大城市社会空间结构演变及其治理——以上海市为例

随着市场化改革的深入,当前中国大城市社会空间正呈现重构与分异的演变趋势,同时也带来许多城市社会问题.以上海为例,在分析当前中国大城市呈现的社会空间结构演变的特征基础上,分析了可能产生的负社会效应,并提出了一些城市空间治理的对策建议.     

完善我国上市公司治理结构的路径选择

本考证了两种典型的公司治理模式的特征，效率和演变趋势，结合我国上市公司的股权结构分析了公司治理结构，并得出结论：现实的国情和西方公司治理的演变趋势决定了完善我国上市公司治理结构的路戏只能是首先完善公司内部治理结构，未来应朝着以内部治理的主、外部治理为辅的博采众长的混合模式的方向发展。     

关于管理者收购的研究探讨

在介绍管理者收购(MBO)的涵义和特点、论述其具体操作方式及对公司治理的影响的基础上,说明MBO的作用意义,提出我国MBO运作的若干建议。     

论企业本质、公司治理与财务会计理论的契合:资本保全视角

基于企业本质从价值角度描述为财务资本、人力资本、组织资本与社会资本的一个不完全契约组合,公司治理就是保证这一契约组合有效执行的制度安排,而现代财务会计在理论与实践上更接近于公司治理.本文利用资本保全概念将企业本质、公司治理与财务会计理论整合为一个完整的理论框架.     

国有商业银行改革所面临的困难及改进措施

随着加入WTO后金融领域的逐步开放和外资银行的大批涌入 ,国有商业银行的改革和创新日益紧迫 ,而影响国有商业银行发展和竞争力的根本因素依然存在 ,如资本严重不足、治理结构及经营机制不完善、经营环境不健全等。要解决这些问题 ,不仅需要商业银行本身加大改革力度 ,大胆进行制度创新 ,建立法人治理结构 ,还需要国家有关部门在宏观调控和具体政策上为国有商业银行营造有力的政策和市场环境。     

Corporate Governance: Factors Influencing Voluntary Disclosure by Publicly Traded Canadian Firms*

We report on the comprehensiveness of voluntary corporate governance disclosures in the annual reports and management information circulars of Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) firms. We focus on disclosure of the corporate governance practices implemented by our sample of TSE 300 firms vis‐à‐vis the 14 guidelines set out in the TSE's report on corporate governance Where Were the Directors? Our analysis indicates that only a very few firms disclose that they have fully implemented the TSE guidelines, and that the extent of disclosure of corporate governance practices implemented varies widely among the firms. We then test factors associated with the comprehensiveness of such disclosures and the choice of disclosure medium using simultaneous equations multivariate analysis. We also assess the influence of publicized corporate governance failures on disclosure. Overall, our results suggest that the choices of disclosure medium and the extent of disclosure are made concurrently, and are influenced by the strategic considerations of management.     

Antecedents and consequences of corporate governance reform: the case of Germany

The paper examines the antecedents and consequences of the voluntary adoption of corporate governance reform in firms embedded in a relationship‐based governance system with less protection of minority shareholders. In such locations, ownership structure should be a key determinant of governance reform. Firms with dispersed ownership are likely to face agency problems but may lack sufficient ownership power in the hand of external owners for adoption to occur. Extensive ownership by external parties facilitates adoption but decreases the need and motivation to adopt governance reform. We examined the adoption of stock‐based incentive plans and transparent accounting regulations (e.g., greater disclosure to shareholders) among large German firms (DAX 100) during the late 1990s. We found an inverse ‘U’‐shaped relationship between ownership concentration and governance reform. In addition, we found that firms adopting governance reform were more likely to engage in corporate divestitures and achieve higher levels of market performance than firms not adopting governance reform. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does the cost of capital differ across countries? An agency perspective*

In this keynote speech, I ask the question: Does the cost of capital differ for firms located in different countries? I argue that there are two ways to look at the cost of capital. First, there is the neoclassical perspective, which assumes that there are no agency problems. In integrated markets, the neoclassical cost of capital is the same in every country. Second, there is the agency perspective. Agency costs increase the cost of capital understood as the expected rate of return necessary for an investment to leave the value of the firm unaffected. Adjusting the cost of capital for agency costs, I argue that it differs across countries because of differences in corporate governance. I then provide a comparison of the agency-adjusted cost of capital between Japan and the US.     

中国证券市场年报补丁公司特征研究

在上市公司午报披露之后，屡屡可见公司对年报的各类补充公告与更正公告（即年报补丁），年报朴丁不仅受到媒体的强烈抨击，也为监管部门所关注。本文选取发布2001～2003年年报补丁的公司作为研究样本，并分年度、行业、公司规模选取配对样本，考察补丁公司的经济特征，研究表明，相对配对样本而言，补丁公司的业绩较差，公目的总资产增长较快，较少设置审计委员会，且审计质量较差。     

创业企业资本融资:相机治理的研究视角

由于创业企业的信息不对称,易产生逆向选择,导致创业资本市场低效率,因此创业企业融资难众所周知。本文从相机治理的角度,通过一套制度安排,实现了创业投资家对创业企业家的激励与约束,成功地解决了创业投资家与创业企业家之间的委托代理问题,使创业企业获得了创业资本的支持。