股权结构、董事会特征与会计信息质量关系的实证研究——来自A股上市公司的经验证据

选取2001-2005年期间被我国证券监督委员会公开处罚的财务报告舞弊的上市公司为研究样本,并选取了股权结构、董事会特征等方面的10个指标,对公司治理结构与会计信息舞弊的关系进行实证研究。研究发现:独立董事比例、审计委员会的设置与会计舞弊显著负相关,董事会规模、控制股东的性质、监事会规模与会计舞弊显著正相关。     

Researcher Interaction Biases and Business Ethics Research: Respondent Reactions to Researcher Characteristics

The potential for biased responses that occur when researchers interact with their study participants has long been of interest to both academicians and practitioners. Given the sensitive nature of the field, researcher interaction biases are of particular concern for business ethics researchers regardless of their preference for survey, experimental, or qualitative methodology. Whereas some ethics researchers may inadvertently bias data by misrecording or misinterpreting responses, other biases may occur when study participants’ responses are systematically influenced by the mere introduction of researchers into the participants’ environment. Although substantial empirical research has been conducted on the general topic of researcher interaction biases, none has focused specifically on business ethics research. In order to remedy this lack of empirical substantiation in the field, we review the related literature on researcher interaction biases, present an empirical example of how such biases can influence research results in an experiment assessing reactions to insurance fraud, and discuss the implications for business ethics research.     

市场竞争、经理人激励与上市公司舞弊行为——来自中国证监会处罚公告的经验证据

中国上市公司控制权市场、经理人市场和经理人激励对舞弊行为影响的检验结果表明,在控制权市场竞争中只有第二大股东的制衡力量对舞弊行为起到显著的抑制作用,经理人市场的竞争程度与公司舞弊行为显著负相关,不成熟的经理人市场使得经理人的声誉机制和报酬激励机制都难以发挥抑制舞弊行为的作用。治理上市公司舞弊行为的更好路径是优化经理人的选任机制和竞争机制,而不是仅仅强化其激励。     

论房地产贷款风险

房地产业是今年我国宏观调控的重点行业。近年来房地产业发展速度惊人,商品房价格在节节上升,房地产泡沫逐步累计并日益显现,房地产业发展中存在诸多问题。而且房地产贷款也在大幅增加,存量和新增的房地产不良贷款已经开始暴露,对银行房地产贷款造成重大风险隐患。     

浅析金融危机下我国出口企业对信用证欺诈的防范

金融危机下进口商的信用和支付能力普遍下降,信用证对出口商收汇安全的优越性凸显出来。但任何一种结算方式都不能完全防止欺诈的发生。如何防范信用证欺诈,充分发挥信用证的优越性已成为众多出口企业和银行关注的话题。本文介绍了我国出口贸易中常见的信用证欺诈方式,提出了一些防范信用证欺诈的有效措施。     

股权分置改革后上市公司财务舞弊分析

股权分置改革后财务舞弊压力、机会和藉口三因素随之发生新变化,特别是财务舞弊手法不断翻新,因此,我们必须从正式制度和非正式制度安排两方面做出相应的财务舞弊约束对策,如加强对上市公司管理层的监管;加强对大股东的监管;完善上市公司"一点三线"监管体制;建立财务舞弊者补偿措施;制定会计行业伦理准则;加强会计人员自身的伦理道德素质等。     

论公司财务治理与财务报告舞弊

财务治理与财务报告舞弊之间存在密切关系,公司的内、外部财务治理结构包括管理当局、董事会、监事会、注册会计师等,都对财务报告的生成与披露产生影响。因此,防范财务报告舞弊的措施应从分析公司相关财务治理结构对财务信息的监督与制衡功能出发,改变其中的薄弱环节,强化相关的治理功能。     

Forensic accounting services in English local government and the counter-fraud agenda

ABSTRACT

Fraud is a growing challenge for English local government, yet the resources and support local authorities (LAs) have available to prevent, detect and investigate it are limited. Forensic accounting services (FAS) provided by external specialist private sector firms, particularly those undertaking mandatory external audit, might be one solution. Research reported in this paper suggests, however, that existing English LA users are not all convinced. Nevertheless, better awareness and understanding of what FAS have to offer, perhaps through case studies of successful implementation, would be a valuable contribution to helping local government enhance its counter-fraud capabilities and make informed decisions about how best to meet the increasingly complex fraud challenge.     

Management's Materiality Criteria of Internal Control Weaknesses and Corporate Fraud: Evidence from China

This paper investigates the determinants and consequence of Chinese listed companies' first-time decisions on materiality criteria for internal control weaknesses, which have been observable beginning from the 2011 annual report. Although pretax income is most commonly used as the benchmark for materiality, revenue is also used as a popular alternative. Revenue is more susceptible to manipulation, as it has a much larger financial amount than pretax income. We argue that unethical managers prefer not to disclose material weaknesses by manipulating the materiality criteria to justify non-disclosure of a potentially material weakness. Consistent with this opportunistic incentive, we find that when companies committed fraud in the previous year that remains undetected, their management is more likely to use revenue (rather than pretax income) as the first-time benchmark and to set a higher revenue-based materiality threshold as well. Moreover, once the materiality metrics are set, the first-time revenue-based materiality threshold is significantly and positively associated with subsequent incidence of corporate fraud, which suggests that setting deviant and loose materiality metrics leaves room for the management to engage in future misconduct.     

法律治理、投资者保护与财务舞弊:一项基于上市公司的经验证据

本文以我国2002—2004年受处理的137家上市公司及配对公司为研究对象,通过对投资者法律保护与财务舞弊之间关系的实证研究发现,投资者法律保护程度与上市公司财务舞弊负相关,投资者法律保护程度的改善能有效降低财务舞弊概率。此结论的政策意义在于:在我国,完善法律制度是加强投资者保护从而抑制公司财务舞弊行为的一项重要制度安排。