中石油存续公司财务管理模式初探

文章通过综合分析各类影响因素，并借鉴历史经验教训，考虑其现实条件和管理要求，认为中石油存续公司适宜采取集权式财务管理。并从财务机制、财务制度等方面进行改革和创新，制定并实施相关的保证措施，以确保集权式财务管理体制能够有效运行。     

Uncertainty Associated with Future Environmental Costs and the Market's Differential Response to Earnings Information

This study examines whether the uncertainty arising from a firm's exposure to future environmental costs (environmental uncertainty) affects the market's price sensitivity to reported earnings. Specifically, when environmental uncertainty is significantly high, are investors more responsive to reported earnings released by 'high-polluting' firms than reported earnings announced by 'low-polluting' firms within the same industry? The initial impact of Title IV (the acid rain provisions) of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (1990 CAAA) on the US electric utility industry provides the research setting required to isolate the effects of environmental uncertainty while addressing this question. Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find that the earnings response coefficients (ERCs) of high-polluting electric utilities are significantly greater than those of their low-polluting counterparts during a predicted period of elevated environmental uncertainty. In adjoining sample years associated with lower environmental uncertainty, we observe no statistical difference in the magnitude of the ERCs between these two groups. In addition, the study's findings suggest that the magnitude of the ERC is increasing in the firm's exposure to future environmental costs, after controlling for other factors that potentially affect ERCs.     

Competition and Information Production in Market Maker Models

Abstract:   The microstructure literature models the mechanisms through which fundamental information is incorporated into market prices. This paper extends previous models by endogenising information production and analysing incentives for costly information production. In contrast to the existing literature, increasing the number of informed traders can result in reduced price informativeness. When prices have an allocative role this has welfare consequences: the regulatory implications of a dichotomy between private and public incentives for information gathering are discussed.     

Trader Anonymity, Price Formation and Liquidity

Using data from the Frankfurt Stock Exchange we analyze priceformation and liquidity in a non-anonymous environment withsimilarities to the floor of the NYSE. Our main hypothesis isthat the non-anonymity allows the specialist to assess the probabilitythat a trader trades on the basis of private information. Heuses this knowledge to price discriminate. This can be achievedby quoting a large spread and granting price improvement totraders deemed uninformed. Consistent with our hypothesis wefind that price improvement reflects lower adverse selectioncosts but does not lead to a reduction in the specialist's profit.Further, the quote adjustment following transactions at thequoted bid or ask price is more pronounced than the quote adjustmentafter transactions at prices inside the spread. Our resultsindicate that anonymity comes at the cost of higher adverseselection risk. JEL Classification: G10.     

Trader Anonymity, Price Formation and Liquidity

Using data from the Frankfurt Stock Exchange we analyze price formationand liquidity in a non-anonymous environment with similarities to thefloor of the NYSE. Our main hypothesis is that the non-anonymity allows the specialist to assess the probability that atrader trades on the basis of private information. He uses this knowledgeto price discriminate. This can be achieved by quoting a large spread and granting price improvement to traders deemed uninformed.Consistent with our hypothesis we find that price improvement reflects loweradverse selection costs but does not lead to a reduction in the specialist's profit. Further, the quote adjustmentfollowing transactions at the quoted bid or ask price is more pronounced than the quote adjustment aftertransactions at prices inside the spread. Our results indicate that anonymity comes at the cost ofhigher adverse selection risk.     

Additive and Multiplicative Uncertainty Revisited: What Explains the Contrasting Biases?

above the certainty level while for additive uncertainty the price should be lower than the certainty level. This note gives an intuitive explanation for the result after first presenting a parsimonious review of the two models. We also discuss which, if either, of the two models is more realistic. Received December 14, 2001; revised version received July 16, 2002 Published online: April 30, 2003 We thank referees for helpful comments. Ciaran Driver would like to acknowledge the research facilities from ANU, Canberra for their help in writing this paper.     

Inflation dynamics in Kazakhstan1

In January 1992, Kazakhstan initiated a reform programme to move towards market-determined prices. The price liberalization process was characterized by large relative price shifts and an increase in the overall price level towards those observed in market economies. The paper shows how the piecemeal manner in which prices were liberalized resulted in strong relative price variability over a prolonged period of time, against a background of high inflation. Convergence towards international relative and absolute price levels has progressed but is not complete, with prices for energy and services in particular still below market economy levels.     

企业竞争策略中的成本效益分析方法

企业每一项经营决策都应该进行成本效益分析，市场竞争中可以根据本企业的成本曲线和需求曲线，预测出竞争策略实施后对内部成本和外部需求可能产生的影响，从而计算出某项决策的经济效果。     

环保型水性上光油的研制与应用

目前，涂布上光技术已被越来越多的印刷厂家所采用，促使上光油的需求量不断上升。经过近几年的努力，我院研制的环保型水性上光油已取得了突破性的进展，完全能够替代溶剂型水性上光油和油性上光油，由于水性上光油具有无毒、无味、透明感强、无有机挥发物（VOC）的排放，成本低、原材料来源广等特点，在使用中能赋予印刷良好的光泽性、耐折性、耐磨性和化学品性，尤其是它所具有的环保性能特别适合食品、药品和烟草等行业包装印刷材料的加工。     

Pollution Control in Open Economies: Implications of Within-period Interactions for Dynamic Game Equilibrium

This paper examines a two-country, dynamic game model of pollution control in the presence of economic interactions between countries within a period, as well as the environmental interaction between periods (i.e., a change in the stock of global pollution). These economic interactions emerge because of changes in the terms of trade of polluting goods or the market share of domestic polluting industries. It is shown that if within-period externalities exist, a noncooperative equilibrium may result in a smaller stock of global pollution in the steady state than does international cooperation. Moreover, the properties of equilibrium paths depend on the direction and size of such externalities. In addition, trigger strategy equilibria that achieve the outcome of the collusive solution are examined.