财产保险公司资产负债管理多维量化评估体系研究

良好的资产负债管理是保险业可持续发展的基石,也是支持保险业在日益复杂的风险环境中保持稳健发展、防范系统性风险的重要保障。近年来,随着我国金融市场发展,业务产品创新加快,保险业在资产端与负债端的业务结构和风险特征出现了新情况、新变化。特别是部分保险公司缺乏有效的治理结构,采取激进经营、激进投资的策略,导致业务快进快出、风险敞口过大以及流动性问题,对保险公司资产负债匹配管理、风险控制提出了挑战。本文介绍了财产保险公司资产负债多维度量化评估规则设计原理、主要评估模型和评估方法,针对财产保险公司的负债特性提出的沉淀资金匹配,在成本收益匹配中有机地将资产投资收益与承保业务综合成本进行匹配,在现金流匹配模式中打破了僵化的匹配模式,解决了长期困扰财产保险公司的资产负债期限不匹配的问题,对财产保险公司资产负债管理具有重要意义。     

中外所得税会计准则比较

所得税会计诞生于西方的会计学领域,并经长期研究和实践已发展得较为成熟.而我国所得税会计则还处于起步发展阶段.本文通过对IAS 12、SFAS 109,FRS 16和19与我国相关制度的比较,介绍了所得税会计准则的国际动态和我国的现状,为我国所得税会计准则的制定提供指导.     

论注册会计师责任保险制度

注册会计师责任保险对于提高会计师事务所的风险抵御能力和保护投资者利益两方面都具有重要意义.在我国,注册会计师责任保险尚处于起步阶段,无论是需求还是供给都存在不足.但随着我国虚假陈述民事诉讼制度的不断完善,注册会计师的法律诉讼风险将大大提高.为了降低事务所的执业风险、保护受到虚假陈述侵害的投资者利益,我国应当借鉴其他国家和地区的经验,完善我国的注册会计师责任保险制度,并建立相关的配套措施,促进注册会计师责任保险制度的发展.     

资产评估法律责任的法律法规分析

我国资产评估行业经过十几年的迅速发展，已经成为与注册会计师和律师并列的三大中介服务行业之一，是我国市场经济体系的重要组成部分。然而，近几年证券市场上公开披露的重大违规案例，很多都直接或间接与资产评估有关，尤其“麦科特”公司虚假上市案，资产评估“诉讼爆炸”时代即将来临，资产评估法律责任引起广泛关注。本从资产评估法律责任的相关法律法规的比较入手，找出了其存在的问题，并进行了理论分析。     

Disclosure of Private Information and Reduction of Uncertainty: Environmental Liabilities in the Chemical Industry

We investigate the potential uncertainty-reducing role of accounting information in the context of contingent Superfund liability valuation. We first develop theoretical arguments for the way reduction of uncertainty regarding these contingent liabilities is expected to affect security prices. Empirical proxies are developed for two types of uncertainty surrounding contingent Superfund liabilities: site uncertainty and allocation uncertainty. In a valuation framework, we then investigate whether financial statement disclosures and accruals reduce uncertainty and thereby affect security valuation. Specifically, we analyze the interaction of private information contained in firm disclosures and accruals with inherent uncertainty surrounding contingent Superfund liabilities. Results suggest that in a regulatory environment allowing substantial reporting discretion, firm-provided financial statement information affects valuation of contingent Superfund liabilities by reducing uncertainty. Further, we find that information revealed through accruals versus disclosures is differentially effective at reducing site and allocation uncertainty.     

