A Canadian Response to the Pursuit of Global Sustainability Reporting Standards*

As business, government, and society continue to emphasize the importance of sustainability—both of individual organizations and of the natural world—accounting standard-setting bodies want to be part of the process. In September 2020, in response to “urgent and growing demand” for more “consistent and comparable” sustainability reporting, the IFRS Foundation (the Foundation) released for comment a Consultation Paper on Sustainability Reporting. In the paper, the Foundation proposed the creation of a Sustainability Standards Board (SSB), which it would oversee alongside the IASB. The SSB would become, de facto, the global sustainability reporting standard setter. The Foundation received 577 responses to its proposal. These responses came from around the world and from a wide range of stakeholders. Thirty-eight of the responses came from Canada. This study profiles the Canadian responses, contrasting them with the wider set of worldwide responses. Some uniquely Canadian features include user responses from a large number of pension funds and preparer responses solely from the energy sector. There was also a significant response from the Canadian accounting community, including from the full set of Canadian standard-setting organizations. Five auditors general also responded. Overall, Canadian respondents supported both globalized sustainability reporting standards and the Foundation's creation of the SSB. This support aligns Canada's response with the worldwide response.     

Making the invisible,visible: Overcoming barriers to ESG performance with an ESG mindset

Improving corporate environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance starts with recognizing that not every dollar of earnings is created equally, as some profit may be earned at the cost of damaging the environment or of harming stakeholder relationships. These costs are often invisible to corporate employees, as they are not recorded. To earn corporate profits that are environmentally and socially responsible, boards and CEOs must overcome two barriers: (1) the ESG issue-assessment barrier, which reflects an organization’s inability to fairly assess, prioritize, scope, and plan ESG initiatives that address the invisible environmental and social damage corporations cause, and (2) the shareholder-value barrier, which recognizes that corporate employees may resist implementing ESG initiatives owing to their entrenched belief that corporations must maximize shareholder returns. To overcome these two barriers, we propose an ESG mindset model that highlights the pitfalls relating to ESG issue assessment and to the common belief in maximizing shareholder value and then suggests tactics to overcome them. The benefits to corporations that successfully overcome the barriers and improve their corporate ESG performance are threefold: They (1) will be perceived as positively contributing to environmental and societal issues, and thereby (2) avoid accusations of greenwashing and (3) improve their standing with stakeholders.     

Lobbying and innovation in the European Union

Aside from anecdotal evidence, lobbying activities and the role of vested interests in the EU have not been scrutinized. This article attempts to cast focus on the relationship between lobbying and aspects of innovation in the EU. The modest performance of the EU compared to the innovation frontier has been attributed to an array of factors, one of which is the adverse effect of vested interests. The lack of new, innovative enterprises has been identified as a decisive factor behind the productivity stagnation and lobbying by incumbents poses as a credible culprit. In this article, I create a novel firm-level database through the cross-fertilization of data from the growing Transparency Register (EC and EP), AMADEUS (BvD), the OECD, Eurostat, and the European Commission in order to address the complex relationship between vested interests, innovation, and competition. The preliminary findings indicate that more R&D intensive firms tend to spend significantly larger amount of funds on lobbying, primarily competing for EU grants and government procurement. Using data for country-sector concentration, I find that the relationship is stronger in the presence of low competition. Despite the improvements required in the documentation of lobbying activities, these results provide preliminary tangible evidence on the effect of vested interests on innovation performance.     

Corporate lobbying: Resource-seeking or rent-seeking? Evidence from audit fees

Theory and prior research suggest that corporate lobbying is a primary means that corporations use to influence government policies either for improving firm performance (i.e., strategic decisions) or for rent-seeking activities (i.e., agency costs) but the evidence between lobbying activities and auditor assessments of audit risk remains unclear. Our results show that lobbying firms are associated with higher audit risks and fees, consistent with the idea that lobbying is related to rent-seeking and higher agency costs. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that the positive association between lobbying and audit fees is weaker for firms with strong corporate governance. Further analysis shows that firm financial returns or low earnings quality mediate the relationship between lobbying and audit fees. The results suggest that practitioners, users of financial statements and regulators could benefit by recognizing that lobbying activities could signal managerial opportunistic behavior.