Do corporations overinvest？ Evidence from Tunisia

The authors study the positive relationship existing between internal net worth and investment. This relationship has been interpreted in the financial literature as evidence showing that the management overinvests the free cash flow available to them in poorly-performing, sub-optimal investment projects. In this paper, the authors empirically tackle this problem in the case of the manufacturing and industrial Tunisian corporations and show that our empirical regularities do not stand for this interpretation. The authors conversely prove that overinvestment does not seem to occur on the basis of the grouping results. Hereby, there do not corroborate the empirical regularities documented in Lamont （1997）.     

控股股东、自由现金流与过度投资

以我国沪深A股上市公司2006—2008年数据为研究样本,从股权特征角度考察公司自由现金流过度投资行为,结果表明：（1）正自由现金流更易诱发过度投资行为;（2）大股东持股越高,现金流过度投资行为越严重;（3）股权制衡在一定程度上抑制过度投资;（4）第一大股东为国有股性质时,过度投资行为更严重。     

The value of cash holdings in hotel firms

Extant research in finance suggests asymmetric information increases the cost of external financing substantially and creates underinvestment problems. While franchising might reduce underinvestment problems, it might exacerbate overinvestment problems in poorly-governed firms. Using combined postulations from both the pecking order theory and the free cash flow theory, this study examines the value of cash holdings in hotel firms and the extent to which franchising, financial constraints, and corporate governance affect this value. The findings suggest that cash can be a curse and a blessing; cash is more valuable for financially constrained firms than for unconstrained firms and less valuable for poorly-governed firms than for well-governed firms. Also, financial constraints have a greater effect on the value of cash holdings than weak corporate governance. Although franchising could solve underinvestment problems, it makes poorly-governed firms more vulnerable to overinvestment. Practical and theoretical implications are discussed within realms of corporate finance and franchising.     

Investment Decisions in Anticipation of Recessions and Outperformance of Pre-Acting Firms

We empirically examine whether firms make investment decisions in anticipation of recessions and subsequently perform better. Using a large quarterly dataset of fixed asset investments for U.S. firms during 1984–2012, we show that not all firms efficiently adjust their investment decisions in anticipation of a recession. However, we find that pre-acting firms that properly adjust their investment decisions (i.e., underinvest) before a recession outperform re-acting firms that fail to make proper investment decisions (i.e., overinvest) before a recession in subsequent returns on assets, returns on investments, and market-adjusted return measures.     

Subsidy competition,industrial land price distortions and overinvestment: empirical evidence from China’s manufacturing enterprises

In China, offering inexpensive industrial land is a major means for local governments to participate in interregional subsidy competition, which caused regional industrial land price distortions. This article examines the effect of regional industrial land price distortions on the overinvestment of Chinese manufacturing enterprises. Chinese industrial enterprises data and land price monitoring data of 49 major cities in China between 1998 and 2007 are employed. This article has found that industrial land price distortions will significantly stimulate the overinvestment of manufacturing enterprises. Such a promoting effect varies among manufacturing enterprises of different ownership and industry attributes. Industrial land price distortions have the most significant promoting effect on the overinvestment of foreign-invested firms, followed by private firms, while state-owned enterprises are the least affected. Compared with private heavy-industry firms, industrial land price distortions have a more significant effect on the overinvestment of private light-industry firms. Compared with foreign-invested heavy-industry firms, industrial land price distortions have a more significant effect on the overinvestment of foreign-invested light-industry firms. This study represents a positive exploration and supplement to the existing studies on the effects of subsidy competition on corporate investment behaviours and the studies on Chinese-style subsidy competition.     

Foreign Acquisitions and Managerial Discretion

Foreign acquisitions have been growingdramatically since the 1980s despite academic studiesshowing that shareholders of acquirers generally donot realize any significant gain. In this paper, weinvestigate whether foreign acquisitions aremotivated by managerial self-interest. Logisticregressions are performed to establish a link betweenforeign acquisitions and the acquirer's free cashflow. The results show that foreign acquisitions oflow-Q firms are strongly influenced by managerialdiscretion. In addition, acquisitions of low-Q firmsare conducted without consideration of theperformance of the acquirers. Foreign acquisitions ofhigh-Q firms, however, do not representoverinvestments.     

Examining a key corporate role: The influence of capital allocation competency on business unit performance

Research on the role of the corporate office in firm performance has focused on establishing how much performance variance can be attributed to a “corporate effect,” with little attention devoted to understanding how this influence occurs. In this study, we model capital allocation competency as a dynamic managerial capability and find that lower levels of allocation competency in the form of excess investment to business units with relatively poorer future prospects reduce business unit performance. We also find that market conditions affect performance implications of capital allocation—allocation competency is more salient in more competitive markets. These results enhance our understanding of how the corporate office influences business unit performance through its role in allocating capital across business units. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

金字塔结构、过度投资与财务风险——基于民营上市公司的实证研究

文章基于我国转型时期特殊的制度背景,以民营上市公司2007-2011年财务数据为样本,研究金字塔股权结构如何影响公司的投资决策的经济后果,考察其是否会加剧公司过度投资带来的财务风险。研究发现：企业的过度投资会导致财务风险的增加;随着现金流权与控制权两权分离度的增加,过度投资带来的财务风险更大。本文的研究结论能够帮助理解民营企业中大股东通过金字塔持股对过度投资的作用,并对通过合理安排股权结构来降低过度投资带来的财务风险有一定的参考意义。     

教育人力资本投资过度理论述评

按照时间上的先后,本文将教育人力资本投资过度理论分为传统教育人力资本投资过度论和现代教育人力资本投资过度论,并分别作了阐述,在此基础上,对教育人力资本投资过度论进行了简要评析,为进一步研究提供思路。     

董事会勤勉、管理者过度自信与企业过度投资

选取深沪A股上市公司2006-2010年数据为样本,对董事会勤勉及管理者过度自信与企业过度投资的关系进行理论与实证研究,分析了董事会勤勉对企业由于管理者过度自信所导致的过度投资的治理效应。结论表明:董事会勤勉与企业当年过度投资水平不存在显著相关性;董事会勤勉度的提高也不能改善企业下一年过度投资状况;管理者过度自信会引发企业过度投资;董事会勤勉对企业由于管理者过度自信所导致的过度投资没有显著治理作用。