Capital structure and the control of managerial incentives

We present a theory of capital structure based on the power of shareholders, bondholders and managers to control the incentive conflicts in large corporations. The manager–owner conflict produces a trade-off between inefficiency in the low state and rents in the high state, and the shareholder–bondholder conflict produces under-investment as in Myers [Journal of Financial Economics 19 (1997) 147]. Since managers and bondholders both prefer more efficient actions in the low state, the two conflicts are interdependent. With risk-less levels of debt, there are no shareholder–bondholder agency costs, but managerial control over the incentive-setting process produces excessive rents. With risky debt, shareholders focus more on returns in the high state so that shareholder–bondholder agency costs increase but managerial rents decrease. Efficient levels of debt holder protection facilitate a reduction in manager–owner agency costs that outweighs shareholder–bondholder agency costs, and are decreasing in firm performance. The results are consistent with the separate empirical results relating control to both compensation and leverage, and suggest how future studies can be integrated.     

A Cross‐national Comparison of R&D Expenditure Decisions: Tax Incentives and Financial Constraints*

We provide evidence on the impact of tax incentives and financial constraints on corporate R&D expenditure decisions. We contribute to extant research by comparing R&D expenditures in the United States and Canada, thereby exploiting the differences in the two countries' R&D tax credit mechanisms and generally accepted accounting principles. The two tax incentive mechanism designs are consistent with differing views of the degree of financial constraints faced by firms in these economies. Our sample also allows us to explore the effects of capitalizing R&D on Canadian firms. Employing a matched design, we document relations between tax credit incentives and R&D spending consistent with both Canadian and U.S. public companies responding as though they are not financially constrained. We estimate that the Canadian credit system induces, on average, $1.30 of additional R&D spending per dollar of taxes forgone while the U.S. system induces, on average, $2.96 of additional spending. We also find that firms that capitalize R&D costs in Canada spend, on average, 18 percent more on R&D. Collectively, this evidence is important to the ongoing debates in both countries concerning the appropriate design of incentives for R&D and is consistent with the assumptions found in the U.S. tax credit system, but not those found in the Canadian system.     

高新技术产业项目的绩效管理——基于软件项目管理的实证研究

针对高新技术产业广泛采用项目驱动的管理模式,在理论分析和实地调查的基础上,实证研究了客户、项目经理和激励制度对项目业绩的影响。结果发现客户对定制化需求大,但对标准化软件却有更高的边际利润;政府机构是大客户,但其垄断地位,所带来的销售利润率和项目交付率并不高;地域商务环境影响交易成本,进而显著地影响了项目的业绩水平;项目业绩受项目经理激励程度和方式的影响,但与项目经理认知特征无显著关系。这些结论说明软件企业在制定战略时,需以定制产品和定制服务为起点,但最终必须研发成为具有行业特点的标准化应用软件;在资源分配时,应重点关注地域商务环境好的客户,适当提高非政府机构行业客户的资源分配比例;应健全项目经理激励制度,促使项目提前完工,从而降低开发成本,增加项目业绩。     

基于AHP＋熵组合的相对发达地区新乡镇建设评价——以苏南三镇为例

面对新农村建设活跃和城市化进程加速，新乡镇建设也初见端倪，选取苏南三镇作为实证地点，构建相对发达地区新乡镇建设评价体系，利用主观赋权的层次分析法（AHP）和客观赋权的熵权法进行组合评价。     

金融信用之法律制度支撑——一个法经济学视角的解读

金融活动的存在与正常运转有赖于良好的信用制度与法治环境,金融信用是金融业赖以生存的基础。良好的金融信用依靠多种因素的支持,法律制度的健全是关键。本文主要从法经济学的视角提出构建完善的金融信用法律制度体系,以此防范金融信用风险,保障国民经济的增长与发展,进而促进社会的安全与稳定。     

提高我国自主创新能力的思考

本文依据当代经济发达国家经济社会发展经验的总结,并从我国当前全面建设小康社会的客观需要出发,分析了提高自主创新能力在国家经济社会发展战略中的核心地位,提出构建体制基础和科技基础以及营造生态环境,是推行自主创新战略的基本措施。     

国库集中支付操作风险产生机理的博弈分析

国库集中支付操作风险是指国库资金支付过程中出现违规操作行为的可能性。国库集中支付制度框架下财政资金支付活动是财政部门、预算单位、代理银行和人民银行共同参与的博弈过程。本文运用博弈理论首先分析国库集中支付操作风险产生的内在机理，然后剖析国库集中支付操作风险产生的外在博弈条件，最后从优化博弈条件出发，提出建立健全监督激励机制以防范国库集中支付操作风险的建议。     

论墨家思想的要指“强本节用”

司马谈在《论六家要指》中对先秦至汉初诸子思想进行了一次大的总结与评价，指出了各家要指所在，将墨家思想的要指总结为“强本节用”。司马谈对墨家思想及要指的评判，不仅仅是从学术角度出发，更重要的是从治国角度出发而作出的评定。     

文化差异对中国大学生英语写作的影响

文化差异对学生的外语学习尤其是写作影响很大。文化差异对篇章结构、语句结构、措词和修辞都产生影响。     

重拾缺失了的感恩意识：高校德育必须直面的现实

感恩是中华民族几千年的传统美德，是每个人都应该具备的基本道德准则。随着我国社会主义市场经济的快速发展，部分大学生存在感恩意识缺失现象。重拾缺失了的感恩意识对于提升人的精神境界、完善人的生命以及建设和谐社会有着重要意义。