The micro-foundations of intertemporal price discrimination

Summary. This paper investigates the optimality of intertemporal price discrimination for a durable-good monopoly in a model where infinitely-lived households face an intertemporal budget constraint, and consume both durable goods and non-durable goods. We prove that the optimal price of the durable good is not constant, and may decrease or increase over time. Some households may choose to purchase the durable good at a later date, and pay lower or higher prices, since the gain in discounted utility of consuming more of the non-durable good more than compensates for the loss in utility from delaying the consumption of the durable good.Received: 12 March 2004, Revised: 7 January 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: D40, D42, D91.I would like to thank C.D. Aliprantis, the Editor, and an anonymous referee for their generous advice, and constructive comments and suggestions. I have also enjoyed discussions with John Quah on the subject. Research support from the Wharton-SMU Research Centre, Singapore Management University, is gratefully acknowledged.     

构建我国个人信用体系保障机制--韩国"坏银行"重整制度考察之思考

我国个人消费信贷近几年的发展十分迅速，但是在个人消费信贷的快速发展中，银行由于个人不良信贷所引发的不良债权比重逐年上升，而且信用环境不良有恶化这一问题的趋势。个人信用制度的建设、个人不良信贷资产的处置和我国个人信用安全体系的构建，已经成为摆在我们面前的现实问题。韩国资产管理公司在处置信用卡公司不良债权中的“坏银行”重整制度，构成了韩国金融安全网络的重要组成部分，这一制度设计值得我们借鉴。     

Deposit insurance and bank regulation in a monetary economy: a general equilibrium exposition

Summary. It is commonly argued that poorly designed banking system safety nets are largely to blame for the frequency and severity of modern banking crises. For example, underpriced deposit insurance and/or low reserve requirements are often viewed as factors that encourage risk-taking by banks. In this paper, we study the effects of three policy variables: deposit insurance premia, reserve requirements and the way in which the costs of bank bailouts are financed. We show that when deposit insurance premia are low, the monetization of bank bailout costs may not be more inflationary than financing these costs out of general revenue. This is because, while monetizing the costs increases the inflation tax rate, higher levels of general taxation reduce savings, deposits, bank reserves, and the inflation tax base. Increasing the inflation tax rate obviously raises inflation, but so does an erosion of the inflation tax base. We also find that low deposit insurance premia or low reserve requirements may not be associated with a high rate of bank failure.Received: 2 January 2002, Revised: 1 March 2003JEL Classification Numbers: D5, E5, G1.B. D. Smith: Sadly, our co-author, colleague and dear friend, Bruce D. Smith, died on July 9, 2002.     

Pricing access in network competition

We compare various access pricing rules in the two-way access model. We show that the Generalized Efficient Component Pricing Rule (TECPR) leads to a lower equilibrium price than does the Efficient Component Pricing Rule, (ECPR) marginal cost pricing, (MCP) and any non-negative fixed access charges.      

The politics of redistributive social insurance

This paper analyses the political support for a social insurance that includes elements of redistribution when there exists an imperfect private insurance alternative. Individuals differ both in their income and risk. The social insurance is compulsory and charges an income-related contribution with pooling of risks. The private insurance is voluntary and charges a contribution based on individual risks. However due to the adverse selection problem, private insurance companies provide only partial insurance. Adopting a non-expected utility model, we show that there is a general majority support for social insurance and that this support is increasing with risk aversion. We also show that a mixed insurance is politically impossible, regardless of the degree of redistribution of social insurance and the joint distribution of risk and income in the population. Lastly, we analyse how the political support for social insurance is affected by any change in its redistributive component and the possibility of using genetic tests.     

Unemployment dynamics in an OLG economy with public pensions

Pension benefits in old age establish a disincentive to save in youth, thereby yielding lower levels of capital stock and the wage rate. As a result, the trade union has an incentive to change the composition of its two targets: employment and the wage rate. This paper develops a model that includes employment effects of public pensions via capital accumulation and union wage setting. Within this framework, we consider how contribution rates to the pension system influence the level and time path of the unemployment rate. It is demonstrated that (1) a higher contribution rate results in a lower unemployment rate, and (2) the economy with a high (low) contribution rate experiences monotone convergence towards (oscillatory convergence towards or a period-2 cycle around) the steady state. The author would like to thank an anonymous referee, Kazutoshi Miyazawa, and seminar participants at Osaka University for their useful comments and suggestions, and Masako Ikefuji and Hiroaki Yamagami for their research assistance. Financial support from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) through a Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B) (No.17730131), the Asahi Glass Foundation, the Japan Economic Research Foundation and the 21st Century COE Program (Osaka University) is gratefully acknowledged. All remaining errors are mine.     

构建贫困农村养老保障体系的对策研究——基于河北省涞水县的实证分析

本文通过对涞水县3个乡的12个村、362户居民的入户调查，了解了困扰涞水县贫困农民养老的问题所在，并就贫困农村养老保障进行了对策性探讨，旨在帮助贫困农民解决实际的养老问题，同时也为构建贫困农村养老保障体系提供参考。     

GAME THEORETIC MODELS OF MIXED OLIGOPOLY

Abstract. In this paper we review various models that have been proposed for the study of mixed oligopoly, that is markets in which private and public firm compete on equal basis using only market instruments.     

关于期权薪酬会计计量方法的思考

股票期权薪酬计量方法的选用一直以来都存在争议,采用不同的计量方法会直接影响到股票期权会计信息的真实性和透明度。本文通过对分别运用内在价值法、最小价值法和公允价值法中的B-S模型和二叉树模型对期权薪酬价值的计算分析,来说明何种计量方法能最有效地实现期权薪酬核算的目的。     

Market Structure and Risk Taking in the Banking Industry

We demonstrate that the common view according to which an increase in competition leads banks to increased risk taking fails to hold in an environment where homogeneous loss averse consumers can choose in which bank to make a deposit based on their knowledge of the riskiness incorporated in the banks outstanding loan portfolios. With an exclusive focus on imperfect competition we find that banks incentives for risk taking are invariant to a change in the banking market structure from duopoly to monopoly. Finally, we show that deposit insurance would eliminate the gains from bank competition when banks use asset quality as a strategic instrument.revised version received October 15, 2003