Does the Company Lawyer Have Your Back? A Brief Look at the Need for Personal Private Liability Insurance

There are four traditional uses of private personal liability insurance dating from the 1970s to the present (Hayes 1979; Sommers 2005) which pertain either to individuals or corporations. There is insurance to cover damage to rental cars, umbrella insurance to cover any injury to a guest at one’s home, insurance bought by corporations to cover potential corporate responsibility for actions of company representatives and insurance including misadventures with financial information and morally hazardous behavior as well as corporate required actions which are later deemed to be wrong or inappropriate. Employees need to find out if the employee manual provides for coverage for legal liabilities resulting out of performing job responsibilities. Due to a need to reduce company costs, many companies are reducing or eliminating coverage for employees for many types of actions. Private personal liability insurance gives you the peace of mind to know what you are covered for and for how long. Employee rights versus corporate budgets are at the core of this discussion.     

道德风险存在下董事责任保险市场的保费水平分析

本文通过对董事责任保险市场的介绍,指出在董事责任保险市场中存在着严重的道德风险问题,通过对市场中保险双方行为的博弈分析,得到在道德风险存在下的保费变动范围,并指出防止或减轻董事责任保险市场中道德风险的方法.     

台湾全民健康保险财务危机论析

台湾全民健康保险自1995年实施至今已经取得了显著的成效,民众的健康有了基本的保障.但是,台湾健保也面临着严重的财务问题,至今已经爆发了三次财务危机.本文从台湾健保的管理制度、财务收入制度和财务支出制度等方面对其财务危机进行了分析,并总结出它为完善我国大陆健康保险制度提供的借鉴意义.     

陕西实施农村养老保险制度的经济分析及措施

随着我国人口老龄化的加剧，老年人特别是农村老年人的养老问题日益突出，本文主要通过对陕西农村养老现状和所存在问题的分析，提出了建立农村养老保险制度的建议，旨在于试图为我国农村养老保险制度的实施提供一些借鉴。     

中国保险业的合谋倾向强度:一个理论分析框架

从结构、需求与信息三个维度构建了一个产业合谋倾向强度理论分析框架，并用该框架分析了我国保险业的合谋强度。研究认为，我国保险业合谋强度比较大。     

基于高频数据的深圳基金市场日内周期性研究

本文利用深市基金指数高频数据,采用Anderson和Bollerslev(1997)提出的弹性傅立叶回归(FlexibleFourierFormregression,即FFF回归)方法首次对深市基金市场进行了日内周期性的研究。通过对高频收益的定性分析,发现基金市场具有同股票市场相似的周期性,并对这一周期性进行了初步的理论解释。通过FFF方法,将该周期因子进行滤波处理以后,基金指数高频绝对收益不再具有明显周期性。FFF回归能较好地确定日内周期因子。     

分红保险合同红利负债的确认与计量研究

近年来分红保险已成为我国保险市场的热销产品,它几乎占据了寿险市场的半壁江山,但分红保险负债的确认与计量问题,特别是分红保险红利负债的确认与计量问题在我国并未形成统一的规范,本文根据分红保险的不同红利分配方式对分红保险合同红利负债的确认与计量问题进行研究。     

构建我国个人信用体系保障机制--韩国"坏银行"重整制度考察之思考

我国个人消费信贷近几年的发展十分迅速，但是在个人消费信贷的快速发展中，银行由于个人不良信贷所引发的不良债权比重逐年上升，而且信用环境不良有恶化这一问题的趋势。个人信用制度的建设、个人不良信贷资产的处置和我国个人信用安全体系的构建，已经成为摆在我们面前的现实问题。韩国资产管理公司在处置信用卡公司不良债权中的“坏银行”重整制度，构成了韩国金融安全网络的重要组成部分，这一制度设计值得我们借鉴。     

Deposit insurance and bank regulation in a monetary economy: a general equilibrium exposition

Summary. It is commonly argued that poorly designed banking system safety nets are largely to blame for the frequency and severity of modern banking crises. For example, underpriced deposit insurance and/or low reserve requirements are often viewed as factors that encourage risk-taking by banks. In this paper, we study the effects of three policy variables: deposit insurance premia, reserve requirements and the way in which the costs of bank bailouts are financed. We show that when deposit insurance premia are low, the monetization of bank bailout costs may not be more inflationary than financing these costs out of general revenue. This is because, while monetizing the costs increases the inflation tax rate, higher levels of general taxation reduce savings, deposits, bank reserves, and the inflation tax base. Increasing the inflation tax rate obviously raises inflation, but so does an erosion of the inflation tax base. We also find that low deposit insurance premia or low reserve requirements may not be associated with a high rate of bank failure.Received: 2 January 2002, Revised: 1 March 2003JEL Classification Numbers: D5, E5, G1.B. D. Smith: Sadly, our co-author, colleague and dear friend, Bruce D. Smith, died on July 9, 2002.     

The politics of redistributive social insurance

This paper analyses the political support for a social insurance that includes elements of redistribution when there exists an imperfect private insurance alternative. Individuals differ both in their income and risk. The social insurance is compulsory and charges an income-related contribution with pooling of risks. The private insurance is voluntary and charges a contribution based on individual risks. However due to the adverse selection problem, private insurance companies provide only partial insurance. Adopting a non-expected utility model, we show that there is a general majority support for social insurance and that this support is increasing with risk aversion. We also show that a mixed insurance is politically impossible, regardless of the degree of redistribution of social insurance and the joint distribution of risk and income in the population. Lastly, we analyse how the political support for social insurance is affected by any change in its redistributive component and the possibility of using genetic tests.