Bank governance,regulation and risk-taking in Ghana

ABSTRACT

Excessive risk-taking could spell doom for the financial market and the economy as a whole as evidenced by the recent global financial crisis of 2007/08. In this study, we document the impact of corporate governance on bank risk-taking behaviour whilst accommodating the moderating effect of forms of ownership on the relationship in a regulated environment as banks do not operate in a vacuum. A panel study with data spanning from 2000 to 2013 under the fixed effects model after several model diagnostics and performance of the Hausman specification test was used. We find reserve requirement regulation to significantly influence risk-taking positively. We advocate the reversal of the recent increase in the reserve requirement from 9% to 11% and rather recommend an increase in the regulatory capital adequacy ratio from the current 10%.     

Measuring risky adolescent cycling behaviour

Adolescents are at a greater risk of being involved in traffic accidents than most other age groups, even before they start driving cars. This article aims to determine the factor structure of a self-report questionnaire measuring adolescent risky cycling behaviour, the ACBQ (Adolescent Cycling Behaviour Questionnaire). The questionnaire's structure was based on the widely used Driver Behaviour Questionnaire (DBQ). A sample of secondary school students (N = 1749; age range: 13–18 years) filled out the questionnaire. Factor analysis revealed a three-factor structure underlying the questionnaire, which was confirmed on two equally large portions of the entire sample. These three underlying factors were identified as errors, common violations and exceptional violations. The ACBQ is a useful instrument for measuring adolescents' risky cycling behaviour.     

次级债能发挥对银行风险承担行为的市场约束作用吗

关于次级债的既有文献基本都在实证研究其市场约束的存在性,而没有揭示次级债作为一种市场约束激励机制的有效程度或内在机理。本文则基于或有权估值理论,研究了次级债对银行风险承担行为的市场约束机理。我们的研究发现:当银行的资产负债水平处于一定的安全边界之内时,随着银行风险承担行为的提高,次级债债权人会在某种程度上补偿高级债债权人。在银行的负债结构中引入次级债,不一定能起到约束银行风险承担行为的目的,它取决于银行既有的资本充足水平。监管当局在允许或强制商业银行发行次级债时,应考虑到次级债市场约束与银行风险承担行为之间的内在关系。为增强市场对银行风险承担行为的约束作用,监管当局应强制资本相对充足的银行发行一定规模的次级债,但这种强制性要求不应覆盖到资本不足的银行。     

我国企业经营管理者创新精神对创新成果影响的实证研究

在我国越过刘易斯拐点之后,通过技术创新提升生产效率及产品性能质量,是结构转型的主要方向。在影响企业创新投入及创新绩效的诸多要素中,企业经营管理者的创新精神是极为重要的。对207家高科技企业和制造企业经营管理者的创新精神和企业创新成果的考察发现,我国企业经营管理者的创新精神与企业创新成果有很强的内在关系。企业经营管理者的变革求新倾向越强,企业创新成果越好;而企业经营管理者的冒险性倾向对创新成果数量和质量的提升无密切相关性。本文旨在为推动我国企业的创新活动和建立培养富有创新精神的社会环境提供参考依据。     

中国货币政策对银行风险承担行为的影响研究——基于异质性视角

国际金融危机的爆发引发了理论界对货币政策是否影响银行体系稳定更为广泛的关注。文章基于异质性视角构建动态面板数据模型对货币政策与银行风险承担行为之间的关系进行估计,研究结果表明：2003-2011年,货币政策变量对银行风险偏好的影响具有时滞性,贷款利率提高有助于抑制银行风险,货币供应量增加会刺激银行更加冒险;不同银行对货币政策冲击会做出异质反应,随着资本充足率的提高,货币政策对银行风险承担行为的影响效果减弱。因此,加强中国人民银行在宏观审慎监管中的主导作用、建立逆周期的货币政策和资本监管协调机制是后金融危机时代我国监管当局的重要议题。     

公司治理机制、替代效应与风险承担

以２００２—２０１１年４１０家上市公司为样本,在动态内生性的框架下,考虑了公司治理机制间的交互效应,运用动态面板的ＳｙｓｔｅｍＧＭＭ估计方法,同时控制了三种内生性,以动态视角研究公司治理机制与公司风险承担间的关系。研究发现,公司治理机制不仅对当期公司风险承担有影响,而且对下一期公司风险承担有影响,并且前期公司风险承担对当期公司治理机制有反馈效应,这表明在公司治理机制与公司风险承担间存在动态内生性。研究还发现,公司治理机制在提高公司风险承担方面存在替代效应。     

金融创新对商业银行风险承担的影响--基于金融创新的分类研究

将银行金融创新分为降低项目监督成本和提高投资回报率两种类型,利用银行在融资市场的博弈均衡模型并结合数值模拟技术,研究两种类型金融创新对银行风险承担的影响。研究结果显示：相对于提高投资回报率的金融创新,降低项目监督成本的金融创新对银行风险承担影响更大,且当投资项目收益率较低时,降低监督成本的金融创新更有利于提高银行资金的使用效率,降低银行风险承担水平。实证结果支持理论模型的结论。     

产权结构与商业银行贷款中的风险行为

产权结构是集中反映当前中国银行业公司治理特征的重要变量.基于我国14家代表性商业银行1994～2004年的面板数据,本文实证检验了产权结构差异对银行贷款中风险行为的影响.分析结果表明:在放贷过程中,非国有银行比国有银行更加谨慎,上市银行比非上市股份制银行更为谨慎.此外,国民经济的持续增长显著增加了商业银行贷款中的风险行为.银行贷款风险对存贷利差的变化并不敏感,对此尚未完成的利率市场化进程可作为部分解释.     

Corruption and Banking Stability: Evidence from Emerging Economies

This article investigates the effect of corruption on banking stability using data from banks in emerging markets. The analysis first reveals that a lower level of corruption had a positive impact on bank stability and is associated with fewer credit losses and with more moderate credit growth. It then highlights the importance of bank and country characteristics in identifying the asymmetric effects of corruption on bank stability. Our evidence suggests that stability of banks that are acting in a country that has not adopted a corporate governance code or is not a member of the European Union is affected more by the corruption. Also, in countries with higher levels of corruption banks could increase their stability if they implement rigorous corporate governance practices.