人力资源管理强度对科技企业知识型员工创新绩效的影响

基于控制理论和程序公平理论，从反馈寻求行为与程序公平感视角探索人力资源管理强度对科技企业知识型员工影响的“黑箱”机制。通过对475名科技企业知识型员工的样本数据进行层次回归分析，证实人力资源管理强度对员工创新绩效有显著正向影响，反馈寻求行为在人力资源管理强度对员工创新绩效影响中具有中介效应，程序公平感在反馈寻求行为对员工创新绩效影响中具有正向调节效应。结论有利于丰富人力资源管理强度对科技企业知识型员工创新绩效作用机制相关研究，可为提升科技企业知识型员工创新绩效提供启示。     

How do US investors perceive the risk of local political corruption? Evidence from acquisition announcement

This study examines the impact of local political corruption on investors’ evaluation of firms’ mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the US. Using the number of corruption convictions of government officials reported by the US Department of Justice, we find that acquirers in more corrupt court districts experience lower acquirer announcement returns, lower combined acquirer and target announcement returns, and are less likely to complete acquisitions. We further find that the relation between local political corruption and acquirer announcement returns is worsened when acquirers operate primarily in the headquarters state. Overall, the results suggest that local political corruption has an adverse impact on investors’ evaluation of a firm’s M&A profitability.     

知识距离、知识寻求与员工创新行为:有调节的中介模型

从知识共享接收者视角,探索不同类型人际关系中知识距离对员工创新行为的作用机制。研究表明,员工间较大的知识距离会抑制员工向同事的知识寻求进而抑制员工创新行为;员工与上级间较大的知识距离会抑制员工向上级的知识寻求继而抑制员工创新行为;同事信任在员工间知识距离与向同事知识寻求的行为关系中起负向调节作用,领导-成员交换在员工同上级的知识距离与向上级知识寻求的关系中起负向调节作用。     

Henry George: rebel with a cause

Henry George's Progress and Poverty (1879) was undoubtedly the most widely read book on economics in the nineteenth century. Its proposal for a ‘single tax’ on land rents inspired both socialists and liberal reformers in the closing decades of the nineteenth century but it was attacked and condemned by virtually all the leading economists of the day, principally on the ground that it was not possible even in principle to separate pure ground rent from profits on capital invested in land. The question whether land is a special factor of production, essentially different from labour and capital, turns out to be at the very heart of all the controversies surrounding the doctrines of Georgism; my view, like that of Marshall, is that land is indeed a unique factor of production.     

Human capital and wages in exporting firms

This paper studies the link between the education level of workers, export performance and wages. We argue that firms may escape intense competition in international markets by using high skilled workers to differentiate their products. This story is consistent with our empirical results. Using a very rich matched worker-firm longitudinal dataset, we find that there is a weak negative direct effect of exporting on wages, but an interaction term between export intensity and skill intensity has a positive impact on wages. That is, we find an export wage premium, but only in firms where the skill intensity is sufficiently high.     

Executive pensions,disclosure quality,and rent extraction

We argue that vague disclosure of supplemental executive retirement plans (SERPs) may impede effective shareholder monitoring over this compensation form. Hence, CEOs with power over the board may view SERP benefits as an attractive mechanism to increase their own pay, thereby extracting rents. Our results provide empirical support of the hypothesis. Many of the variables proxying for CEO power are significant in explaining the incidence and magnitude of CEO SERP benefits. In contrast, we find little association between CEO power and cash pay, a well disclosed and monitored compensation form. The results indicate that rent extraction depends on the quality of compensation disclosure.     

Corruption and industrial dualism in less developed countries

This paper provides an explanation for the observation that developing countries tend to have a higher degree of dualism in the size distribution of firms and a relatively smaller proportion of large firms than do developed countries. This paper builds a model where large 'formal' firms attract rent seeking activities from the government while small firms do not. In the model, there exists a 'competitive fringe' of small firms and a formal market consisting of Cournot competitors. The number of formal firms is made endogenous and is a function of the degree to which the government can extract rents. This ability to extract rents is itself posited as a function of the degree of corruption in a country's government. Thus, it is the high degree of corruption in developing country governments that contributes to the dual nature of their industrial structure. The model predicts that the higher the degree of corruption, the fewer (and larger) are the formal firms, the lower is social welfare and the greater is dead-weight loss, and the higher are government rents. An examination of the size distribution of 16 countries and their degree of corruption shows that the degree of corruption is a good predictor of the percentage of large firms in an economy.     

Is Talk Cheap?

For the steel import quota bill of 1999, each word in the Congressional Record costs $39 in campaign contributions from the steel industry. Consequently, our answer is "Yes, talk is cheap!"     

建立健全保障性住房规划建设管理体制研究——基于廉租房的视角

结合当前扩大内需,增加保障性住房财政投入的宏观背景,基于完善廉租房制度的视角,首先分析了廉租房制度运行中存在的主要矛盾与问题,进而提出了完善廉租房规划建设管理的实施路径及其框架,主要从土地供应、融资机制、法律法规建设、组织管理体系的架构、信息化管理、制度创新、退出机制等方面展开讨论,以其为城市政府提高廉租房制度的运作绩效提供可操作性的实施建议。     

寻租理论的新发展

寻租理论把租金的范围定义在政治领域。政府拥有某些政治特权,可以创造和保护租金,从而增加人们的决策选择。出于利益最大化的考虑,人们会选择＂寻租＂方式来增加收益。正是由于＂寻租＂,遏制了市场经济发挥作用。同时,寻租活动也浪费了本应用于从事生产性活动的资源。在上述思想的指引下,寻租理论的发展出现两大分支：一是规范寻租理论,试图说明和估算寻租活动给经济带来的成本;二是实证寻租理论,试图解释社会中人为制造的租金来源。寻租被应用于很多研究领域,但是也许是由于寻租理论本身存有缺陷,或者其他原因,寻租理论在中国并没有很好地发展起来。