Market Structure and Audit Fees: A Local Analysis*

This study conducts a local analysis of the relation between market structure and audit fees. The research question of interest to us is how audit fees are determined by each practicing local office, after taking into account the auditor's own position in a local market and the influence exerted by his or her clients. Appealing to the economic theories of monopoly and monopsony power, we hypothesize a positive audit fee‐concentration relation, and a negative audit fee‐client influence relation. Results indicate that auditor market concentration is positively associated with the non‐Big 6 audit fees but is unrelated to the Big 6 audit fees. Evidence is mixed concerning the client influence hypothesis. When this construct is proxied by the number of rival auditors operating within a geographic area centered on the municipality, the prediction of negative audit fee‐client influence relation is strongly supported for both groups of auditors. Results are much weaker using measures developed based on the relative importance of a municipal client to its auditor's audit portfolio. The issues addressed in this study are important at a time when the Canadian municipal sector is undergoing major changes because of municipal amalgamation, altering the underlying market structure for audit services and the bargaining position of a municipality vis‐Ã‐vis its auditor. More broadly speaking, our analysis implies that when assessing an auditor's report for signs of client pressure, the professional oversight bodies and regulatory authorities need to consider the relative, rather than the absolute, bargaining position of the client in question.     

A clash of governance logics: Foreign ownership and board monitoring

We ask whether and when shareholder‐oriented foreign owners are likely to change corporate governance logics in a stakeholder‐oriented setting by introducing shareholder‐oriented governance practices. We focus on board monitoring and claim that because the bundle of practices used in a stakeholder context does not protect shareholder‐oriented foreign owners' interests, they seek to introduce their own practices. Our results suggest that board monitoring is only activated when shareholder‐oriented foreign ownership is high and that the influence of foreign ownership is especially strong in firms without large domestic owners, with high levels of risk and poor performance. Our findings uncover the possibility of the co‐existence of different corporate governance logics within a given country, shaped by the nature and weight of foreign owners Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

改进的价格敏感的随机库存模型

从考虑商品的库存管理费用出发.探讨含有商品管理费用的库存模型。首先介绍了传统的价格敏感的随机库存模型.接着提出了改进的模型,后又对两种模型进行了分析比较.最后通过实例分析.说明改进模型优于原模型。     

论审计收费对独立性的影响

审计独立性是注册会计师执行鉴证业务的灵魂。笔者针对目前我国审计收费模式和收费价格方面所存在的问题,进行了分析,阐述对独立性的影响,并提出了改进的建议。     

Does International Accounting Network Membership Affect Audit Fees and Audit Quality? Evidence From China

Regulators suggest that small audit firms join international accounting networks to reduce their resource constraints in serving large clients and providing high-quality service. Bills, Cunningham, and Myers (2016) investigate the issue in the United States and find that both audit fees and quality are higher for members of international accounting networks (i.e., member audit firms). We investigate the effects of network membership on audit fees and quality in China, a relatively weaker institutional environment than the United States. Using data of Chinese listed companies audited by non-Big N audit firms from 2001 to 2010, we find that member audit firms charge 3.9% higher fees than nonmember audit firms, much lower than the 30% fee premiums charged by U.S. member audit firms. We do not find consistent evidence that audit quality is higher for member audit firms. Overall, our results demonstrate that China's weak institutional environment may overwhelm the quality control brought by international accounting networks and that it may weaken or even offset the benefits of audit firms' participation in these networks, resulting in smaller or even no effects of membership on audit fees and quality.     

Calling party pays or receiving party pays? The diffusion of mobile telephony with endogenous regulation

This paper analyzes the impact on mobile telephony diffusion patterns of the two predominant payment regimes, calling party pays (CPP) and receiving party pays (RPP), for mobile termination services. By applying instrumental variable techniques to panel data we account for a possible interdependency of penetration rates and regulatory interventions. For this purpose we use data on political and institutional factors to instrument endogenous regulatory decisions. We conclude from our empirical analysis that there is no significant impact of either RPP or CPP on penetration rates. Therefore an application of RPP in order to obviate regulation of termination fees would be feasible.     

DEFERRED FEES FOR UNIVERSITIES

Each English university should be allowed to introduce its own ‘deferred fees’ on top of the existing national funding structure. Each graduate would only have to pay these fees to its university if their income rises beyond the point of paying off their maintenance and state tuition loans. I show these new fees are fiscally neutral, highly progressive and have no impact on the state or the financial position of the universities which do not introduce such fees. They have the potential to provide a long‐run solution to the repeated underfunding of undergraduate education at a number of English universities and reduce the fiscal pressure the state is under.     

Rejoinder

This paper provides a formula for a commonly used measure of the economic value of asset return predictability. In doing this, we find that there is a strong connection between this measure and a traditional statistical measure of predictive quality. In particular, we demonstrate that the maximum amount an investor is willing to pay for predictability knowledge (the performance fee) is a simple transformation of the R ² statistic associated with the predictor equation. We illustrate the use of these results with an application to the Ibbotson US bond and equity data (and a set of pertinent predictors), and via application to the results published in Fama and French [1988. Dividend yields and expected stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics 22: 3–25], Balvers, Cosimano, and McDonald [1990. Predicting stock returns in an efficient market. Journal of Finance 45: 1109–28], Lettau and Ludvigson [2001. Consumption, aggregate wealth and expected stock returns. Journal of Finance 56: 815–49], and Santa-Clara and Yan [2010. Crashes, volatility, and the equity premium: Lessons from S&;P 500 options. Review of Economics and Statistics 92: 435–51].     

Exit fees and termination fees revisited: funding irrigation infrastructure in a manner compatible with water trade*

It has long been recognised that the mechanism for funding irrigation infrastructure in Australia may be incompatible with efficient trade in the rural water market. If the revenue received by an irrigation operator is dependent on the volume of water entitlements held in the operator’s region, out‐of‐region permanent water sales threaten the operator’s revenue stream, potentially leading to higher charges on remaining irrigators, encouraging an inefficient ‘rush for the exit’. In response, irrigation operators have imposed restrictions on permanent water trade, such as exit fees and termination fees, to protect their revenue stream. Previous economic analysis has suggested that exit fees, in particular, are a barrier to efficient trade in the water market and should be abolished. In contrast, this paper argues that allowing irrigators to cancel their water delivery rights without fees or charges leads to inefficient trade in the water market, hinders efficient on‐farm investment in sunk complementary assets and leads to inefficient network rationalisation decisions. Instead, the revenue stream of irrigation operators should be insulated from water trade decisions, through high termination fees, tying irrigation charges to the land, or tagging the obligation to pay delivery charges to the new owner of the traded water.     

浅议我国建设工程质量管理的体系设计与运行机制

工程质量管理体系应该规定质量责任法定负责人,房屋的产权人是质量认定的核准人.应该建立质量评定时的经济处罚制度,建立工程质量信用担保制度,完善工程监理费用支取制度.