房地产投资项目融资风险的灰色模糊评判研究

房地产投资项目的融资风险问题具有灰色性(信息不完全)和模糊(概念不明确)性。考虑到灰色性和模糊性的影响，采用适用性更广的灰色模糊多级综合评判理论，对房地产投资项目融资风险的多级指标体系进行综合评判，可以有效地、全面地和系统地评价房地产投资项目融资风险的大小，为项目融资项目决策提供准确依据。     

浅析房地产开发企业融资方式之变革

中央人民银行出台《关于进一步加强房地产信贷业务管理的通知》，引发了房地产开发企业融资方式的变化，房地产开发企业应对当前融资环境变化，采取切实可行的融资渠道和资金运营方法，今后将成为主流房地产项目融资方式有：房地产信托投资、房地产企业上市、房地产基金、债券融资和住宅抵押贷款证券化等。     

房地产融资渠道分析

由于国家银根收缩，房地产融资难度增大，加上中国房地产金融体系尚未完善，融资渠道狭窄，在一定程度上限制了我国房地产业的发展。房地产业需要新的融资渠道，如信托、基金、债券等取代传统的银行贷款融资模式。针对新的市场现状，各房地产企业必须加强资本运作能力，扩大融资渠道，创新金融产品。     

房地产投资分析浅析

房地产投资分析是房地产投资决策的基础，所涉及的内容较多。章通过对消费、投资地域、资金筹集和投资项目4个方面分析，详细地阐述了影响房地产投资决策的各种主要因素，提出将房地产投资风险降至最低的建议。     

房地产企业开发经营绩效的影响因素研究

在分析房地产开发经营过程中关键价值活动的基础上，深入研究影响房地产开发经营绩效的四大因素：规划设计、施工质量、营销策划和物业管理的基本内容，以及其指标体系。以大最的数据调查为依据，对四大影响因素与房地产开发经营绩效关系模型的进行分析，为房地产开发企业的经营战略提供积极的指导价值。     

模糊决策在房地产建筑方案优选中应用

在房地产开发中建筑方案的决策是一项综合性、专业性、技术性极强的工作。针对以往建筑方案评价的缺陷，归纳总结了，影响方案评价的基本因素，运用模糊决策理论和结合层次分析法，探讨了方案决策的问题，并对实例进行分析。     

房地产三种评估价格的比较分析

简要的阐述了比准价格、收益价格、积算价格三种房地产评估价格的形成机理及理论依据，并从对一种观点的局限性分析出发，综合运用市场供求理论、均衡理论以及短边原则，对不同市场背景下三种估价方法得出的评估价格进行经济比较分析。     

峰谷分时电价的现状分析与发展趋势探讨

分时电价以经济学均衡价格为理论依据。它在引导客户合理用电、削峰填谷、优化电力资源配置等方面起了积极的作用。但它也存在分时价差幅度小、时段划分长、缺乏灵活性及实施范围窄等问题。完善分时电价运行机制,由分时电价向实时电价转变。     

Hot Money and Quantitative Easing: The Spillover Effects of U.S. Monetary Policy on the Chinese Economy

We develop a factor‐augmented vector autoregression (FA‐VAR) model to estimate the effects that unanticipated changes in U.S. monetary policy and economic policy uncertainty have on the Chinese housing, equity, and loan markets. We find the decline in the U.S. policy rate since the Great Recession has led to a significant increase in Chinese housing investment. One possible reason for this effect is the substantial increase in the inflow of “hot money” into China. The responses of Chinese variables to U.S. shocks at the zero lower bound are different from those responses in normal times.     

Cross‐Firm Real Earnings Management

Our analysis is rooted in the notion that stockholders can learn about the fundamental value of any firm from observing the earnings reports of its rivals. We argue that such intraindustry information transfers, which have been broadly documented in the empirical literature, may motivate managers to alter stockholders’ beliefs about the value of their firm not only by manipulating their own earnings report but also by influencing the earnings reports of rival firms. Managers obviously do not have access to the accounting system of peer firms, but they can nevertheless influence the earnings reports of rival firms by distorting real transactions that relate to the product market competition. We demonstrate such managerial behavior, which we refer to as cross‐firm real earnings management, and explore its potential consequences and interrelation with the practice of accounting‐based earnings management within an industry setting with imperfect (nonproprietary) accounting information.