解决广东区域发展不平衡问题需要顺势而为

文章基于对多年统计数据的分析,指出了资源、环境因素在区域发展中的重要作用。强调解决区域发展不平衡问题,首先要认真分析区域环境承载力,并在此基础上制定促进人口合理流动的大政方针。     

A simple axiomatization and constructive representation proof for choquet expected utility

>P>Summary. We provide a set of simple and intuitive set of axioms that allow for a direct and constructive proof of the Choquet Expected Utility representation for decision making under uncertainty. Received: October 29, 2002; revised version: November 13, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We thank Matthew Ryan for very useful comments and suggestions on related work and for encouraging us to write this note. Correspondence to: S. Grant     

Coalition-proof supply function equilibria under capacity constraints

Whereas in the absence of capacity constraints the Cournot outcome is the unique coalition-proof supply function equilibrium outcome, the presence of capacity constraints may enlarge the set of equilibrium outcomes. Interestingly, if capacities are sufficiently asymmetric the new equilibrium prices are below the Cournot price. These results have important implications for merger and privatization policies: specifically, capacity divestiture will not necessarily imply lower market prices.This article is based on the second chapter of my PhD dissertation. I benefited from the comments and suggestions of Diego Moreno and Bill Hogan. I thank three anonymous referees for helpful comments. Seminar audiences at Carlos III and Harvard are gratefully acknowledged. The author is currently a Repsol YPF fellow at the Harvard John F. Kennedy School of Government. I am grateful to the Repsol YPF-Harvard Fellowship Program for financial support.     

Forward induction and entry deterrence: an experiment

The Dixit (Econ J 90:95–106, 1980) hypothesis that incumbents use investment in capacity to deter potential entrants has found little empirical support. Bagwell and Ramey (J Econ 27:660–680, 1996) propose a model where, in the unique game-theoretic prediction based on forward induction or iterated elimination of weakly-dominated strategies, the incumbent does not have the strategic advantage. We conduct an experiment with games inspired by these models. In the Dixit-style game, the incumbent monopolizes the market most of the time even without the investment in capacity. In our Bagwell-and-Ramey-style game, the incumbent also tends to keep the market, in contrast to the predictions of an entrant advantage. Nevertheless, we find strong evidence that forward induction affects the behavior of most participants. The results of our games suggest that players perceive that the first mover has an advantage without having to pre-commit capacity. In our Bagwell–Ramey game, evolution and learning do not drive out this perception. We back these claims with data analysis and a theoretical framework for dynamics. Financial support by the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia and Tecnología (SEC2002-01352 and SEJ2006-11665-C02-01) and the Barcelona Economic Program of CREA and excellent research assistance by David Rodríguez are gratefully acknowledged. The authors thank Aurora García Gallego and Armin Schmutzler for helpful comments.     

Subjective ambiguity, expected utility and Choquet expected utility

Summary. Using the Savage set up, this paper provides a simple axiomatization of the Choquet Expected Utility model where the capacity is an inner measure. Two attractive features of the model are its specificity and the transparency of its axioms. The key axiom states that the decision-maker uses unambiguous acts to approximate ambiguous ones. In addition, the notion of ‘ambiguity’ is subjective and derived from preferences. Received: March 23, 2000; revised version: April 24, 2001     

