‘An Examination of the Ethical Commitment of Professional Accountants to Auditor Independence’

This research explores the relationship between work context and professional ethics. Specifically, we analyze through an online survey of professional accountants the degree to which changing work conditions have altered individual accountants’ commitment to the core professional value of auditor independence. We argue that certain changes in the condition of work have made some categories of accountants more susceptible to the logic of commercialism rather than the logic of professionalism. We find general support for this argument. We observe that accountants working outside of public accounting have a higher commitment to independence than do accountants working in the context of public accounting firms. We further observe that accountants in large international accounting firms (i.e. the “Big Four”) report lower commitment to auditor independence than do others in public accounting. And we observe that older accountants report stronger commitment to auditor independence. One finding, however, contradicts our general thesis. We find that commitment to one’s client does not necessarily result in a loss of commitment to the core professional value of independence. We conclude that changes in the context of work have contributed to the demise of ethics among professional accountants and suggest that further research be done to elaborate the relationship between client commitment and independence commitment.     

Auditors' Fee Premiums and Low‐Quality Internal Controls*

We examine the relation between low‐quality internal controls and audit fee premiums. Using a novel data set of audit hours and audit fees we find, consistent with the audit risk model, that auditors increase their effort (hours) owing to low internal control quality. We find that auditors also charge a significant fee premium to clients with internal control weaknesses. This premium is observed for severe internal control weaknesses and companies with low‐quality alternative governance mechanisms. The results are robust to multiple methods to address endogeneity, including company fixed effects, difference‐in‐differences design, and a propensity score‐matched sample. Taken as a whole, low internal control quality leads to fee premiums, which are a deadweight loss to client companies.     

Precision in auditing standards: effects on auditor and director liability and the supply and demand for audit services

Theoretical research suggests that large auditors have more incentive to issue accurate reports compared to small auditors (DeAngelo, 1981; Dye, 1993). Controlling for the client characteristics of large and small auditors, this paper shows that large auditors issue reports that are more accurate and more informative signals of financial distress. These findings are consistent with the theoretical prediction of a positive relationship between auditor size and auditor accuracy.     

Big Six auditors and audit quality: The Korean evidence

This study investigates the association between discretionary accruals and Big Six and non-Big Six auditors, and the direction of auditor change. We hypothesize that there is no significant difference in discretionary accruals between Big Six and non-Big Six clients when there is low incentive for auditors to provide high-quality audits, as in Korea.Upon examination of the discretionary accruals of firms listed on the Korean Stock Exchange from 1994 to 1998, we find there is no significant difference between the discretionary accruals of firms with Big Six and non-Big Six auditors. This holds true for firms that switch from non-Big Six to Big Six auditors and vice versa. These resources imply that there may be no difference in audit quality between Big Six and non-Big Six auditors in Korea. This is consistent with other studies in Korea, while inconsistent with the findings of previous studies on audit quality in other countries.     

The impact of MAS on perceived auditor independence-some evidence from Denmark

The Enron case has highlighted that the provision of management advisory services (MAS) can endanger auditor independence. Recently, a number of changes have not only been made to the relevant international and US regulations, but also to the Danish regulations in this area. Theoretical research explains the emergence of non-independence and demonstrates that the provision of MAS can decrease independence. According to the economic model of DeAngelo, the existence of client-specific quasi-rents impairs auditor independence. The provision of MAS increases quasi-rents and thus, is a threat to independence. Antle used an agency theoretical approach. Information asymmetries between auditor and client could lead to a moral hazard risk, i.e. the auditor could give up independence from client's management and accept payments for withholding detected errors and irregularities. The client's management could also use MAS to legally compensate the auditor for giving away independence.A large number of empirical studies have investigated the influence of MAS on the perceived independence of the auditor. Most of these studies were performed in English speaking countries and the majority found a negative impact. Sociological research reveals cultural differences between English speaking and Nordic countries, e.g. concerning the dimension ‘masculinity’. Thus, an empirical investigation of the impact of MAS on perceived auditor independence in Denmark is promising. It was found that shareholders, bank loan officers and journalists perceive a negative effect on auditor independence if MAS are provided. The recent liberalization in Denmark is inconsistent with this finding. Furthermore, it was shown that the type of MAS influences the degree to which auditor independence is perceived to be impaired. Thus, independence rules related to MAS should be differentiated. Additionally, the study ascertained that perceived auditor independence does not increase if MAS are provided by a separate department of the audit firm. An internal separation of the auditing and the consulting function within the same audit firm is not viewed as being beneficial in Denmark.     

