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941.
生产集中、人口分布与地区经济差异 总被引:63,自引:4,他引:63
动、静态比较分析发现 ,我国生产的极化作用不高 ,人口的极化作用过低。我国地区经济差距的主要原因是生产向东部地区不断集中的同时 ,人口没有相应地向那里集中 ,造成核心发达区域生产与人口分布高度失衡。鼓励中西部贫困人口向东部尤其是东部核心区域流动 ,是解决我国地区经济差距的有效策略。 相似文献
942.
943.
The Borda rule,Condorcet consistency and Condorcet stability 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Summary. The Borda rule is known to be the least vulnerable scoring rule to Condorcet inconsistency, Saari (2000). Such inconsistency
occurs when the Condorcet winner (the alternative which is preferred to any other alternative by a simple majority) is not
selected by the Borda rule. This note exposes the relationship between the Borda rule and the Condorcet q-majority principle as well as the Condorcet q-majority voting rule. The main result establishes that the Borda rule is Condorcet q-majority consistent when where k is the number of alternatives. The second result establishes that is the minimal degree of majority decisiveness corresponding to the Borda rule under sincere voting. The same majority is
required to ensure decisiveness under the Borda rule and to ensure that a q-rule (the generalized q-majority Condorcet rule) is a voting rule.
Received: April 8, 2002; revised version: July 17, 2002
Correspondence to:S. Nitzan 相似文献
944.
Summary. The requirement that a voting procedure be immune to the strategic withdrawal of a candidate for election can be formalized
in different ways. Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (Econometrica, 2001) have recently shown that two formalizations of this candidate stability property are incompatible with some other
desirable properties of voting procedures. This article shows that Grether and Plott's nonbinary generalization of Arrow's
Theorem can be used to provide simple proofs of two of their impossibility theorems.
Received: August 15, 2001; revised version: March 11, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" Parts of this article were previously circulated in somewhat different form in a working paper with the same title
by the second author. We are grateful to Michel Le Breton and an anonymous referee for their comments.
Correspondence to:J.A. Weymark 相似文献
945.
Hiroyuki Nakata 《Economic Theory》2003,21(2-3):697-727
Summary. This paper studies how communication or exchange of opinions influences correlation of beliefs. The paper focuses on a situation
in which agents communicate with each other infinitely many times without observing data. It is an extension to the ‘Expert
Problem’ in Bayesian theory, where the informational flow is asymmetric. Moreover, this paper generalizes the existing literature
of communication that employs the common prior assumption (CPA) by allowing for heterogeneous beliefs. Some basic convergence
results are shown in contrast with the results obtained under the CPA. Furthermore, several economic implications of the basic
results are provided.
Received: August 27, 2001; revised version: April 16, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" The results presented in this paper are taken from my Ph.D. thesis at Stanford University. I gratefully acknowledge
the inspiration obtained from innumerable discussions with Mordecai Kurz about this subject. Also, I appreciate comments from
Kenneth J. Arrow, Peter J. Hammond, Maurizio Motolese, Carsten K. Nielsen, Ho-Mou Wu and the anonymous referee. 相似文献
946.
Summary. We examine how irreversible capital reduces the possibility of a duopoly to sustain implicit collusion by grim strategies,
when the product is homogenous and firms compete in quantities. Compared with the case of reversible capital, there are two
countervailing effects: Deviation from an existing collusion is less attractive, because capital once installed causes costs
forever. But the punishment will also be less severe due to the high capacity the deviating firm can build before punishment
starts. The last effect dominates, meaning that the commitment value of capital is negative for all firms. If capital is irreversible,
collusion breaks down for realistic magnitudes of interest rates.
Received: April 30, 1999; revised version: November 30, 2001 相似文献
947.
Summary. We prove existence of a competitive equilibrium in a version of a Ramsey (one sector) model in which agents are heterogeneous
and gross investment is constrained to be non negative. We do so by converting the infinite-dimensional fixed point problem
stated in terms of prices and commodities into a finite-dimensional Negishi problem involving individual weights in a social
value function. This method allows us to obtain detailed results concerning the properties of competitive equilibria. Because
of the simplicity of the techniques utilized our approach is amenable to be adapted by practitioners in analogous problems
often studied in macroeconomics.
Received: September 13, 2001; revised version: December 9, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We are grateful to Tapan Mitra for pointing out errors as well as making very valuable suggestions. Thanks are due
to Raouf Boucekkine and Jorge Duran for additional helpful discussions. We also thank an anonymous referee for his/her helpful
comments. The second author acknowledges the financial support of the Belgian Ministry of Scientific Research (Grant ARC 99/04-235
“Growth and incentive design”) and of the Belgian Federal Goverment (Grant PAI P5/10, “Equilibrium theory and optimization
for public policy and industry regulation”).
Correspondence to: C. Le Van 相似文献
948.
Tetsuo Ono 《Economic Theory》2003,22(1):141-168
Summary. The purpose of this paper is to consider environmental taxation which would control emissions of firms in a model of growth
cycles. In the model presented below, the economy may experience two phases of growth and environmental quality: “the no-innovation
growth regime” and “the innovation-led growth regime”. Aggregate capital and environmental quality remain constant in the
no-innovation growth regime, while they perpetually increase in the innovation-led growth regime. The paper shows that the
tax plays a key role in determining whether the economy stably converges to one of the two regimes or fluctuates permanently
between them. It also shows that there is a critical level of the tax and that the economy obtains higher growth rates of
capital and environmental quality by raising (or reducing) the tax if the initial tax is below (or above) the critical level.
Received: April 2, 2001; revised version: March 21, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" This research reported here was conducted within the research project “Project on Intergenerational Equity” at Institute
of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. I am deeply grateful to an anonymous referee for his or her insightful comments,
which greatly improved the paper. I also thank Hiroshi Honda, Yasuo Maeda, Yuji Nakayama, and participants in workshops at
Hitotsubashi University, Kyoto University, Nagoya University, Osaka University, University of Tsukuba, Yokohama National University,
and University of Tokyo for their valuable comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors are mine. 相似文献
949.
The paper claims that, in The Wealth of Nations, the divisionof labour refers simultaneously to two different things: a socialdivision of labour and an organisational division of labour.The central point is that the organisation of work (the organisationaldivision of labour) in the firm is the logical counterpart ofthe social division of labour, and that these reflect two inseparableaspects of the process of the division of labour. Smith is thusconcerned with organisations as well as with markets, each functioningaccording to the same principle. Hence, Smith does not believethat the organisational and the social divisions of labour arefundamentally different, although he does recognise some variationbetween them and describes different states of the divisionof labour within the firm, liberal and capitalist. 相似文献
950.
Spatial agglomeration and endogenous growth 总被引:6,自引:0,他引:6
This paper constructs a dynamic general equilibrium model with spatial interactions in which a human capital externality is the centripetal force towards agglomeration. The resource cost of transportation is, on the other hand, the main centrifugal force, preventing a city from growing unboundedly. A central feature of our analysis is the dynamic interaction between (perpetual) economic growth and (bounded) city growth. We examine the socially optimal and the decentralized growth rates as well as city sizes. In the decentralized environment, individuals under-invest, whereas cities are under-populated. We show how public policies may enable a decentralized city to attain the socially optimal allocation. 相似文献