Dissertation abstract: Essays on pricing in experimental duopoly markets

This dissertation comprises three independent essays that analyze pricing behavior in experimental duopoly markets. The first essay examines whether the content of buyer information and the timing of its dissemination affects seller market power. We construct laboratory markets with differentiated goods and costly buyer search in which sellers simultaneously post prices. The experiment varies the information on price or product characteristics that buyers learn under different timing assumptions (pre- and post-search), generating four information treatments. Theory predicts that price information lowers the equilibrium price, but information about product characteristics increases the equilibrium price. That is, contrary to simple intuition, presence of informed buyers may impart a negative externality on other uninformed buyers. The data support the model's negative externality result when sellers face a large number of robot buyers that are programmed to search optimally. Observed prices conform to the model's comparative statics and are broadly consistent with predicted levels. With human buyers, however, excessive search instigates increased price competition and sellers post prices that are significantly lower than predicted. The second essay uses experimental methods to demonstrate the anti-competitive potential of price-matching guarantees in both symmetric and asymmetric cost duopolies. When costs are symmetric, price-matching guarantees increase the posted prices to the collusive level. With asymmetric costs, guaranteed prices remain high relative to prices without the use of guarantees, but the overall ability of guarantees to act as a collusion facilitating device depends on the relative cost difference. Fewer guarantees, combined with lower average prices, suggest that cost asymmetries may discourage collusion. The third essay investigates the effect of firm size asymmetry on the emergence of price leadership in a homogeneous good duopoly. With discounting, the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium predicts that the large firm will emerge as the endogenous price leader. Independent of the level of size asymmetry, the laboratory data indicates that price leadership by the large firm is one of the most frequently observed timings of price announcement. In most cases, however, it comes second to simultaneous price-setting. This tendency to wait for the other firm to announce its price is especially strong when the level of size asymmetry between firms is low. We attribute the lower than expected frequency of price leadership to coordination failure, which is further compounded by elements of inequity aversion. JEL Classification C91, D43, D83, L11 Dissertation Committee: Timothy Cason (Chair), Department of Economics, Purdue University Dan Kovenock, Department of Economics, Purdue University Stephen Martin, Department of Economics, Purdue University Marco Casari, Department of Economics, Purdue University     

客运专线通过能力研究

分析了客运专线通过能力计算与既有铁路的不同之处,探讨了客运专线客流区段长度与通过能力之间的关系;重新选定了扣除标准列车,分析计算了中速列车和高速停站列车相对于高速直达列车平均扣除系数的变化趋势,以及不同高速停站列车比例变化时,客流区段高速列车通过能力的变化趋势。     

郑焦城际铁路能力制约因素及对策研究

郑焦城际铁路是郑州城市群城际铁路网的重要组成部分,在郑州铁路枢纽内,利用京广线接轨引入郑州站,能力受到一定限制。基于郑焦城际铁路与京广线共线区间及郑州站的能力利用现状,分析郑焦城际铁路能力制约因素,提出提升郑焦城际铁路能力的普速旅客列车外迁和重新规划建设客站2种方案。分析各方案的枢纽分工和能力适应性,考虑工程投资和运输组织方案等因素,选定新建郑州北客站及客运环线方案,为城际铁路规划、建设及枢纽的合理分工提供借鉴。     

研发团队知识共享、知识重用与新产品开发绩效——吸收能力的倒U型调节作用

国有制造企业作为国际竞争中的重要力量,已成为国家重点关注对象。基于知识基础观和动态能力理论,通过对166名国有制造企业研发团队成员的调查研究,探究知识共享对新产品开发绩效影响过程中,知识重用的中介作用和吸收能力的调节作用。结果表明：知识共享和知识重用均正向影响新产品开发绩效;知识共享正向影响知识重用;知识重用完全中介知识共享与新产品开发绩效的关系;吸收能力对知识共享与知识重用的关系具有倒U型调节作用。     

“三农”承载力研究——以浙江嘉兴为例

将承载力概念应用到“三农”问题研究中,介绍了改革开放以来嘉兴“三农”在土地、劳动力、产品、资本和生态环境等资源要素方面作出的贡献,为进一步提升和增强嘉兴“三农”承载力,应该强化以工促农、以城带乡的政策,从政治、经济、文化、生态等多个层面创造性地开展综合系统工程,并辅之采取健全生态补偿机制、设立增加三农投入总量和比例机制、创建耕地休耕期机制和建立农业风险补偿机制等的配套政策支持,以推动“四化同步”更上新台阶,实现嘉兴整个经济社会的可持续发展。