Squatting as a transition problem in South Africa

This paper applies principles of transition to land tenure and squatting in South Africa. Political transition in South Africa reassigned political property rights, which produced contestable, and rent‐seeking incentives for squatting as a means to privatize land and redistribute wealth. Government failure to establish and protect private property rights in a squatter camp resulted in common‐pool problems that resisted private and public resolution with consequent rent dissipation and social loss. In response to this retreat from duty, informal agents emerged to claim their own share of the prize. Without enforceable rules of capture, the growth of squatter camps in South Africa will continue. JEL classification: D7, H8, K1, K4, R1, R4.     

元代安徽地区的土地开发与利用

元代安徽地区的官田和民田多得到了有效开发与利用。官田主要用于充当职田、屯田、赐田、草场、牧地等,占有主体为封建国家。在官田中,屯田最发达,分布广,延续时间长,在全国具有重要地位。民田占有主体为官僚地主、一般富户地主、宗族地主、自耕农、民办学校、寺院等,呈现多元化特征。在民田中,族田、学田较发达,地域特色明显。在官、民田中,租佃制经营方式十分流行,地租形态以实物地租为主,也存在货币地租,但不普遍。     

International Rent Sharing and Domestic Labour Markets: A Macroeconomic Analysis

Compared to international trade relations relatively little is known about the role foreign direct investment linkages play in the transmission of disturbances from one country to the next. Inspired by the microevidence on profit sharing within multinational corporations and within industries, we investigate for six countries whether a cross-border rent-sharing phenomenon can be identified at the macroeconomic level. The rent-sharing hypothesis implies that an increase in foreign profitability should boost wages and/or employment in the domestic economy. We find corroborative evidence for Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. US labour market conditions, by contrast, are not affected by changes in profitability in other countries. JEL no. E32, F23, F40, J23, J31     

Determinants of residential water demand in Germany

We econometrically analyze the impact of several economic, environmental and social determinants for the per capita demand for water in about 600 water supply areas in Germany. Besides prices, income and household size, we consider the effects of population age, the share of wells, housing patterns, precipitation and temperature. We also explore why current per capita residential water consumption in the new federal states is about 30% lower than in the old federal states. Since average cost pricing may cause an endogeneity problem, we apply instrumental-variable procedures in addition to single equation ordinary least squares, but find no evidence that prices are endogenous. Our estimation results suggest that the price elasticity of water demand in Germany is around − 0.24. The income elasticity is positive, decreases with higher income levels and is at least three times higher in the new federal states than in the old federal states. Current differences in prices and income levels explain about one third of the gap in residential water use between the two regions. Household size and the share of wells have a negative impact on per capita water demand, and water use increases with age. Finally, the findings provide some evidence that rainfall patterns rather than total rainfall affect water consumption, while temperature appears to have no impact at all. All outcomes are robust to a log-log and two types of semi-log specifications for the water demand function.     

Explaining Real Commercial Rents Using an Error Correction Model with Panel Data

This paper presents rent models for retail and office property in the United Kingdom. Panel data are used covering eleven regions for 29 years, enabling us to overcome the limitations of a relatively short time series. We use an error correction model (ECM) framework to estimate long-run equilibrium relationships and short-term dynamic corrections. The combination of panel data and an ECM is an innovative approach that is still being developed in economics. We construct new supply series that combine infrequent stock data with more frequent construction data. Separate regional models are estimated for retail and office properties. The regions are then combined into a number of panels on the basis of the income and price elasticities in the long-run and short-run models. Unlike previous studies, we find no evidence of a board north–south divide between low growth and high growth regions. Like these studies we do find a London effect: in London, demand elasticities for space with respect to both price (rent) and income are much lower in magnitude. We conclude that, while the economic drivers may vary, there is no evidence of differences in the operation of the regional property markets outside London. Elasticities for retail and office are similar. Our final models are parsimonious with single measures of economic activity and of supply and always support the use of an ECM.     

Is Marx's absolute rent due to a monopoly price?

ABSTRACT

Absolute rent, in Marx's view, has an upper limit represented by the difference between the value and the price of production of agricultural commodities. The relevance of this limit was questioned by Bortkiewicz because of the difficulties concerning the argument which Marx based it on. The lack of this upper limit prompted some scholars to claim that there is no difference between absolute rent and a rent paid by a monopoly price. Referring to the classical/Marxian theory of monopoly price, we shall argue that it is still possible to distinguish absolute rent from a rent due to a monopoly price.     

Residential Asking Rents and Time on the Market

Landlords offering a house in the rental market face a difficult strategic pricing decision. The revenue maximizing decision for the landlord involves a tradeoff between the rental rate and time on the market. Because the turnover of renters is higher than owners, and because the landlord must bear some carrying costs on a vacant house, pricing the rent too high may decrease revenue due to a higher vacancy period and pricing it too low may reduce the revenue when occupied. While there is substantial research on the relationship between listed prices and time on the market for freehold interests, this is the first study to provide empirical evidence on the relationship between asking rent, contract rent and time on the market for single family residential rental (leasehold) property interests. We present two models; a rental price model and a duration model for time-on-the market. Using data from the Dallas–Fort Worth area we find that landlords who set a lower asking rent relative to predicted rent can expect a shorter marketing period for their properties. The results also indicate that overpricing the asking rent and then lowering it at a later date leads to a longer marketing time (after the reset) and often a lower rent. These finding are reasonably robust for low-, mid-, and higher-valued rental properties.

Job protection,housing market regulation,and the youth

Young Europeans experience high unemployment rates, job instability, and late emancipation. Meanwhile, they do not support reforms weakening protection on long‐term contracts. In this paper, we suggest a possible rationale for such reform distaste. When the rental market is strongly regulated, landlords screen applicants with regard to their ability to pay the rent. Protecting regular jobs offers a second‐best technology to sort workers, thereby increasing the rental market size. We provide a model where nonemployed workers demand protected jobs despite unemployment and the share of short‐term jobs increases, whereas the individual risk of dismissal is unaffected. Our theory can be extended to alternative risks and markets involving correlated risks and commitment under imperfect information.     

银行业为何是大赢家?——一个基于竞赛理论的分析

文章以竞赛理论为视角,分析当前我国银行业整体业绩表现突出的原因。得出如下结论:银行业垄断、存贷高利差、信息优势以及货币产品经营者等先天优势促成了我国银行业大赢家的局面。这一局面会激励各行业之间展开银行牌照竞赛,产生租金耗散,影响实体经济。文章对此进行分析,并得出结论与政策建议。     

效率、公平、社会稳定与住房问题——基于世代模型的政治经济学分析

土地和住房是劳动者历史共同体的公共物品。社会是否能够按照效率与公平的原则解决住房问题,其本质是社会是否能够解决劳动者现实具体利益与历史一般利益的矛盾,即个体理性与国家理性的矛盾。公共权力通过经济制度对租金的抽取和使用是解决住房问题的基本途径,不同制度模式具有等价性。在社会稳定的约束条件下,公共权力对租金的抽取和使用并不必然保证住房问题的解决符合效率与公平的原则,为此社会还需要具备公共权力良好的政治性质、法律约束力以及劳动者对国家理性道德自觉的条件。