控股股东杠杆增持与审计定价

基于审计成本效益理论和审计风险溢价理论，以2015—2020年我国A股上市公司数据为样本，检验控股股东杠杆增持与审计定价的关系及内在机理。结果表明，控股股东杠杆增持与审计定价正相关。控股股东杠杆增持行为主要通过提高审计师风险溢价以及增加审计投入对审计定价产生促进作用。上述关系在企业存在控股股东股权质押、法律环境较为严格时得到强化，而较好的信息披露质量以及较高的股权制衡度会削弱控股股东杠杆增持与审计定价的正相关关系。同时，控股股东杠杆增持带来的风险溢价效应会抑制审计师出具标准的审计意见，损害审计质量。研究结论有助于强化审计师对控股股东杠杆增持的风险认知，进而为进一步提升审计报告质量、强化投资者保护提供了增量证据。     

Blockholdings in closely held corporations: An analysis of ownership coalitions in emerging countries

Blockholdings in closely held corporations have been examined in the literature to understand the importance of the size and structure of minimal coalitions in a volatile macroeconomic environment. We show, theoretically and empirically, that three-member minimal controlling coalitions provide the best performance results because the portfolio of potential strategies of such coalitions can increase strategic choices in the boom-bust-recovery cycle, but coordination costs are not that high. We also show that “competition” between potential minimal controlling coalitions (of the same firm) with two or more members improves the firm’s performance. With respect to the characteristics of the institutional owners of one-member controlling coalitions, we found that firms controlled by foreigners and/or other non-financial firms and financial holdings performed better than the average firm. Our study indicates that the change of ownership structures in emerging countries is determined by the extant economic systems and through administrative interventions.