Regulatory ‘Balancing’ and the Efficiency of Green R&D

We identify and analyse several dynamic implications of setting environmental standards such as to balance marginal costs and benefits. The adoption of such a regulatory approach is shown to effect (i) the speed of improvement of abatement technologies; (ii) the direction (in a sense to be defined) of that improvement; (iii) its source and the distribution of the rents from it; and (iv) the rate of development of defensive (averting) technologies. Existing views are thoroughly synthesised in the context of a simple diagrammatic model, several new results are derived and at least one conventional wisdom questioned. The message of the analysis for legislators and regulators is that cost–benefit balancing should be done with care.     

Using clustering ensemble to identify banking business models

The business models of banks are often seen as the result of a variety of simultaneously determined managerial choices, such as those regarding the types of activities, funding sources, level of diversification, and size. Moreover, owing to the fuzziness of data and the possibility that some banks may combine features of different business models, the use of hard clustering methods has often led to poorly identified business models. In this paper we propose a framework to deal with these challenges based on an ensemble of three unsupervised clustering methods to identify banking business models: fuzzy c‐means (which allows us to handle fuzzy clustering), self‐organizing maps (which yield intuitive visual representations of the clusters), and partitioning around medoids (which circumvents the presence of data outliers). We set up our analysis in the context of the European banking sector, which has seen its regulators increasingly focused on examining the business models of supervised entities in the aftermath of the twin financial crises. In our empirical application, we find evidence of four distinct banking business models and further distinguish between banks with a clearly defined business model (core banks) and others (non‐core banks), as well as banks with a stable business model over time (persistent banks) and others (non‐persistent banks). Our proposed framework performs well under several robustness checks related with the sample, clustering methods, and variables used.     

Regulation of a Risk Averse Firm

We extend the Laffont–Tirole regulation model to the case of risk-averse firms. Our main results are:

• The impact of risk aversion is to shift the optimal contract toward a cost-plus contract.

• As compared with the risk-neutral case, distortions are greater and informational rents are smaller.

• For high levels of risk aversion, the optimal contract involves cost ceilings and the less efficient firms are bunched together.

Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D8, L5.     

Politics, Processes and the Future of Australian Accounting Standards

The perspective of public interest and interest group theories of regulation is adopted to consider the future of Australian accounting standards following major reforms proposed by the Australian Commonwealth government as part of its 1997 Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP). Interest groups in the Australian environment are identified. Their lobbying had influenced the initial proposals; and their reactions when the CLERP proposals were published resulted in substantial modifications to the CLERP proposals, which had initially recommendedthat International Accounting Standards (IASs) be adopted as national standards from 1 January 1999.
The role of accounting standards and the structure of standard setting are explored. The political nature of standard setting is illustrated through a review of the CLERP proposals, submissions of various interest groups and the government's responses to them. The central arguments are that key assumptions underlying the CLERP proposals are flawed, and that the CLERP proposals could not achieve the outcomes desired of them.
It seems inevitable, however, that international standards eventually will supplant domestic standards. In the longer term, Australian standard setters seem destined to have a diminished role in the international standard setting arena.     

CORRUPTION AND MICROCREDIT INTEREST RATES: DOES REGULATION HELP?

Misunderstandings about the structure of microcredit interest rates continue to generate rich criticism of the industry's high interest rates. Research has focused attention on the cost structure of interest rates and, more recently, on macroeconomic and macro‐institutional factors. While the cost structure is probably the most important determinant of interest rates, other factors also matter. In addition to other important results that usually validate the empirical literature, this paper finds that microcredit interest rates respond positively to corruption. The analysis shows that there is asymmetry between the effects of corruption, depending on whether or not the MFIs are regulated. While corruption has a positive and significant impact on interest rates of unregulated MFIs, it has a negligible impact on interest rates of regulated MFIs.     

海洋环境管制的供需矛盾分析

本文从我国海洋环境问题的现实出发，重点分析了海洋环境管制的供求现状和矛盾，指出我国海洋环境管制的必要性和紧迫性。同时，结合我国海洋环境管制的现实，探讨了我国海洋环境管制的发展，提出我国在加强海洋环境管制的同时应拓宽思路，促进海洋环境管制的有效供给。     

试论我国商业银行的金融创新

加入WTO后,我国商业银行已不可能依靠对外资银行的限制来对国内银行业进行保护,中资银行将直接面对国际金融市场的竞争,直接面对资金实力雄厚、管理手段先进、服务质量高效的国外金融机构的竞争。要在竞争中求生存、谋发展,惟有加快金融创新的步伐。     

Determinants of the allocative,cost and scope efficiencies of Indian banks

ABSTRACT

This study aims to investigate the impact of competition on determinants of allocative, scope and cost efficiencies of Indian scheduled commercial banks (SCBs). Specifically, the study, analyzes the impact of the second round of licensing on the efficiency of Indian SCBs. This is the first paper to measure scope efficiency of Indian banks and analyze its determinants. A two-stage analysis is performed on a balanced panel dataset of Indian SCBs for the period 1999–2016. In the first stage, the allocative, cost and scope efficiencies for each bank are estimated following the data envelopment analysis approach. In the second stage, internal determinants of the stated efficiency measures are estimated following the system of the generalized method of moments approach. The findings suggest that competition has not resulted in enhancing the efficiency of Indian SCBs. Among factors that can influence efficiency, it is seen that size does matter. Larger banks can enhance the efficiency of SCBs. It is also seen that having more foreign banks improves the overall efficiency of SCBs. However, before embarking on further rounds of licensing, the study posits that market-driven correction to succeed, it is imperative to address sunspots in the form of investor or borrower repression.     

Bank Capital Regulation of Trading Portfolios: An Assessment of the Basel Framework

In setting minimum capital requirements for trading portfolios, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1996, 2011a, 2013) initially used Value‐at‐Risk (VaR), then both VaR and stressed VaR (SVaR), and most recently, stressed Conditional VaR (SCVaR). Accordingly, we examine the use of SCVaR to measure risk and set these requirements. Assuming elliptically distributed asset returns, we show that portfolios on the mean‐SCVaR frontier generally lie away from the mean‐variance (M‐V) frontier. In a plausible numerical example, we find that such portfolios tend to have considerably higher ratios of risk (measured by, e.g., standard deviation) to minimum capital requirement than those of portfolios on the M‐V frontier. Also, we find that requirements based on SCVaR are smaller than those based on both VaR and SVaR but exceed those based on just VaR. Finally, we find that requirements based on SCVaR are less procyclical than those based on either VaR or both VaR and SVaR. Overall, our paper suggests that the use of SCVaR to measure risk and set requirements is not a panacea.