European quanto option pricing in presence of liquidity risk

In this paper, we study the pricing problems of the European quanto options in which the underlying foreign asset is in imperfectly liquid markets. First, we assume that the dynamics of the underlying foreign asset price are affected by market liquidity and propose a liquidity-adjusted quanto model. This allows for the effects of market liquidity on European quanto option pricing. And then we derive the analytical pricing formulas for four different types of European quanto options. Finally, we empirically investigate the pricing performance of our proposed model with a European quanto construction involving the SSE 50 ETF, as the underlying asset, and the CNY/HKD exchange rate. Empirical results demonstrate that the pricing accuracy of the proposed model is markedly superior to that of the Black-Scholes quanto model. In other words, allowing for liquidity risk in the framework of European quanto option pricing can make markedly improvements in fitting the real market data. Particularly, the improvement rate is high for medium-term and out-of-the-money options. Moreover, these results are robust for different liquidity measures.     

商品金融化与产品定价机制变革——从近代欧洲大宗商品交易中心形成过程谈起

近年来,在金融全球化背景下,商品金融化趋势愈加显著。商品金融化并非新生事物,早在近代欧洲,一些大宗商品贸易已开始被赋予金融属性。本文从近代欧洲大宗商品交易中心的形成过程的历史视角研究商品金融化与产品定价机制变革关系,对荷兰的大宗商品交易中心发展过程及商品金融属性的表现特征研究发现,各类金融衍生工具在近代初期已从商品交易中发展起来,并在阿姆斯特丹商品市场上大量应用。由于过分依赖资本收益,国内产业衰落,荷兰商品交易中心地位没能保持下去,在工业革命前半个世纪甚至更早,欧洲商品交易中心从阿姆斯特丹转移至伦敦。从交易中心的形成与转移,可以看到商品金融化进程中基本条件的意义与作用,以及商品金融化问题的本质。这同时揭示出当代商品金融化趋势与产品定价机制变革的关系。     

城市再生水的边际机会成本定价方法研究

分析了边际机会成本定价法的特点,指出了该方法应用于城市再生水定价时的作用,给出了边际机会成本定价的一般公式.通过分析得出再生水边际成本定价时需用平均增量成本代替边际机会成本,并给出了平均增量成本的计算公式.最后提出了城市再生水边际机会成本定价的具体步骤.采用边际机会成本定价法可使再生水生产企业获得足够的收入去扩容并实现可持续发展,还有可能实现资源的高效分配,因此可作为判断再生水价格是否合理的一个主要依据.     

非线性定价的福利再分配效应研究——基于非对称双寡头市场的分析

较之"线性定价","非线性定价"在社会福利方面的优势被现有理论反复证明。在肯定"非线性定价"方式能够改进社会总福利的同时,指出并不是每一个市场主体的福利水平都能够通过"非线性定价"方式得到改进。通过建立模型、计算和比较分析,提出了在上述两种情况下,"非线性定价"可能会对特定的市场主体产生"福利剥夺",从而出现福利再分配效应。     

有政府的动态资产定价模型

文章建立了一个有政府的动态资产定价模型.政府被模型化为具有垄断力量的市场参与者,它可以利用自己的税收和交易行为影响市场.我们求解了一个政府先行,私人跟随的均衡,得到了一个资产定价的双因子(总消费因子和税收因子)模型.文章证明:资产的超额收益不但取决于与总消费的相关性,还受与政府税收相关性的影响;资本市场的波动行为依赖于税收的随机模式.我们的模型预言,在一个政府作用比较大的经济体里,如果忽略政府的作用,单因子的ICAPM可能低估均衡的股权超额收益.同没有政府的经济相比,有政府经济中风险资产的波动率会更高.分析还表明:在动态资产定价模型中引入政府行为是可能的.     

