How financial intermediation impacts on financial stability?

The great financial crisis widened the role of financial intermediation in financial stability. This study develops a new financial intermediation variable, credit cash flow (CCF), which enables measurement of the net financial flow resulting from loan activity. An analysis provides evidence that CCF affects the capital buffer via credit gap behaviour, thus indicating the existence of a channel between the CCF and the capital buffer. Such a link offers the policy-maker the possibility to monitor the behaviour of financial intermediation carried out by banks, in order to avoid the outbreak of financial instability events.     

Lenders on the storm of wholesale funding shocks: saved by the central bank?

We provide empirical evidence on banks’ responses to shocks in the wholesale funding market, using data of 181 euro area banks over the period from August 2007 to June 2013. Responses to funding liquidity shocks for both banks’ lending volumes and loan rates, to households and corporates, are analysed in a panel VAR framework. We thereby distinguish banks by country, extent of Eurosystem borrowing, bank size and capitalization. The results show that shocks in the securities and interbank markets have significant effects on loan rates and credit supply, particularly of banks in stressed countries of the periphery. The results also suggest that central bank liquidity has mitigated this effect on lending volumes. Lending to nonfinancial corporations is more sensitive to wholesale funding shocks than lending to households. Lending volumes of large banks that are typically more dependent on wholesale funding and banks with large exposure to sovereign bonds show stronger responses to wholesale funding shocks.     

内部资本市场的主体及其功能定位

内部资本市场是对企业集团财务资源进行整合和重新配置的场所,是市场行为的内部化。通过分析内部资本市场资本配置系统的构成与运行,指出内部资本市场的参与主体是集团总部和各业务单位。总部利用权威通过行政和价格双重机制集中并重新配置资源;各业务单位则提供资源并通过竞争获得资源,进行内部资本的具体运营;内部结算中心或财务公司发挥金融中介功能,构架了各主体之间的资金桥梁。     

Study on the measurement of China’s financial intermediation ratio in terms of stock: 1992–2006

In terms of China’s financial intermediation ratio (FIMR) in stock, we make a thorough empirical study on the change of the ratios during 1992–2006. We find that: The monopoly position of bank credit in the financing channel of non-financial sector is weakened, but bank credit is still the most important financing channel for non-financial sector. There is a structure change in the financing channel of government sector and its FIMR is increasing. Though the scale of non-banking financial institutions underwent rapid development during 1992–2006, their role in social financing cannot be evenly matched with banking system. It is the change of various economy behaviors that induce the changes of FIMR in China.     

平台自治的监管问题研究——以平台的双重身份为视角

平台自治在市场监管中具有双重作用,即其自身作为监管链条的关键一环发挥主动性,同时作为监管中介为公共部门的市场监管提供支持。在此种机制下,平台自治对监管政策 构成了挑战。一方面平台自治有可能抑制创新;另一方面平台自治因其超前于监管政策的更新也会引发与现有监管政策的冲突。因此,对平台自治的监管路径需要思考,既要发挥平台自治的优越性,又要规制其限制竞争的行为。国家监管政策的着力点也需要相应调整,在监管政策上要从对平台用户的直接监管转向为平台制定自我监管的指导;同时需要规范平台技术,以技术监管促进监管目标的实现。面对平台经济的组织模式和技术在监管中日益深刻的作用,需要坚持“网络中立性”原则和平台规则透明度原则,实现监管政策与平台自治的协调。     

Microfinance institutions,financial intermediation and the role of deposits

Microfinance institutions (MFIs), widely regarded as bankers to the poor, have extended their financial functions beyond lending to managing deposits. We empirically examine the influence of MFI deposit-taking on MFI financial performance. Using data of 1,301 MFIs worldwide, we find that an MFI's deposit level is an important determinant of its financial viability. However, the relationship is influenced by MFIs’ institutional type (for-profit or nonprofit) and the legal environment (common law or civil law). The results suggest that the positive financial impact of deposits has not been fully realised, reflecting the need to further improve cost management and revenue generation.     

Profit strategy of Greek banks: cross-subsidization and diversification versus complementarity

This study analyses the profit strategy employed by banks in Greece using dynamic panel data techniques and a data set which includes proprietary supervisory data covering the whole Greek commercial banking system from 2004 to 2011. We provide evidence that banks use interest- and non-interest income (non-II) as substitutes rather than complements, with non-II representing an indirect competition instrument by the more efficient banks used in place of direct competition with their peers through prices on loans and deposits. This behaviour is explained by further decomposing the non-II into the relatively stable fees component and the volatile trading income. Moreover, we provide evidence that the net-interest income is primarily affected by the banks’ market power and their operating costs, while more efficient banks exploit their core deposit base to lever their non-II. Finally, macroeconomic developments affect both income components, which are found to be procyclical with respect to economic activity. In particular, the two income components are affected differently from inflation implying that non-II provides a natural hedge against adverse effects from deflation on interest income.     

A monetary mechanism for sharing capital: Diamond and Dybvig meet Kiyotaki and Wright

Summary. A model is presented in which banks update public records, accept deposits of fiat money and intermediate capital. I show that inside money is more liquid than outside money, increasing the turnover rates of idle capital. The model offers a simple explanation for the dual role of financial institutions: Banks are monitored and can issue nominal assets upon request, which helps them to transfer capital in sufficiently high rates and to also become intermediaries. The model shares some features with those of Diamond and Dybvig [5], and Kiyotaki and Wright [7].Received: 18 February 2003, Revised: 16 February 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: E51, G21, G24.Ricardo de O. Cavalcanti: I thank two anonymous referees, Susumu Imai, B. Ravikumar and Neil Wallace, as well as participants at the Economic Theory symposium Recents Developments in Money and Finance, and seminar participants at the Richmond Fed, Queens University, and Sabanci University for comments on an early draft. The hospitality and financial support of the Cleveland Fed Central Bank Institute and CNPq are greatfully appreciated. The authors opinions are not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland or the Federal Reserve System.     

Optimal debt contracts and moral hazard along the business cycle

Summary. We analyze the Pareto optimal contracts between lenders and borrowers in a model with asymmetric information. The model generalizes the Rothschild-Stiglitz pure adverse selection problem by including moral hazard. Entrepreneurs with unequal abilities borrow to finance alternative investment projects which differ in degree of risk and productivity. We determine the endogenous distribution of projects as functions of the amount of loanable funds, when lenders have no information about borrowers ability and technological choices. Then, we embed these results in a dynamic competitive economy and show that the average quality of the selected projects in equilibrium may be high in recessions and low in booms. This phenomenon may generate (a) multiple steady states, (b) a smaller impact of exogenous shocks on output relative to the full information case, (c) endogenous fluctuations.Received: 11 June 2001, Revised: 17 June 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: A10, G14, G20, E32.Correspondence to: Pietro ReichlinPietro Reichlin acknowledges financial support from MURST and Paolo Siconolfi acknowledges financial support from the GSB of Columbia University.     

Information, Credit Risk, Lender Specialization and Loan Pricing: Evidence from the DIP Financing Market

We provide an empirical support for theories of lender specialization using the recently developed market for Debtor-in-Possession (DIP) financing. The legal environment in which DIP financing operates represents a natural laboratory for testing determinants of lending specialization (e.g. lender choice). We find that the choice of lender is not driven by credit risk, but by information considerations and that this lending specialization has loan pricing effects. In short, banks (non-bank lenders) lend to more (less) transparent firms and at lower (higher) loan spreads. Our results are consistent with the interpretation that banks provide important and useful services.