审计师声誉与银行信贷资源配置——基于银行信用借款决策的经验证据

本文以2001至2006年沪深A股上市公司为样本,从银行信用借款决策的视角,研究了审计师声誉对银行信贷资源配置的影响。研究发现,聘请高声誉审计师的上市公司更可能获得银行信用借款(即存在门槛效应)且信用借款的比例更高(即存在约束效应);在区分产权性质后发现,国有控股公司中审计师声誉机制主要体现为约束效应,其原因在于政治关系是一种更可靠的替代机制;非国有控股公司中仅存在审计师声誉机制的门槛效应,主要归因于我国司法体系不健全,银行将寻求其他更可靠的替代机制。研究结果表明审计师声誉是一种有效的资源配置机制,但其有效性受制度环境的制约。     

Improvements onthe Earnings Forecast Model——Based on Correlation between Financial Ratio, Auditor Opinion and Future Earnings

This paper aims to find evidence for the improvements on the present earnings forecast models through analyzing the correlation among financial ratios, auditor opinion of listed companies and their future earnings. This paper uses two statistical regression methods including Logistic model and Linear model to examine the inner interaction between financial ratios and future earnings from qualitative and quantitative perspectives respectively. Empirical tests find that financial ratios, especially ROE, can help to predict future earnings. Then we add auditor opinion variable into Logistic model to test whether going concern opinion in the auditor reports can be helpful for earnings forecast. Result shows the degree of optimistic statement of going concern opinion is significantly correlated with future earnings but with the disturbance of earnings management.     

审计师变更、时机选择与投资者评价

文章从投资者评价的角度对我国证券市场中审计师变更事件的经济后果进行考察。研究发现,在我国证券审计市场中,审计师变更事件具有显著为正的市场反应;市场总体正的累计超额回报主要是由晚变更样本的公告信息引起,晚变更公司在变更公告日附近的累计超额回报为正,并且显著大于早变更的公司;总体来看,审计师变更会显著降低公司的财务盈利可信度,并且在审计师变更以后,晚变更公司盈利可信度的下降程度显著大于早变更的公司。     

公司治理对上市公司审计师变更影响的实证分析

对审计师变更原因以及公司治理对审计师变更影响的国内外研究文献进行了梳理。以我国沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,综合运用统计检验和Logistic分析方法,实证检验了公司治理评价体系的6个维度、15个指标对上市公司审计师变更的影响。结果表明:公司治理对审计师变更的影响显著;其中,第一大股东持股比例、独立董事比例、董事会会议次数与审计师变更显著负相关,是否发生诉讼仲裁事项、信息披露是否充分与审计师变更显著正相关。     

盈余管理、关联交易与审计师特征

上市公司利用关联交易进行盈余管理必须得到会计师事务所的"配合"才有可能顺利实施,而与之"配合"的审计师因承担更高的审计风险,必以收取更高的审计费用作为补偿.实证研究表明,关联交易是上市公司盈余管理的重要手段,上市公司关联交易量越大,会计师事务所的品牌、规模越有利于抑制公司盈余管理行为,审计任期过长不利于抑制公司盈余管理行为.上市公司关联交易量越大,就越倾向于选择非国际"四大"和国内非"十大"会计师事务所,即小规模会计师事务所是上市公司的选择目标,因盈余管理进行关联交易的上市公司支付了更高水平的审计费用.