企业融资交易的契约安排：一个交易费用经济学的分析框架

交易费用经济学理论将股权契约和债权契约视为对融资交易不同的契约治理结构。债权契约具有古典契约的特征,是一种按规则运作的契约治理结构;股权契约具有弹性治理的特征,是一种关系型契约治理结构。依据交易费用经济学理论关于交易与契约匹配的一般机理,可以得出融资交易的契约安排机理:低资产专用性融资交易选择债权契约,高资产专用性融资交易选择股权契约,中等资产专用性融资交易选择混合性融资契约,这既可达到交易费用的最小化,又可实现交易效率的最大化。究竟哪类契约在现实融资契约安排中占主导地位,这取决于融资交易包含的资产专用性大小。     

林业物权制度解析

林业物权是权利人对森林、林木、林地等森林资源享有的直接支配和排他的权利,包括森林、林木、林地所有权,以及与森林、林木、林地有关的用益物权和担保物权。《物权法》、《农村土地承包法》和《森林法》是构建我国林业物权制度体系的主要法律依据。     

我国经济转型期间的劳动力市场分割:从所有制分割到行业分割

本文对我国改革开放以来劳动用工单位的劳动力市场分割进行了全面分析.主要观点为:(1)实证分析显示我国劳动力市场中存在所有制分割与行业分割.(2)上世纪90年代中期,劳动力市场中所有制分割向行业分割演化.(3)劳动力市场分割的演化,是经济转轨过程中的特有现象,也是我国经济改革不断深化,市场力量日趋强大的过程.     

股权激励与代理成本

传统以管理费用率作为代理成本的替代不能恰当地反映管理者在职消费和职务侵占的真实水平,本文用经过Jones模型纠正的费用率作为代理成本的替代,考察了所有权性质、总经理持股与否及持股比例对代理成本的影响。本文提供了私有制下总经理适当持股有利于降低代理成本的可靠证据,为中国上市公司即将展开的股权激励计划提供证据的支持。     

投资现金流敏感性研究述评

大量的经验文献支持了流动性假说,认为内部现金流是影响公司投资的一个重要因素。文中基于信息不对称下的融资约束理论与自由现金流的代理成本假说,回顾了关于投资现金流敏感性存在及其根源的国内外相关研究成果,梳理了该领域的研究脉络,并对主要结论进行了总结与评论。对文献研究发现,大多数研究均证实了投资与现金流之间具有较强的敏感性,但挖掘这种敏感性的根源却尚未达成一致的结论。尤其随着股权结构的引入,考虑到管理层内部持股的激励与堑壕效应、股权集中下控股股东的监督与侵占效应,该领域的研究纷繁复杂。但基于股权结构的研究是揭示这种敏感性的根源、探索非效率投资治理机制的有效途径。     

Quantiles, expectiles and splines

A time-varying quantile can be fitted by formulating a time series model for the corresponding population quantile and iteratively applying a suitably modified state space signal extraction algorithm. It is shown that such quantiles satisfy the defining property of fixed quantiles in having the appropriate number of observations above and below. Like quantiles, time-varying expectiles can be estimated by a state space signal extraction algorithm and they satisfy properties that generalize the moment conditions associated with fixed expectiles. Because the state space form can handle irregularly spaced observations, the proposed algorithms can be adapted to provide a viable means of computing spline-based non-parametric quantile and expectile regressions.     

机构投资者持股、治理环境与审计意见购买

以2003—2018年A股上市公司为样本的分析表明,机构投资者持股能显著抑制基于签字审计师变更的审计意见购买行为。这种抑制作用的发挥需要依赖良好的内外部治理环境,因机构投资者类型而存在显著差异,但不因机构投资者稳定性或专注性而发生显著变动。此外,在控制持股比例后,机构投资者数量的抑制作用不再显著。上述结果为机构投资者治理成效提供了积极证据,也为相关部门更好地培育中长期投资者、提高上市公司质量提供了借鉴。     

The Effects of Public Ownership and Regulatory Independence on Regulatory Outcomes

We examine the effects of public ownership and regulatory agency independence on regulatory outcomes in EU telecommunications. Specifically, we study regulated interconnect rates paid by entrants to incumbents. We find that public ownership of the incumbent positively affects these interconnect rates, and suggest that governments influence regulatory outcomes in favor of incumbents in which they are substantially invested. However, we also find that the presence of institutional features enhancing regulatory independence from the government mitigates this effect. In order to study regulatory independence, we introduce a new cross-country time-series database—the European Union Regulatory Institutions (EURI) Database. This database describes the development of institutions bearing on regulatory independence and quality in telecommunications in the 15 founding EU member states from 1997 to 2003 *We thank Laurent Pipitone for superb research assistance. Geoff Edwards thanks the Sasakawa Foundation and the Institute of Management, Innovation and Organization at the Haas School of Business for generous financial assistance, and London Business School for non-financial support. Leonard Waverman thanks the Global Communications Consortium for support     

关系在中国的文化内涵：管理学者的视角

关系及其作用被认为是在中国从事商业活动的一个基础性变量,也被认为是中国文化主导下的企业从事商业活动的一个重要特点。虽然国内外已经积累了不少研究关系的文献,但是关系与中国文化之间联系的线索还不清晰——我们并不确定二者是如何联系起来的。依照狭义的文化概念和中国文化的核心特质,本文试图以管理学者的视角探讨这一问题,从关系状态、关系行为、关系规范和关系导向等几个方面寻找“关系”在中国的文化内涵,为管理学者更深人地探讨关系的商业功能打一个基础。本文的主要结论如下：在文化构成的三个层次中,关系状态和关系行为是人际关系的现象文化,以个性化和多样化的方式展现着中国文化的丰富性;关系导向和关系规范则体现着中国文化对人际关系的基本假设和显性价值观,具有更深刻的文化内涵和更重要的文化基因,决定着中国人际关系的共性。     

Ownership, institutions, and capital structure: Evidence from China

We employ a unique data set to explore the role of ownership structure and institutional development in debt financing of non-publicly traded Chinese firms. We show that state ownership is positively associated with leverage and firms’ access to long-term debt, while foreign ownership is negatively associated with all measures of leverage. Surprisingly, firms in better developed regions are associated with reduced access to long-term debt, suggesting the availability of alternative financing channels and the tightening of the lending standards under the on-going banking reform. The combination of ownership structures and institutions explains up to 6% of the total variation in firms’ leverage decisions, while firm characteristics alone explain no more than 8% of the variation. Further, we show that non-state-owned firms tend to have lower total and short-term debt than their state-owned counterparts in less developed regions. Finally, we show that state-owned firms’ easy access to long-term debt is positively associated with long-term investment and negatively associated with firm performance.