全文获取类型
收费全文 | 499篇 |
免费 | 25篇 |
国内免费 | 8篇 |
专业分类
财政金融 | 115篇 |
工业经济 | 14篇 |
计划管理 | 113篇 |
经济学 | 72篇 |
综合类 | 73篇 |
旅游经济 | 2篇 |
贸易经济 | 85篇 |
农业经济 | 18篇 |
经济概况 | 40篇 |
出版年
2024年 | 1篇 |
2023年 | 16篇 |
2022年 | 12篇 |
2021年 | 15篇 |
2020年 | 16篇 |
2019年 | 24篇 |
2018年 | 15篇 |
2017年 | 11篇 |
2016年 | 6篇 |
2015年 | 11篇 |
2014年 | 33篇 |
2013年 | 33篇 |
2012年 | 44篇 |
2011年 | 36篇 |
2010年 | 30篇 |
2009年 | 27篇 |
2008年 | 32篇 |
2007年 | 40篇 |
2006年 | 47篇 |
2005年 | 19篇 |
2004年 | 20篇 |
2003年 | 24篇 |
2002年 | 7篇 |
2001年 | 4篇 |
2000年 | 4篇 |
1999年 | 3篇 |
1998年 | 2篇 |
排序方式: 共有532条查询结果,搜索用时 0 毫秒
531.
《Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics》2022,18(1):100283
Using a sample of listed Chinese companies during 2010–2019, we examine whether corporate renaming is associated with fraudulent financial reporting. We find that companies that change their corporate names without making underlying changes to business fundamentals are more likely to commit financial reporting fraud. The positive association between corporate renaming and financial reporting fraud is more pronounced for non-state-owned enterprises and companies with a lower ownership concentration. There is further evidence that corporate renaming is more likely to be associated with disclosure-related fraud (e.g., failure to disclose or delayed disclosure) and that the likelihood of fraudulent behavior increases with the frequency of corporate renaming. Overall, the findings of this study provide evidence of a new red flag for regulators and investors investigating financial fraud. This study is timely and has policy implications for market regulators hoping to establish and improve emerging capital markets in which the information environment is generally considered weak and opaque. 相似文献
532.
We identify occupancy fraud—borrowers who misrepresent their occupancy status as owner-occupants rather than investors—in residential mortgage originations. Unlike previous work, we show that fraud was prevalent in originations not just during the housing bubble but also persists through more recent times. We also demonstrate that fraud is broad-based and appears in government-sponsored enterprise and bank portfolio loans, not just in private securitization; these fraudulent borrowers make up one third of the effective investor population. Occupancy frauds obtain credit at lower interest rates, suggesting a motivation for undertaking fraud. These fraudulent borrowers perform substantially worse than similar declared investors, defaulting at a 75% higher rate. We also provide evidence consistent with fraudulent borrowers’ defaults being more “strategic,” suggesting that this population poses a risk in the face of declining house prices. 相似文献