A Model of Reputation in Cheap Talk*

We study a dynamic game of advice where the sender's preferences are unknown to the receiver. The novel feature of the model is that there is more than one type of biased sender. We show that the more equal the proportions of different biases in the sender population, the greater the credibility of the information transmitted. Somewhat surprisingly, however, we also find that the receiver does not benefit from this equality. We discuss our results in the context of political lobbying and show that institutions that increase transparency lower lobbyists' incentives for truthtelling, but unambiguously promote the policymaker's welfare.     

The political economy of non‐tariff measures

This paper examines the extent to which non‐tariff measures (NTM s) are set for protectionist purposes. Our main focus is on developing countries. Overall results show that NTM s reflect protectionist forces, in particular for those that have been subject to trade concerns at the World Trade Organization (WTO ). For the other measures, there is no evidence that protectionism is the driving force behind their adoption, suggesting that their determinants may be associated with legitimate goals such as consumer health and safety. Furthermore, transnational lobbying, defined as the participation of national business groups at the Ministerial Conferences—the highest authority of the WTO —is positively associated with the probability of adopting NTM s.     

Lobbying,political competition and the welfare effect of campaign contribution tax

This paper develops a probabilistic voting model in which a single lobby group commits campaign contributions to parties, contingent on the policy position the party adopts. Parties may have different propensities for diverting campaign funds towards rents. We show that a party that skims more from contributions mobilises fewer uninformed voters but places more value on receiving greater contributions. Further, the contributions and vote share of the party increases with the distance between the lobby's preferred policy and the median voter's ideal policy. Finally, we show that the equilibrium policy is between the median voter's ideal point and the lobby's preferred policy. Such an equilibrium policy does not maximise the aggregate social welfare due to the distortionary nature of lobbying. However, when an appropriate contribution tax is introduced to limit this distortion, social welfare will be maximised.     

Does ‘Protection for Sale’ Apply to the US Food Industries?

This paper tests the Protection for Sale model in terms of the structure of protection and how realistic the estimated domestic welfare weight is relative to campaign contributions. Using data from US food manufacturing, empirical results support the key predictions for the structure of protection when either all food manufacturing industries or most of the general population is assumed to be politically organised. The domestic welfare weight is estimated as low as 0.837, the lowest econometric estimate to date, underlining that protection is for sale and that, with a qualified ‘yes’, the model fits the data for these industries.     

Forest Conservation – Too Much or Too Little? A Political Economy Model

This paper studies the formation offorest policy when the government isinfluenced by an environmental lobbyand an industrial lobby representing anon-competitive wood processing industry.Government decides on forestconservation by way of restricting timberharvesting. Lobbying is modelledas a common agency game with differencesin the efficiency of lobbying. Acomparison of the political equilibriashows that an exporting forestindustry faces a stricter conservationrequirement than a forest industrywhose production is destined for domesticmarkets. If the industrial lobbyis more efficient than the environmentallobby, conservation is insufficientfrom the social point of view. However,conservation may be insufficienteven if the environmental lobby is moreefficient in lobbying than theindustrial lobby. This is because thelobbying effort of the environmentallobby also benefits consumers thatremain politically passive.     

Lobbying contests with alternative instruments

This is a model of a contest where, in order to win, each opponent can use two instruments. The probabilities of winning are explored, as well as the expenditures of the interest groups, and the relative rent-dissipation in both cases where the players have the option to use only one instrument (the standard Tullock contest) and where the players have the option to use two instruments in the contest. We show that the use of two instruments strengthens the player with the higher stake, decreases the relative rent dissipation and it decreases total expenditure if the parties are sufficiently asymmetric. Received: February 23, 2001 / Accepted: March 25, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We are grateful to two anonymous referees and the editor Kai Konrad, for constructive comments.     

Dynamic Career Incentive Versus Policy Rent-Seeking in Institutionalized Authoritarian Regimes: Testing a Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination in China

Abstract:

In this paper, I study the effect of political elites’ career incentives on China’s trade policy formation. I propose a theoretical dynamic view in which China’s authoritarian leaders can preempt protectionist actions of their selectorate (bureaucrats) by offering them future promotion opportunities within the authoritarian hierarchy as long as the leaders can credibly commit to these political promises. Drawing on a database of China’s sectors for 1999–2007, the empirical results support the dynamic perspective that while political organization still matters for China’s trade policy outcomes, it is less likely for a sector with a higher promotion expectation score to get politically organized.     

WHY ARE TRADE BARRIERS SO LOW?

The political economy literature suggests that tariff rates should be high because the gains to producers from protection are enormous while the welfare costs are small. This paper presents and evaluates six possible explanations for the relatively low tariffs we see today in most developed countries.     

国际贸易政策合作的动因分析

各种形式的国际贸易政策合作是现代国际经济关系的普遍现象。本文将从操纵贸易条件、利益集团游说和政策不可信性等不同角度给出贸易政策合作的理论解释。