Diversification, Ownership and Control of Swedish Corporations

We study the short‐ and long‐term valuation effects of Swedish takeovers. Using a sample of 93 bidding firms that acquired 101 targets between 1980 and 1995, we find that diversifying acquisitions lead to a negative market reaction and deterioration of the operating performance of the bidder. Announcement and performance gains in each of the three years following the acquisition occur only when bidders expand their core rather than their peripheral lines of business. Our findings suggest that focused acquisitions lead to greater synergies and operating efficiencies than diversifying acquisitions. Intra‐group acquisitions, however, show that bidders do not realise significant gains whether they adopt diversifying or focusing investment strategies by purchasing firms controlled by the Wallenberg and SHB conglomerate groups. Intra‐group targets realize significant gains regardless bidder's investment strategy. Finally, the evidence does not support the view that intra‐conglomerate acquisitions are associated with expropriation of minority shareholders. However, they appear to enhance the control rights of large shareholders of the bidding firm.     

Asymmetric Information,Asset Allocation,and Debt Financing

We analyze a signaling game where firms' financing announcements convey private information about their prospects but a moral hazard problem exists in that managers may suboptimally invest. Consequently, the attempt to address an asymmetric information problem exacerbates moral hazard. The equilibrium recognizes both imperfect information problems. Additionally, the firm must determine how to allocate funds between two technologies differing in cash flow timing and managerial accessibility. We define an above-average firm's comparative advantage as that technology which is most dominant relative to a firm with lesser prospects and show that the resultant equilibria follow the lines of the firm's comparative advantage. Finally, we show that separation may be achieved costlessly, i.e., with no explicit signaling cost.     

Antecedents and consequences of corporate governance reform: the case of Germany

The paper examines the antecedents and consequences of the voluntary adoption of corporate governance reform in firms embedded in a relationship‐based governance system with less protection of minority shareholders. In such locations, ownership structure should be a key determinant of governance reform. Firms with dispersed ownership are likely to face agency problems but may lack sufficient ownership power in the hand of external owners for adoption to occur. Extensive ownership by external parties facilitates adoption but decreases the need and motivation to adopt governance reform. We examined the adoption of stock‐based incentive plans and transparent accounting regulations (e.g., greater disclosure to shareholders) among large German firms (DAX 100) during the late 1990s. We found an inverse ‘U’‐shaped relationship between ownership concentration and governance reform. In addition, we found that firms adopting governance reform were more likely to engage in corporate divestitures and achieve higher levels of market performance than firms not adopting governance reform. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does the cost of capital differ across countries? An agency perspective*

In this keynote speech, I ask the question: Does the cost of capital differ for firms located in different countries? I argue that there are two ways to look at the cost of capital. First, there is the neoclassical perspective, which assumes that there are no agency problems. In integrated markets, the neoclassical cost of capital is the same in every country. Second, there is the agency perspective. Agency costs increase the cost of capital understood as the expected rate of return necessary for an investment to leave the value of the firm unaffected. Adjusting the cost of capital for agency costs, I argue that it differs across countries because of differences in corporate governance. I then provide a comparison of the agency-adjusted cost of capital between Japan and the US.     

国有商业银行上市后面临的挑战及对策

国有商业银行上市的目的是为了逐步实现市场化经营,促进国有商业银行改善经营管理,提高业务发展质量,最终实现可持续发展。但能否实现可持续发展,要从实际市场化运营中加以衡量。本文简要分析了国有商业银行上市带来的积极影响,同时也指出了其面临的提高经营绩效、增强经营透明度和股市多变对稳健经营等带来的一系列挑战。鉴于此,作者提出了从转变经营理念、完善公司治理结构、提高全面风险管理能力、强化资产负债管理、实现信贷业务均衡有效发展等方面,加强各项发展要素的整合,从不同层面提高可持续发展水平和国际竞争能力;同时,积极推进相关配套的外部环境建设。     

商业银行公司治理机制的发展趋势研究

公司治理机制是现代公司制度的基本架构。从公司制度诞生至今,良好的公司治理机制始终和公司的健康运行密切相关。由于商业银行区别于一般公司的特殊性,构建良好的公司治理机制一直是国际银行业所关注的焦点。本文从公司治理机制的理论和制度两个层面分析商业银行公司治理机制的发展趋势,并探讨这种变化趋势对中国商业银行公司治理改革的借鉴意义。作者认为商业银行应当按照国际会计准则提高信息披露的质量,利用市场竞争的力量来改善公司治理机制,注重外部审计和内部审计力量的结合,注重法律在公司治理机制中的作用,实现商业银行激励与约束机制的创新。     

中国证券市场年报补丁公司特征研究

在上市公司午报披露之后，屡屡可见公司对年报的各类补充公告与更正公告（即年报补丁），年报朴丁不仅受到媒体的强烈抨击，也为监管部门所关注。本文选取发布2001～2003年年报补丁的公司作为研究样本，并分年度、行业、公司规模选取配对样本，考察补丁公司的经济特征，研究表明，相对配对样本而言，补丁公司的业绩较差，公目的总资产增长较快，较少设置审计委员会，且审计质量较差。     

公司债务期限结构问题研究综述

本文对国内外公司债务期限结构间题的理论和经验研究进行了全面、系统的回顾，包括两方面内容：一是公司债务期限结构与公司价值之间的关系，二是公司债务期限结构的影响因素。本文评价了现有文献存在的问题和不足之处，为中国上市公司债务期限结构问题研究提供了依据和方向。     

资源类上市公司的价值评估方法探讨

现有“利润加储量”的评估方法应用于资源类公司仍在某些环节出现悖论。本文认为，资源类上市公司的价值构成应包括矿权重估溢价、正常开采投资收益及个别公司的超额利润。其中，采矿权重估溢价的潜在收益应是在矿权未市场化之前的资源类企业获得的特有收益，但其收益期和相应的折现期也因矿权的逐步市场化而受到采矿权有效期的限制。本文用简单模型估算了主要资源类上市公司的基本价值。     

组织信息体制、制度化关联与高技术企业集群治理效率

高技术企业集群是一种网络式中间体组织，其组织结构更多的表现为组织之间垂直方向和水平方向的信息关联关系。不同的信息关联形成不同的信息体制。高技术企业集群治理合约分为VC捆绑武治理合约、转换者式治理合约、主导企业式治理合约等三种典型形式．其治理合约的选择受制于信息体制的交易费用大小。信息体制有其特定的制度生存环境，并且具有不同的交易费用结构特征．必须使制度环境与信息体制相匹配。制度化关联与信息体制的耦合互动可以弥补组织信息体制内生的体制缺陷．降低总交易费用。制度环境的扰动和制度的历时关联影响治理合约的治理效率．治理合约需要做出相应的调遣．