On the evolutionary edge of altruism: a game-theoretic proof of Hamilton’s rule for a simple case of siblings

We offer a game-theoretic proof of Hamiltons rule for the spread of altruism. For a simple case of siblings, we show that the rule can be derived as the outcome of a one-shot prisoners dilemma game between siblings.JEL Classification: A13, C70, D64Correspondence to: Oded Stark, ZEF, University of Bonn, Walter-Flex-Strasse 3, 53113 Bonn, GermanyWe are indebted to an anonymous referee and to Uwe Cantner for helpful comments and suggestions. Partial financial support from the National Institute on Aging (grant RO1-AG13037) and from the Humboldt Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.     

农地利用技术创新的类型与模式研究

农地利用技术是一个多层次的体系，它能在扩大耕地面积、提高土地利用率和耕地质量等多方面发挥重要作用。通过对“市场机制自发作用下的技术选择”和“政府引导下的技术选择”两种现实模式的探讨，认为技术创新具有外部性，土地利用更是具有明显的“外溢效应”，加上我国农业比较利益偏低和农地使用权流转市场发育不全带来的农地价格扭曲，常造成市场机制下技术创新的方向与资源稀缺状况不相符合的现象，从而带来资源配置的低效率。因此，适当的政府引导是必要的，也是有效的。     

Jointness in production and farmers' willingness to supply non-marketed ecosystem services

This paper highlights how farmers' willingness to supply non-marketed ecosystem services (ES) is influenced by whether or not the non-marketed ES are produced jointly with agricultural products. When marketed products and non-marketed ES share some production inputs the production relationships between the two may be complementary, competitive or substitutive. Using a cost minimization framework, it is shown how complementary relationships lead to costless voluntary provision of non-marketed ES (typically the case for ES that are supportive of provisioning ES for marketed farm products). It is also shown how competitive production relationships lead to provision of non-marketed ES at lower cost than when non-marketed ES are direct substitutes for farm products or are produced outside of agriculture. The paper closes by showing how the minimum willingness to accept (WTA) payment for ES that are complementary/competitive is less than or equal to the minimum WTA for the same ES produced in substitute or independent production relationships.     

提升我国国际竞争力的主要途径初探

运用系统范式分析现代国家竞争力的构成因素,应当包括企业行为,产业环境,要素禀赋,国家政治、经济、文化、人口、科技、习俗,国际环境等。这些在国家、产业、企业发展中的不同阶段中具有不同作用,国家和企业应据此采取相应的措施,作为形成和提升国家竞争力的基本途径。     

组织文化对国有企业效能影响的调查研究——以五粮液集团有限公司为个案

组织文化是组织成员共享的一组管理理念假设、核心价值观、行为准则和行为模式的体系，它以文化力量推动着组织和企业的长期发展。本文立足实际，调查组织文化的不同难度与国有企业效能之间的相互关系，以实证论证组织文化对企业发展的推动作用。     

技术性贸易壁垒内涵辨正

进入21世纪以来，技术性贸易壁垒替代反倾销成为我国面临的第一大非关税壁垒。但是对于技术性贸易壁垒，世界贸易组织框架下的相关协议，即《技术性贸易壁垒协议》和《实施卫生和植物卫生措施协议》，并没有做出明确的定义。因此，在分析世贸组织相关协议和判例的基础上，提炼出技术性贸易壁垒的内核，以对技术性贸易壁垒的含义加以澄清并重新认识，对于我国具有重大而深远的意义。     

基于行为决策理论的投资决策研究：发展及实践意义

以“理性人”假设为基础的传统财务决策理论将决策者独立于投资决策过程之外，认为决策者完全能够依据理性决策模型做出最优的决策，但现实并非如此。本文对行为决策理论中关于投资决策的研究文献进行了梳理，揭示了决策者的行为特征会影响到投资决策及投资回报率的设定，展望了行为决策理论在我国的发展前景及实践意义。     

浅谈金融创新与金融风险管理

中国金融业已全面对外开放,中资银行要与外资银行展开全面的合作与竞争,金融业必须加大金融创新的力度.当前金融创新呈现出新的趋势和特点:金融监管的自由化与国际化、金融业务多元化、金融交易电子化、金融产品复杂化、金融服务个性化及金融机构同质化.在金融创新同时,也产生了新的金融风险,要加强对金融风险的管理,保证金融稳定,促进金融创新,提高中国金融业的国际竞争力.     

The Legislator as Political Entrepreneur: Investment in Political Capital

This paper applies the standard Austrian theory of capital investment to the standard interest group model of legislator behavior. Distinguishing between reputational capital and representative capital as interdependent forms of political capital, I argue that legislator behavior (specifically roll call voting) can be explained as entrepreneurial investment in political capital under uncertainty. I discuss several examples in which this approach can potentially add predictive power regarding legislative voting.     

Incentive Regulation of Prices When Costs are Sunk

We present a model featuring irreversible investment, economies of scale, uncertain future demand and capital prices, and a regulator who sets the firm’s output price according to the cost structure of a hypothetical replacement firm. We show that a replacement firm has a fundamental cost advantage over the regulated firm: it can better exploit the economies of scale because it has not had to confront the historical uncertainties faced by the regulated firm. We show that setting prices so low that a replacement firm is just willing to participate is insufficient to allow the regulated firm to expect to break even whenever it has to invest. Thus, unless the regulator is willing to incur costly monitoring to ensure the firm invests, revenue must be allowed in excess of that required for a replacement firm to participate. This contrasts with much of the existing literature, which argues that the market value of a regulated firm should equal the cost of replacing its existing assets. We also obtain a closed-form solution for the regulated firm’s output price when this price is set at discrete intervals. In contrast to rate of return regulation, we find that resetting the regulated price more frequently can increase the risk faced by the firm’s owners, and that this is reflected in a higher output price and a higher weighted-average cost of capital.