大股东资金占用与外部审计的公司治理职能

我国特殊的股权结构决定了我国上市公司的主要代理问题是大股东与中小股东之间的代理冲突。大股东往往通过各种方式如资金占用等来对上市公司进行掠夺。在西方成熟的资本市场上，审计作为一种独立的外部监督机制能够在一定程度上抑制代理冲突。那么在我国新兴的市场中，审计能否起到有效的监督作用从而抑制大股东的“利益输送行为”呢？本文从需求和供给两个方面进行了研究。实证结果发现，从需求方面来说，大股东资金占用越严重的公司越没有动机聘请高质量的审计师；从供给方面来说，审计师在出具审计报告时会考虑大股东的资金占用，大股东资金占用越严重，越有可能被出具非标准的审计意见报告。实证结果表明我国目前还不存在高质量的审计需求，但审计师能对大股乐的资金占用作出反应，从而在一定程度上抑制大股东的行为。     

The Political Economy of Rental Housing in Spain: The Dialectics of Exploitation(s) and Regulations

ABSTRACT

This paper analyses how the exploitation of tenants in Spain is boosting income for banks, hedge funds and pension funds. It does so by tracing the origins of the money invested in a Tres Cantos housing project in Madrid. The paper makes the following claims: First, the exploitation taking place in households -referred in this paper as secondary- is increasingly related to worker exploitation, and thus this particular type of exploitation is increasingly relevant to the dynamics of capital accumulation. Second, the key role of secondary exploitation of tenants in the revenue-making strategies of pension funds, hedge funds and banks is augmented and mediated by a myriad of regulations being implemented at the national and supranational scales. Theoretically, the paper contests the Marxian claim that household exploitation is ‘secondary’ to the exploitation taking place in the production process.     

基于期权定价理论的所有者与债权人代理问题分析

所有者和债权人之间的代理关系是现代公司治理的重要要素,如何理解和处理二者之间的关系成为社会关注的核心。本文从期权角度对所有者与债权人之间的代理关系进行新的理解,并分别介绍了无风险套期保值、B-S期权定价理论模型的具体运用以及保护债权人利益的具体措施。     

基于可持续发展观的企业财务政策选择研究

企业的财务政策是企业根据其目标和理财环境以及本身的财务实力制定的财务方针和策略，它大量涉及企业理财的谋略和企业的商业秘密，所以必须根据企业内外客观情况的变化，对政策不断加以修改补充，甚至更新替代。然而，这种更新与替代却是很难的，一方面旧的财务政策由于其内部韧性作用而得以维持；另一方面，人们由于心理中的惰性因素而倾向于维护自己已经熟悉的政策。本文探讨如何把可持续发展观引入企业财务政策的选择过程，以解决以上的矛盾。     

论养老基金平衡机制--基于辽宁试点模式对养老基金平衡的透视

我国处于转轨中的养老模式面临着人口老龄化和转轨成本的双重压力，为此，2001年7月开始在辽宁省进行社保改革试点。本将以试点模式为研究起点，并将养老基金平衡剖析为两个收支平衡：一是横向平衡，二是纵向平衡。就横向平衡而言，笔认为难关的突破在于强化政府的社会保险责任，而纵向平衡的难关在于基金收益率。为此，本提出一些拓展性的社保改革思路，并认为在此基础之上养老基金的平衡是可以实现的。     

Cross-hedging foreign currency risk: Empirical evidence from an error correction model

In this article, the traditional price change hedge ratio estimation method is extended by applying the theory of cointegration in the case of cross-hedging of spot exchange risk of the Belgian franc (BF), the Italian lira (IL), and the Dutch guilder (NG) with U.S. Dollar Index futures contracts. Previous studies ignore the last period's equilibrium error and short-run deviations. The findings of this study indicate that the hedge ratio estimated by the error correction method is superior to that obtained from the traditional method, as evidenced by the likelihood ratio test and out-of-sample forecasts. Hedgers will be able to control the risk of their portfolios more effectively at a lower cost.     

大股东资金占用与审计师的监督

本文研究审计师对大股东占用上市公司资金行为的监督作用。通过对1997年到2002年间的上市公司进行分析,我们发现随着大股东资金占用程度的加大,审计师更加倾向于出示非标准意见。在大股东占用资金最多的10%的公司年度中,审计师出示非标准意见的概率高达近50%。在控制了其他影响审计师意见的变量以后,大股东资金占用程度仍然是决定审计意见的一个非常显著的因素。这说明我国的审计师对中国资本市场出现的大股东资金占用问题有一定的认识,并且将其反映到审计师意见中去。我们进一步的分析发现: (1)被审计师出具了非标准意见的公司,其大股东占用资金反而更加持续。这说明审计师意见对公司的监督意义不大,公司并没有因为审计师的意见而减轻占用程度。(2)被审计师出具了非标准意见的公司,其大股东占用对未来的股票收益的负影响与其他公司并没有区别。这说明投资者对审计师的意见并没有给予足够的重视。本文的研究结果说明,审计师对大股东盘剥中小股东的现象进行了监督、对大股东资金占用严重的公司出示了更多的非标准意见,然而这些非标准意见并没有引起各方面的重视,一方面公司的治理并没有改善,另一方面投资者也没有因审计师的意见而避免更多的损失。     

不同融资制度下的金融中介发展

在任何一种经济中都需要建立一种金融机构与证券市场能够共同发挥作用的、完善的金融体系。但是,考虑到各种经济制度建立基础和发展历史与传统上的差异,以及金融体系与企业部门之间的关系不同,各国金融体系的架构并不需要保持完全的一致。本文从不同融资制度中金融中介的作用,探讨经济中金融中介的发展。     

Mutual fund characteristics, managerial attributes, and fund performance

This study provides a comprehensive examination of recent mutual fund performance by analyzing a large set of both mutual funds and fund attributes in an effort to link performance to fund-specific characteristics. The results indicate that the hypothesized relationships between performance and the explanatory variables are generally upheld. After taking into consideration general market conditions and fund investment objective, the characteristic variables that relate to fund popularity, growth, cost, and management also explain performance. Finally, after controlling for survivorship and benchmark error as well as fund-specific factors, the results refute the performance persistence phenomenon.     

A Time to Scatter Stones,and a Time to Gather Them: The Annual Cycle in Hedge Fund Risk Taking

Analyzing a sample of hedge fund daily returns from Bloomberg, we find a seasonal pattern in their risk taking. During earlier months of a year, poorly performing funds reduce risk. The reduction is stronger for funds with higher management fees, shorter redemption periods, and recently deteriorating performance, consistent with a managerial aversion to early fund liquidation. Toward the end of a year, poorly performing funds gamble for resurrection by increasing risk. It is largely achieved by increasing exposure to market factors, and can be linked to stronger indirect managerial incentives during the second half of a year.