Defying gravity: The determinants of China's outbound mergers and acquisitions

We find that the determinants of China's outbound M&As depart dramatically from the literature. First, China's M&A volume with a target country is not affected by geographic distance, currency appreciation, or stock market return. Second, Chinese acquirers pick an unconventional uphill battle by primarily targeting countries with greater cultural distance, stronger investor protection laws, and higher per capita income. We also document that China's outbound M&As have a higher than normal percentage of deals being partial acquisitions. We argue that emerging markets can differ remarkably from developed countries in the considerations and modes of outbound M&As.     

锌-锰干电池性能检测仪的设计

锌 -锰干电池性能检测仪是一种自动检测锌 -锰干电池放电容量的设备 ,它采用上、下位机结构 ,可同时检测多个电池。根据锌 -锰干电池恒阻放电的要求 ,避开传统的串入固定电阻的检测方法 ,采用实时采集电池的电压并控制其放电电流的方法来达到恒阻放电的目的。为了保证检测的公开、公正性 ,该测试仪为每个被检测电池建立了档案 ,且检测数据人为无法改变     

军民融合之“三制”体系框架研究

国家“十二五”规划将军民融合提升到国家战略层面，军民融合成功与否直接影响国防建设和经济建设。本文借鉴现代应急管理的“三制”（即体制、机制、法制）体系理论，首先从体制、机制、法制三个维度简要梳理我国军民融合现存的主要问题；在此基础上，通过吸收国外的成功经验，结合自身的国情军情，重点对军民融合管理体制、运行机制进行优化设计，针对性地提出相关建议和实施路径，并对现有法制法规的健全提供思路。全文通过系统性地分析“三制”体系框架，力求为军民融合的深入开展提供参考建议。     

Employee firing costs and accounting conservatism: Evidence from wrongful discharge laws

This paper identifies the causal effect of a firm's employee firing costs on its conditional conservatism, using the staggered adoption of US state wrongful discharge laws (WDLs) that increase a firm's cost of firing employees. We find that the adoption of WDLs leads to a significant increase in conditional conservatism. This result is greater for firms that are more labor-intensive, have higher propensities to fire employees, make more firm-specific investments and have greater risk. Overall, our findings support the view that higher firing costs lead to greater demand for conditional conservatism to decrease investment inefficiencies because higher firing costs make inefficient investments (including overinvestment in negative-net present value (NPV) projects and delays in disinvesting poorly performing projects) costlier for the firm.     

International takeover laws and corporate cash holdings

We examine the impact on corporate cash holdings of international merger and acquisition (M&A) laws, which facilitate corporate takeovers. We use the staggered enactment of M&A laws from 1992 to 2005 and a sample spanning 34 jurisdictions, and find that levels of corporate cash holdings increase after passage of M&A laws. We also find that firms with better operating performance, higher earnings volatility, higher P/E ratio, and in jurisdictions with high M&A intensity hoard more cash after the enactment of M&A laws. These firms decrease dividends and capital expenditure and increase cash-based acquisitions in the post-M&A law period. Additional analysis shows that the effect is manifested in the subsample of firms in jurisdictions with better institutional environments. Lastly, we find that investor valuations of cash holdings decrease after the enactment of M&A laws. Collectively, our results suggest that managers hoard cash to finance M&A activities after the enactment of M&A laws, driven by the motive of empire-building, and that cash hoarding behaviors are viewed by investors as value-decreasing.     

高校科技成果产业化的制约因素、内在规律与实践研究

高校是中国科技创新的重要力量，科技成果产业化是科研与产业的核心纽带，具有支撑经济发展和反哺科研的双重意义，但这是一个科技向经济转化的复杂过程，是投资、时间、风险等经济要素的最优解。文章从中国改革开放后科技和产业的发展历程出发，分析了成果产业化的演进过程，提炼了制约成果产业化的表层及深层次因素，阐明了高校科技成果产业化的内涵定义与内在规律，结合实践开展了探讨，提出了促进科技成果产业化的对策与建议。     

Shareholder litigation and toxic releases

We examine the environmental impact of the staggered adoption of universal demand laws by 23 U.S. states between 1989 and 2005. Universal demand laws impede derivative lawsuits and thus undermine shareholder oversight of corporate environmental performance. We find that weakened litigation rights for shareholders are positively associated with the release of toxic chemicals by firms. The effect is stronger for firms with weak governance, and environmental mismanagement by firms after the passage of the laws lead to poorer financial performance. Overall, our findings imply that derivative lawsuits by shareholders are not frivolous, as is often asserted. Rather, they act as an effective mechanism of corporate governance.