Top management team incentive heterogeneity,strategic investment behavior,and performance: A contingency theory of incentive alignment

Research summary : We develop and test a contingency theory of the influence of top management team (TMT) performance‐contingent incentives on manager–shareholder interest alignment. Our results support our theory by showing that although TMTs engage in significantly higher levels of acquisition investment when their average incentive levels increase, investors' responses to those large investments are generally negative. More importantly, however, we further find that within‐TMT incentive heterogeneity conditions that effect, such that investors evaluate TMTs' large acquisition investments more positively as the variance in those top managers' incentive values increases. Thus, within‐TMT incentive heterogeneity appears to increase manager–shareholder interest alignment, in the context of large acquisition investments. Managerial summary : We find that as the average value of TMTs' incentives increase, relative to their total pay, they invest more in acquisitions and investors' respond negatively to the announcement of those deals. However, we further show that investors respond more positively to acquisitions announced by TMTs whose members' incentive values vary (some TMT members hold higher incentives and others hold lower). Results imply that when TMT members hold differing incentives levels, they approach investments from divergent perspectives, scrutinize those investments more heavily, and make better decisions, relative to TMTs with similar incentives. They also suggest that boards seeking tighter manager–shareholder interest alignment may benefit from introducing variance into TMT members' incentive structures, as doing so appears to create divergent preferences that can improve team decision making. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

接管壁垒缺失与国有企业经营者低效更替的发生

接管壁垒是治理结构的一个重要环节,它在维护企业家职位稳定性的同时,可以防止和减少低效率更替的发生。本文的分析表明,在以行政干预下的“内部人”控制为特征的国有企业治理结构中,接管壁垒的缺失使企业经营者的更替陷入“低壁垒,高更替,低效率”的恶性循环。因此,解决领导班子问题必须从治理结构的源头－产权改革开始,并为企业家阶层的形成提供金融制度的支持。     

公司治理、董事会规模与上市公司的实际控制

最优合约理论和管理权力理论都从不同侧面对高管人员的激励报酬进行了解释,但都有不足。在分析和评述这两种理论的基础上,从公司治理角度,通过对公司治理与高管人员报酬的实证研究,发现在我国上市公司中公司治理机制的改进对高管人员报酬的影响正在逐步体现:当董事会规模大、流通股中机构投资者多、发行了外资股或实现了海外上市、公司的实际控制人为个人及公司规模扩大都能显著提高高管人员报酬;任职年限、ROA和独立董事占比与高管人员报酬正相关但不显著。     

基于企业自主创新的企业文化建设策略

基于企业自主创新的企业文化建设是企业自主创新的关键。企业经营管理者应通过培育企业主体创新意识的创新价值观、构建以创新绩效为导向的激励机制、畅通信息沟通渠道、鼓励员工进行参与和自主管理、以"合作伙伴关系"代替"单向控制型关系"、营造有利于自主创新的人文环境、构建学习型组织等措施来加强创新型企业文化建设。     

公司治理、大股东资金占用与盈余质量

论文从大股东资金占用行为的影响因素与行为后果两个角度出发,研究公司治理机制与大股东资金占用行为的关系以及大股东资金占用行为与盈余质量的相关关系。研究结果发现：第一大股东控制程度越高,其占用上市公司资金的可能性越大并且这种现象在国有控股上市公司中更为严重,公司治理综合水平对大股东资金占用程度起到了有效的抑制作用,大股东这种资金占用行为对企业盈余质量具有显著的影响。     

企业社会责任国内外发展研究：一个综述

随着经济的快速发展,社会要求企业承担的社会责任也越来越多,企业自身的发展也必须建立在承担一定的社会责任的前提下。重点介绍了国外企业社会责任发展过程的不同时期学者们对企业社会责任的不同观点以及介绍了我国学者对企业社会责任的看法,研究表明,相对于国外研究我国学者对企业社会责任的研究还有很大的距离。     

Socio-economic developmental strategies as retail performance indicators: A balanced scorecard approach

This research analyses the commitment to and use of ‘balanced scorecards’ by retailers in generating sustainable profitability, whilst contributing to socio-economic development in South Africa. An international literature review of scorecard frameworks, plans and reports by major retail companies and semi-structured dialogic interviews with a purposive sample of retail business stakeholders and government officials formed the methodology. By contrasting the literature and empirical insights, a summary of findings was generated, which conclude that most retailer scorecards (formal or informal) seek to balance financial with ‘cause-related marketing’ targets, but implementation differs according to factors such as company size, developmental maturity and managerial competence. Furthermore, collaboration between retailers and state institutions in scorecard management is not a reality, as has been achieved in other industries. It is therefore recommended that a Retail Charter scorecard framework be considered, to promote public/private-sector knowledge-sharing and socio-economic development.     

Study on Problems of Group of Companies Listing as a Whole and Corporate Governance

Listing as a whole refers to reorganize all the enterprises＇ businesses, establish a stock corporation and increase capitals to list by issuing social public shares. TCL Group and Wuhan Iron and Steel （Group） Corporation have set a good example for other groups of enterprises that have parts of their assets listed, and will guide groups of enterprises which are affiliated to the center authority of China to list their assets. Listing as a whole, is beneficial to make clear the complex share-holding relationships between the group and its affiliates. It will also be beneficial to improve the whole structure of corporate governance, decrease the correlation trade, reduce the information disclosure cost, and solve the problem of the correlation trade between the group and its affiliates. However, it is far beyond the standard of what standardized corporate governance requires. Standardized corporate governance at least possesses two factors： One is the equality of the rights of shareholders, namely the same share with the same rights; the other is the clear rights boundary of the stakeholder and the existence of the efficient mechanism of equilibrium of rights. These two factors do not have the necessary relations to whether the group list as a whole or not, but depend on the maturity of the market and the soundness of the law and regulation.     

循环经济体系下的企业逆物流运行模式创新研究

在日益稀缺的资源环境下,经济的发展模式逐渐从粗放型转向集约型,发展循环经济成为了一种．必然趋势。在循环经济体系下,从产品到再生资源这一过程需要依赖逆物流的有效运作来完成,由于逆物流的交易成本较高、技术处理水平较低,以及质量标准与监管问题日益凸现,在现阶段企业逆物流的运作尚处于摸索阶段。为建立起一个有效的企业逆物流激励机制,文章就逆物流的运行模式提出三个层面的创新：宏观视角的政府战略导向机制;中观视角的行业协会战略规划机制;微观视角的企业战略部署机制。     

上市方式、大股东持股与民营上市公司的绩效

企业上市可以采取直接上市（IPO）和间接上市（买壳上市等）两种方式。本文考察了民营上市公司的不同上市方式下大股东持股与公司绩效间的关系。研究发现,间接上市的民营企业的大股东持股对公司绩效没有影响,而直接上市的民营企业的第一大股东持股与公司绩效存在正的线性关系,前5大股东持股与公司绩效呈非线性的U形关系。当考虑大股东持股的内生性时,发现间接上市的大股东持股与公司绩效互不影响,而直接上市的大股东持股与公司绩效互为正相关。