公共产品供给主体及边界确定的交易费用经济学分析——兼论我国公共产品供给过程中交易费用的计量

将新制度经济学中交易费用理论引入公共产品供给分析,给出了供给公共产品的主体确定的理论模型,并在威廉姆森范式扩展的基础上得出了各个主体的边界,认为最优公共产品供给方式的选择和主体边界的确定,取决于公共产品供给过程中发生的交易费用.测算了中国公私部门供给公共产品过程中存在的交易费用,发现就我国公共产品的供给而言,在一定的条件下将公共产品供给由政府部门交给私人部门与第三部门可以节约交易费用,提高公共产品供给的效率.     

Comprehensive assessment of patients with irritable bowel syndrome with constipation and chronic idiopathic constipation using deterministically linked administrative claims and patient-reported data: the Chronic Constipation and IBS-C Treatment and Outcomes Real-World Research Platform (CONTOR)

Abstract

Aims

To characterize a US population of patients with irritable bowel syndrome with constipation (IBS-C) or chronic idiopathic constipation (CIC) using CONTOR, a real-world longitudinal research platform that deterministically linked administrative claims data with patient-reported outcomes data among patients with these conditions.     

基于标准成本系统的政府行政成本管理研究

通过对政府行政成本的初步研究，在分析政府行政成本现状之基础上。尝试将企业标准成本系统引入政府行政成本管理中，来构建政府行政标准成本管理体系。并期望以此控制政府行政成本，从而实现廉价政府的目标。     

环境产权问题的博弈分析

环境产权是最广泛意义的公有产权,在环境产权的行使中,各行为主体的个体经济目标和环境目标常常存在极大的差异,运用博弈理论阐述环境产权行使中的纳什均衡,旨在说明环境资源保护的社会意义。     

Frictions, Heterogeneity and Optimality in Mortgage Modeling

The purpose of this article is to provide a unified framework for incorporating frictions into a theoretical options-pricing model (OPM) for mortgages. This article presents formulation for a frictions-adjustable mortgage model that integrates borrower heterogeneity while simultaneously preserving prepayment and default financial decisions. Our model demonstrates the flexibility of the OPM by simulating separate and concurrent effects of three categories of frictions on the mortgage and mortgage components. Researchers can use our example formulation to determine the effects of specific borrower characteristics on mortgage values without destroying the options theoretic framework.     

Unit initial public offerings: Staged equity or signaling mechanism?

We investigate the use of unit (i.e., package) initial public offerings by Australian industrial firms and conclude that their use reflects their role as a signaling mechanism (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1997), as distinct from the agency–cost explanation offered by Schultz (1993). From a sample of 394 IPOs between 1976 and 1994, the 66 firms making unit offerings are typically riskier, use less prestigious underwriters and have a lower level of retained ownership than other IPO firms. While these results are also consistent with Schultz's agency cost explanation, other results we report are not. We find no difference in underpricing etween unit IPOs and other IPO firms, nor are there any significant differences in the planned uses of proceeds reported in the prospectus, post–listing failure rates or secondary equity offerings of the type predicted by Schultz. We do however, report evidence consistent with a prediction unique to the signaling explanation. After controlling for the level of ownership retained by insiders, the proportion of firm value sold as warrants is increasing in IPO firms' riskiness.     

Knowledge transfer costs and dependence as determinants of financial reporting

Abstract This paper examines the circumstances in which financial reporting exists. Jensen and Meckling (1995 ) observe that where there are high knowledge transfer costs, then decentralisation is necessary; and that where decentralisation occurs there is a control problem, which can be addressed by providing a control system. I predict that where there are high knowledge transfer costs there will be a control system; if the control system uses financial reports, these will occur for activities with high knowledge transfer costs. The ability to decentralise is reduced where dependence makes it potentially costly to allow a subordinate to make decisions about the activity. The paper predicts that high dependence will be negatively associated with the existence of financial reports. The results confirm the predictions that financial reports are positively associated with knowledge transfer costs and negatively associated with dependence.     

Complementarity, coordination and compatibility: The role of fixed costs in the economics of systems

We analyze industry equilibrium and incentive to compatibility when goods produced by different producers generate utility only when consumed as component parts of a system. We assume the presence of two systems, each composed of some basic component and a set of differentiated complementary products. The combination of complementarity between the two components of the system and of fixed costs in the production of the complementary product results in a form of network effect. We focus on the role played by the size of the fixed costs in the production of the complementary products in determining the size of this system effect and, by this means, the structure and types of equilibria that may be observed: monopolistic or duopolistic, symmetric or asymmetric. We also highlight the consequence of the same fixed costs for the private and social incentives to render the systems compatible.