Financial crisis,GDP variation and earnings management in Europe

The purpose of this study is to examine the consequences of the financial crisis on the European companies’ in conjunction with earnings management practice. It focuses on financially distressed companies that audited by a big 4 auditor during recession years. The study makes use of discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management and studies the influence of big 4 auditor, in order to shed more light on possible causes for shifting earnings. The findings of the study provide evidence that financially distressed companies that audited by a big 4 auditor exhibit lower discretionary accruals. The results reveal that Greek and Spanish companies reduce earnings management manipulation during recession. In contrast, Portuguese, Irish and Italian companies show mixed results. They tend to reduce earnings management practices, but there are reasons that influence managers’ behavior to increase earnings management. The findings of this study can be useful for both investors and standard setting authorities.     

论我国实行强制性环境责任保险制度的可行性——以环境责任保险制度的发展演进为视角

近年来,我国经济的高速发展带来了大量的社会问题,日益严重的环境污染问题就是其中之一。为了治理环境污染,提高污染企业的环境保护意识,我国于20世纪90年代初开始试行环境责任保险,经历了从任意性责任保险到强制性责任保险的发展历程,发展思路和模式也逐渐清晰,当前已经具备构建强制性环境责任保险制度的基本条件。实行强制性环境责任保险与企业社会责任理念相契合,投保环境责任保险是企业承担社会责任的方式之一。近年来我国政府相继出台了一系列推进强制性环境责任保险制度发展的规定,为制度构建奠定了政策基础。2014年4月24日新修订的《环境保护法》第52条明确规定国家鼓励投保环境强制责任保险,为制度构建提供了法律依据。我国在船舶油污损害强制责任保险和交强险方面的立法和实践可以为制度构建提供参考,同时在保险模式选择上可以借鉴西方国家成熟的环境责任保险制度。     

Can Agents Be Better Off with Pay Caps?

A popular way to discipline the managers of companies or banks that got into trouble during the recent financial crisis has been to impose caps on managers' pay. Using a small extension of the standard principal–agent model, we argue that pay caps might serve the opposite purpose, because the agent might be better off with a pay cap. Specifically, we show that, given a fixed effort level to be implemented, the agent's expected utility can be decreasing in an upper bound for the agent's reward. The effect of pay caps on the general structure of optimal incentive contracts is also characterized. While an improvement of contracting information always helps the principal, it might increase or decrease the marginal cost of imposing pay caps.     

Precision and Manipulation of Non-financial Information: The Curious Case of Environmental Liability

This paper develops a model showing how the environmental liability regime and the precision of the disclosed environmental performance indicator affect managers’ incentives (1) to reduce actual pollution and (2) to manipulate the reported pollution. I assume a company with a separation of ownership and control which can be held liable for environmental damages and distinguish between a negligence regime and strict liability. The results suggest that if there is no manipulation but only a lack of precision of the disclosed environmental performance indicator, a negligence rule induces lower actual pollution levels than strict liability even though a negligence rule is considered to be more lenient. If managers are able to manipulate the disclosed environmental performance indicator, they will do so and actual pollution levels will generally increase. While manipulation makes it easier for shareholders to escape liability under a negligence regime, shareholders suffer from manipulation under strict liability due to higher actual pollution and higher expected damage compensation payments. Therefore, the manipulation level is higher under a negligence regime. My analysis contributes to the environmental performance and disclosure literature by showing that the liability regime is an important determinant affecting environmental reporting and actual pollution decisions.     

Auditors' Responses to Workload Imbalance and the Impact on Audit Quality*

Using detailed data for fieldwork hours and audit hours by rank from audit engagements in Korea, we examine whether audits conducted under workload imbalance, proxied by busy‐season audits, impair audit quality, and how auditors adjust staff assignments for busy‐season audits. We generally find that busy‐season audits are associated with lower audit quality, and that audit firms reduce the involvement of senior auditors during busy‐season audits. In addition, the greater the involvement of senior auditors and junior auditors, the lesser the deterioration in audit quality. Finally, although there is no increase in interim audits in response to workload imbalance during busy seasons, increasing interim audits can mitigate the negative impact of busy‐season audits on audit quality. Our results are relevant to auditors and regulators, who have expressed concerns about the adverse effects of workload imbalance on audit quality.