Bertrand versus Cournot competition in a downstream mixed oligopoly with foreign ownership

Focusing on foreign ownership in the private firm, we examine the Cournot-Bertrand comparison in a mixed oligopolistic market with vertical market structure. We have found that if public and private firms were charged with uniform price for their inputs, then Cournot-Bertrand ranking in market outcomes confirms those obtained by Ghosh and Mitra (2010). This implies that under uniform pricing in the upstream sector, the vertical market structure does not have substantial influences on Cournot-Bertrand ranking. However, if discriminatory pricing is adopted, firm's profits, output, and social welfare are often reversed to those obtained from uniform pricing in the upstream sector. Given the closeness of products, if the share of foreign ownership is sufficiently low, social welfare in Cournot competition can exceed that of Bertrand competition, contrasting with the standard welfare ranking that Bertrand welfare is strictly higher than Cournot. This implies that Cournot competition can be more socially desirable than Bertrand in mixed oligopoly with vertical market structure if discriminatory pricing scheme is adopted by foreign upstream monopolists.     

上市公司终极控制人两权分离度的决定因素分析——基于2004年上市公司经验数据研究

本文以2003-2004年我国上市公司的股权结构、资产状况、现金收入与发展前景等方面的数据,采用理论分析、描述性统计与多元回归假设检验等方法,分析了我国上市公司两权分离度的影响因素。结果发现:上市公司终极控制人两权分离度的大小主要取决于上市公司的企业规模、企业资产可控性、现金流状况、企业发展前景、第一大股东持股比例、终极控制人控制层级与股权性质。     

Economic Calculation: Private Property or Several Control?

Abstract

As the centenary of the 1917 Russian revolution approaches, it is worth reviewing the past 100 years’ discussion amongst economists on the possibility—or otherwise—of economic planning under socialism. The socialist calculation debate is of fundamental importance, not merely as a specialist application of economic ideas, but as an investigation of the foundations of economic activity. Every economic action is premised upon calculation, every choice depends upon an assessment of the costs and benefits of each alternative between which the agent must choose. The view of that choice and its attendant calculation is constitutive of the schools of thought—Marxian, neoclassical and Austrian—which have contributed to the debate. An understanding of the calculation debate is therefore required to understand how these paradigms stand in relation to each other. This article addresses one aspect of that debate—the claim by Austrian economists that socialism is impossible because the absence of private property in the means of production precludes economic calculation. The article suggests that several control rather than private property is required for economic calculation, and that several control is consistent with public ownership of the means of production. The Austrian argument on this point, therefore, is without force.     

上市公司的所有权与融资结构

文章对上市公司的融资结构进行了研究,指出企业的国有（或国有控股）性质是企业资产负债率水平偏高的根本原因。与此相对应,民营企业的资产负债率水平则明显低于国有（或国有控股）企业。作者认为,现有的发行新股或债转股方式,并非是解决我国国有企业资产负债率水平偏高的根本出路。解决这一问题的最终途径可能还是在于调整所有权结构。另外,作者利用我国上市公司的数据,发现了与MMM理论相矛盾的一些事实,即我国的国有相对控股上市公司的资产负债率水平是与此类公司的所有权结构相关联的。     

异质机构投资者对高管薪酬的影响研究——来自A股上市公司的经验数据

以2012—2016年沪深A股上市公司为样本,从静态和动态两个角度实证研究异质机构投资者对上市公司高管薪酬的影响,结果表明：在高管薪酬方面,压力抵抗型投资者持股对薪酬总额的影响并不显著,而压力敏感型机构投资者则能显著提高薪酬总额;在高管薪酬变动速度方面,压力抵抗型机构投资者能够显著提升上市公司的业绩—薪酬敏感性,压力敏感型机构投资者的这一提升效果不显著;在高管薪酬变动幅度方面,A股上市公司高管薪酬普遍存在向下的粘性,相较于压力敏感型机构投资者,压力抵抗型机构投资者能够显著抑制高管薪酬粘性。     

Corporate governance structure and product market competition

This article assesses the effects of the competitive structure of a product market on a firm’s corporate governance structure. Our model demonstrates that shareholders strategically determine the corporate governance structure, including the manager’s stock ownership and his controlling power over the firm, in order to maximize their utility in the product market competition. We find that the manager’s stock ownership is lower and his controlling power over the firm is higher when the firm’s product is more profitable or when competition within the product market is more severe. The inefficiency of the wealth transfer from shareholders to the manager also affects the corporate governance structure.     

The Influence of Vested Interests on Healthcare Legislation in the USA, 2009–2010

Collective lobbying organizations and some big companies acted as cautious partners in the design of the Affordable Care Act of the Obama Administration. In addition to being consulted by government executives, these entities intensively lobbied legislators. The qualitative and statistical analysis I conduct here shows a positive impact of healthcare lobbying. Collective lobbying organizations have a significant impact on lawmaking and complementary lobbying enhances their impact. However, not all (disjointed) lobbying is successful. Perspective-based distortion might explain why organizations lobby on issues against all odds of ever being effective.     

管理层薪酬和持股激励效应的行业性差异分析--来自我国上市公司的实证证据

本文的研究以我国上市公司不同行业的实际数据为考察样本,运用实证分析方法验证我国上市公司不同类型行业管理层薪酬和持股与公司绩效之间的相关关系,分析结果表明:我国上市公司管理层薪酬和持股激励效应存在着较大的行业性差异,并提出不同行业企业应该根据自身特点和性质以及管理层薪酬和持股激励效应的大小,相机选择薪酬激励或股权激励,制定出详细周密、客观有效、切合实际的企业管理层激励方案,从而使其激励效应最大化。     

技术创新和制度创新的组合对企业持续成长的影响——基于墒理论和耗散结构理论的视角

企业持续成长是企业实现其他目标的前提。技术创新学派或制度创新学派分别强调技术创新或制度创新对企业成长的作用，忽视了二者的协同对企业成长的作用．本文借用熵理论和耗散结构理论，在提出企业技术熵、制度熵、技术负熵、制度负熵、协同负熵等概念的基础上，分别研究了企业的技术创新与制度创新的不同组合对企业持续性和成长性的影响，并对此进行了比较。最后应用所构建的模型分别对于生命周期处于闭区间和开区间的企业成长性和持续性进行了研究，并推导出了企业进行技术创新和制度创新的最佳时间，临界点。