房地产价格与通货膨胀预期

文章通过构建房地产均衡市场模型,在风险中性的假设前提下,利用无套利均衡定价原理,发展了从房地产价格波动中分离出市场通货膨胀预期的新方法.在此基础上,通过对中国房地产市场的实证研究发现,房地产预期收益率与通货膨胀预期之间确实存在稳定的函数关系.最后,文章提出将房地产价格纳入到居住类消费价格指数中去以减少货币政策认识时滞的政策建议.     

对中国景区门票价格制定的思考

文章总结了不同类型门票价格的制定原则以及门票价格的作用,并据此对中国景区门票价格制定的现状问题进行了阐述和分析,指出中国大部份景区在制定价格时没有充分发挥门票价格的作用,以国家公园为代表的资源型景区的门票收入分配问题也成为业内关注的焦点。最后,文章从定价理念、规范化管理和增强景区综合赢利能力等三方面提出了建议。     

Giffen goods and market making

Summary. This paper shows that information effects per se are not responsible for the Giffen goods anomaly affecting traders demands in multi asset noisy, rational expectations equilibrium markets. The role that information plays in traders strategies also matters. In a market with risk averse, uninformed traders, informed agents have a dual trading motive: speculation and market making. The former entails using prices to assess the effect of error terms; the latter requires employing them to disentangle noise traders demands within aggregate orders. In a correlated environment this complicates the signal extraction problem and may generate upward sloping demand curves. Assuming (i) that competitive, risk neutral market makers price the assets or that (ii) uninformed traders risk tolerance coefficient grows unboundedly, removes the market making component from informed traders demands rendering them well behaved in prices.Received: 30 April 2002, Revised: 3 December 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: G100, G120, G140.Support from the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA and the Ente per gli Studi Monetari e Finanziari Luigi Einaudi, are gratefully acknowledged. I thank Anat Admati, Jordi Caballé, Giacinta Cestone, and Xavier Vives for useful suggestions. The comments provided by the Associate Editor and an anonymous referee greatly improved the papers exposition.     

Market clearing and derivative pricing

Summary. We develop a method of assigning unique prices to derivative securities, including options, in the continuous-time finance model developed in Raimondo (2001). In contrast with the martingale method of valuing options, which cannot distinguish among infinitely many possible option pricing processes for a given underlying securities price process when markets are dynamically incomplete, our option prices are uniquely determined in equilibrium in closed form as a function of the underlying economic data.Received: 14 April 2003, Revised: 7 January 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: G13, D52.This paper is dedicated to Birgit Grodal, whose strength and character we greatly admire. We are very grateful to Darrell Duffie, Steve Evans, Botond Koszegi, Roger Purves, Jacob Sagi, Chris Shannon, Bill Zame and an anonymous refereee for very helpful discussions and comments. The work of both authors was supported by Grant SES-9710424, and Andersons work was supported by Grant SES-0214164, from the National Science Foundation.     

Commitment in sequential auctioning: advance listings and threshold prices

This paper models sequential auctioning of two perfect substitutes by a strategic seller, who learns about demand from the first-auction price. The seller holds the second auction only when the remaining demand is strong enough to cover her opportunity cost. Bidding in anticipation of such a contingent future auction is characterized, including a sufficient condition for existence of an invertible (increasing symmetric pure-strategy) bidding equilibrium that facilitates the seller’s learning. A unique invertible bidding equilibrium exists for the Dutch auction format, but only when the second auction is sufficiently discounted by the bidders. In the equilibrium, high-valuation bidders shade their bids down as if the second auction were guaranteed. To counter such strategic bidding, the seller would value ex-ante commitment to hold the second auction less often. Three forms of such commitment are analyzed: commitment to list future auctions in advance, commitment to not hold the second auction unless the first price exceeds a publicly announced threshold, and commitment to a reserve-price in the second auction. I would like to thank Georgios Katsenos, Thomas Jeitschko, Miguel Villas-Boas, George Deltas, and an anonymous referee for thorough and insightful feedback.