论企业群的组织机理

企业群是一种非常普遍的经济现象,它是指在一定地域形成的以提供某种产品或服务为核心,以信任关系为纽带,以市场竞争为外在表现形式的社会网络组织。由于企业聚集,企业群内具有明显的外部经济性,这些经济"外益"的主要表现是,由于企业群组织机理的作用,企业的市场交易费用和组     

时间竞争条件下的时间与成本关系研究

一般认为，时间的缩短必然导致成本的增加。但目前来自世界各地基于时间竞争的诸多经验表明．快速的研发和交货有利于成本的降低和利润增加。针对这两种状况的不一致性．本文通过界定时间一成本的关系曲线和时间价格弹性的概念．同时从厂商和顾客的角度．构造了时间竞争条件下的时间和成本均衡模型。该模型从理论上解释了传统上的时间和成本的权衡关系和在时间竞争条件下两者之间一致性关系：也清晰描述了采用时间竞争策略的厂商获得较大市场份额、较高利润和明显竞争优势的现象。     

工程项目成本的控制

在施工企业中,加强对工程成本管理,不断降低成本,具有十分重要的意义。施工项目的成本计划工作是一项非常重要的工作,本文从如何选定技术上可行、经济上合理的最优降低成本方案入手,通过成本计划,把目标成本层层分解,落实到施工过程的每个环节,有效地进行成本控制。     

How manufacturers value purchase offerings: An exploratory study

The notion of value and the principles and methods that buyers use to discover which supplier offering has more value needs to drive all business marketing activity. However, the concept of value and how to measure it is somewhat vague. The authors present a simple way to think about value. The research reports an exploratory empirical study of how the valuation model fits the views of purchasing managers and how purchasing agents view value and use it to make decisions. In general, the model posited appears to fit the view of purchasing agents, however, there is some digression and further research is needed.     

Do formal contracts and relational governance function as substitutes or complements?

Relational exchange arrangements supported by trust are commonly viewed as substitutes for complex contracts in interorganizational exchanges. Many argue that formal contracts actually undermine trust and thereby encourage the opportunistic behavior they are designed to discourage. In this paper, we develop and test an alternative perspective: that formal contracts and relational governance function as complements. Using data from a sample of information service exchanges, we find empirical support for this proposition of complementarity. Managers appear to couple their increasingly customized contracts with high levels of relational governance (and vice versa). Moreover, this interdependence underlies their ability to generate improvements in exchange performance. Our results concerning the determinants of these governance choices show their distinct origins, which further augments their complementarity in practice. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Non-parametric production analysis in non-competitive environments

We extend the non-parametric methodology for empirical production analysis to deal with endogenous prices. As price endogeneity is often complemented by price uncertainty, we consider both the case of certain prices and the case of uncertain prices. The extensions are fully compatible with existing tools for eliciting and representing technology and price information, and preserves the tractable mathematical programming structure of the original methodology. An empirical application to the Dutch electricity distribution sector illustrates our extension.     

Optimal Size in the Waste Collection Sector

The purpose of this study is to analyze the cost structure of a sample of Italian wastecollection firms in order to assess economies of scale and density and, therefore, definethe optimal size of the firms. A total and a variable translog cost function were estimated using panel data for a sample of 30 firms operating at the provincial level over the period 1991–1995.The empirical evidence suggests that franchised monopoly, rather than side-by-sidecompetition, is the most efficient form of production organization in the waste collection industry. Further, the majority of firms are not operating at optimal scale.     

几种工业乙酸乙酯制备方法的技术经济对比

乙酸乙酯是应用最广泛的脂肪酸酯之一，其制备方法有乙酸酯化法，乙醛缩合法，乙烯加成法和乙醇脱氢法等，相对比，乙醛缩合法生产乙酸乙酯路线投资低，成本也较低，较适合乙醛富裕地区投资生产。     

Forced Versus Voluntary Dividend Reduction: An Agency Cost Explanation

We examine whether the agency cost arising from shareholder‐bondholder conflict is an important determinant of the timing of dividend reduction decisions. Firms forced to reduce dividends owing to bond covenant violations experience lower earnings, more frequent losses, and greater earnings declines around the dividend reduction year than do firms that voluntarily reduce dividends. Relative to voluntary‐reduction firms, forced‐reduction firms have higher debt‐to‐equity ratios and managerial holdings. These findings coupled with the increased dividend payout ratios and lower announcement period returns suggest that financially distressed firms that anticipate poor performance have greater incentives to delay reducing dividends to avoid a wealth transfer to bondholders.     

Yardstick and incentive issues in UK electricity distribution price controls

Electricity distribution is a primary candidate for regulation since it is a natural monopoly whose costs it would be inefficient to duplicate in a competitive market. In the UK since privatisation of the electricity industry in 1990, this regulation has emphasised incentives for cost efficiency through the use of RPI‐X price capping applied to 14 regional distribution businesses. The paper examines the issues that have arisen in implementation, including the practice of bench‐marking the operating and capital expenditures of different companies. It analyses how the price set at the beginning of each review period depends on the determination of cost yardsticks, the weighted average cost of capital and the regulatory asset base of the companies. The analytical model is used to evaluate Ofgem's 1999 Distribution Price Control Review and compares it with other European distribution price regulations.