos.