存款保险法律制度利弊之研究

存款保险法律制度是直接针对银行挤兑和破产倒闭而设计的,目的在于保护存款人的利益,增强公众对银行体系的信心,减少挤兑的可能性。我国建立该制度,将有利于维护金融安全,营造公平竞争的市场环境,完善银行的退出机制,从而提高金融业的效率。     

利差演进、利差层次与我国利差结构分析

本文从金融学视角揭示了商业银行存贷款利差、中央银行与商业银行利差和国内与国际金融市场利差三个层次,并指出利差三个层次构成了有机的统一体.作者对建国以来历次利率调整进行了综合系统分析,勾画出我国利差变化的轨迹,得出以下基本结论:中国人民银行对利差管理从无序逐步过渡到有序,利差体系从扭曲逐步得到矫正,在金融管制环境下实现了利率总体水平的国际化"磨合".存在的主要问题是:存贷款利差考虑商业银行收益因素较多,兼顾国际化竞争不足;邮政储蓄转存利差在体现政策性的同时负效应越来越大;再贷款利差调整频繁和扩张太快,透视出金融宏观调控手段相对单一.     

房地产融资渠道分析

由于国家银根收缩，房地产融资难度增大，加上中国房地产金融体系尚未完善，融资渠道狭窄，在一定程度上限制了我国房地产业的发展。房地产业需要新的融资渠道，如信托、基金、债券等取代传统的银行贷款融资模式。针对新的市场现状，各房地产企业必须加强资本运作能力，扩大融资渠道，创新金融产品。     

Optimal Dynamic Capital Requirements

We characterize welfare maximizing capital requirement policies in a quantitative macrobanking model with household, firm, and bank defaults calibrated to Euro Area data. We optimize on the level of the capital requirements applied to each loan class and their sensitivity to changes in default risk. We find that getting the level right (so that bank failure risk remains contained) is of foremost importance, while the optimal sensitivity to default risk is positive but typically smaller than under Basel internal ratings based (IRB) formulas. Starting from low levels, savers and borrowers benefit from higher capital requirements. At higher levels, only savers prefer tighter requirements.     

银保协作、风险自留与银行信用风险补偿——基于银保信贷系统的分析视角

在分析风险自留的内生逻辑基础上,进一步分析风险自留实现银行信用风险补偿的内在机理。研究表明：银保信贷系统通过对贷款企业个体风险与事先设定的平均代偿风险的匹配性甄别,实现对银行信用风险的分级补偿功能。针对银行超预期信用风险,先行实施银行风险拨备机制对银行平均代偿风险进行补偿,然后实施超额风险自留机制对超过平均代偿风险的银行超额风险部分再次进行补偿,超额风险自留补偿基金将由银行与担保机构依据各自的风险均衡配置阈值占比共同筹集,以此来实现银行信用风险分级补偿目标。并以此为依据,设计了银保信贷系统风险自留机制。     

Hot money in disaggregated capital flows

We explore the possible existence and behavior of hot money in six categories of disaggregated bilateral capital flows (equity inflows, equity outflows, bond inflows, bond outflows, banking credit inflows, and banking credit outflows) for 12 emerging markets vis-à-vis the US from 1995 to 2012 and provides several new findings. First, we identify the existence of hot money in all six categories above and conclude that both gross inflows and gross outflows can be the sources of hot money. Second, hot money in equity inflows (outflows) engages in positive (negative) feedback trading regarding local stock market returns. Third, some categories of hot money have a temporary influence on local stock market returns while the others have a permanent influence, supporting the explanations of both price pressures and information advantage. Finally, local stock market returns in half of our sample countries, which have tightened capital controls during the late 2000s global financial crisis (GFC), are more affected by hot money than in the other half. Our findings confirm several popular conjectures of hot money, and endorse the use of capital controls to limit financial vulnerability in the run-up to and during the GFC.     

Bank net interest margins,the yield curve,and the 2007–2009 financial crisis

Using quarterly call report data from 2000 to 2016, we reexamine the relationship between net interest margins (NIM) and the yield curve for more than 5,500 U.S. commercial banks. In the full sample, yield curve and RGDP growth have positive effects on NIM, while inflation and deposit‐to‐loan ratios (D/L) have negative effects. Splitting the sample around the 2007–2009 crisis, we show the impact of yield curve and RGDP growth on NIM increasing during the “recovery” (2009Q3 to 2016Q4), and inflation and D/L changing signs. Positive effects of yield curve on profits vary with bank size and change over time.     

Can Foreigners Improve the Profitability of Emerging Market Banks? Evidence from the Vietnamese Strategic Partner Program

Foreign ownership and foreign management are often assumed to improve the efficiency of emerging market banks. Our article examines this relationship for the Vietnamese strategic partner program, where foreign banks have been allowed to take minority stakes in local banks. We add to the existing literature by distinguishing between ownership by foreign strategic and non-strategic investors, and between foreign management sent by the strategic partner and independent foreign executives. We show that only the presence of independent foreign executives has a positive impact on banks. We interpret these results as the consequence of conflicts of interest and power struggles between local shareholders and the strategic partner, which prevent efficiency in enhancing technology transfer.     

腐败与金融包容性国际经验研究

金融包容性是指提高低成本的金融服务的广泛可得性。金融服务普及的深度和广度对国民经济的发展起到了至关重要的作用。而腐败会影响金融包容性,将贫困弱势群体排除在外,客观上形成金融排斥,加重小微企业贷款难、贷款贵等问题,降低金融服务实体经济的能力和质量。本文选取1995—2016年170个国家和地区建立非平衡面板数据模型,经过实证研究发现：腐败会显著降低金融服务的包容性,但会提高金融服务的可得性。并且腐败会通过提高银行贷款利率,增加贷款规模以及提高企业融资难度传导到金融包容性。此外,本文还进行了内生性检验,并按时间、经济发展速度、人口规模和地区划分进行异质性分析。本研究填补了腐败对金融包容性影响机制研究的空白,从而丰富了腐败对金融市场影响的研究,也为普惠金融的发展提供了重要补充。     

中小企业融资难的新解读

中小企业融资难问题已成为制约我国市场经济体制改革的重要因素。对主要发达国家经验的梳理,可以得到解决该问题的一般规律。基于我国中小企业发展的特点、金融系统结构失衡、政府职能错位三个方面的解读,可以发现我国中小企业融资难问题具有特殊性。本文提出的建议,包括构建"银政合作"模式,推进金融体制改革,创建中小型金融机构。