金融结构演变、货币政策与银行风险承担异质性

基于2002-2017年165家银行的面板数据,本文采用可行广义最小二乘(FGLS)方法实证检验金融结构演变视角下货币政策对银行风险承担渠道的影响。研究发现:金融结构的变化对银行风险承担具有显著影响,随着直接融资占比的上升,银行资产端风险承担显著减少,但负债端风险承担显著增加;控制住金融结构的作用之后,货币政策对银行资产端风险承担和负债端风险承担也具有显著的异质性影响,具体来说,价格型货币政策的紧缩使得银行资产端风险承担显著减少而导致银行负债端风险承担显著增加,数量型货币政策的紧缩则使得银行资产端风险承担和负债端风险承担同时减少;此外,货币政策与金融结构对银行风险承担具有显著的交互影响,随着直接融资占比的上升,价格型货币政策工具对银行资产端风险承担的影响减弱,对银行负债端风险承担的影响没有表现出显著变化,数量型货币政策工具对银行资产端风险承担和负债端风险承担的影响都受到削弱。研究结论的政策含义对货币当局、监管部门以及商业银行都具有重要意义。     

信息披露、市场约束与银行风险承担行为

文章运用我国14家主要商业银行2000-2008年间的数据,实证研究了银行信息披露与其风险承担行为之间的关系,研究表明信息披露能否发挥其市场约束功能取决于相应的制度基础和市场环境,只有当金融体系的市场化程度较高,且银行能充分有效地披露其风险信息时,来自债权人的市场约束行动才能真正发挥对银行风险承担行为的约束作用.     

共享型领导对员工建言行为的影响 ——员工权力感的中介作用

本文探讨了共享型领导对员工建言行为的影响,以及员工权力感的中介效应和差错风险承担、角色自我效能感的调节作用,丰富了员工建言行为、共享型领导的相关理论并给出了相应的实践建议。以上海多家企业中的员工以及其直属上级领导作为研究对象,通过194对领导-下属有效调查问卷分析得出了以下结论:①共享型领导对员工的促进性建言与抑制性建言都有显著的正向预测作用;②员工权力感在共享型领导与员工建言行为之间存在中介作用;③差错风险承担在员工权力感与促进性建言之间存在调节作用,角色自我效能感在员工权力感与抑制性建言之间存在调节作用。本文在此研究结果的基础上进行讨论并给出相关管理建议。     

The relationships between CEO characteristics and strategic risk-taking in family firms

Abstract

We examine the influences of chief executive officer (CEO) personal characteristics on family firms’ strategic risk-taking. Building on upper echelons theory, we investigate the influences of CEO family relationships, the CEO professional education, other career experiences, tenure, and career horizon have on the risk level a company takes. By analyzing a sample of 107 Italian family firms listed on the Milan Stock Exchange, we find that company’s risk-taking significantly and negatively relates to CEO family relationship and professional education, but positively to CEO career horizon. This provides support to the argument that such CEO personal characteristics are key factors in explaining differences in risk-taking among family firms. Further, our analysis of control variables shows that family firms’ risk-taking relates positively to board size and negatively to company size. These results suggest that company and board characteristics also significantly influence the risk levels taken by a company.     

Millionaire investors: financial advisors,attribution theory and gender differences

To date little attention has been paid to how social cognitive bias can influence how financial advisors interpret and respond to the needs of millionaire investors, and if this varies depending on the gender of the investor. This research investigates whether experienced professional financial advisors who work with millionaire investors make different attributions for the control and knowledge that investors have of their investments, and if they make different investment portfolio recommendations to equivalent male and female investors. Using methodology novel to finance, this vignette-based study that controls for gender finds evidence that professional financial advisors judge millionaire female investors to have less control over their investment portfolios relative to men. Empirical results also show that female advisors judge women to be less knowledgeable about investments than men. Despite such perceptual differences, advisors recommend equally risky portfolios to male and female investors. These results have implications for wealth management institutions and the monitoring of financial advisors for millionaire individuals.     

Catch me if I fall: Cross-national differences in willingness to take financial risks as a function of social and state ‘cushioning’

Knowledge about the existence and source of national differences in willingness to take risks plays a vital role in ensuring successful communication, collaboration, and understanding across countries, from the personal to the organizational and political/social domain. The current study investigates differences in financial risk-taking willingness between countries as a function of social and state ‘cushioning’, i.e. the extent of a person’s social support network and the state’s social-safety support network. The study compares large-scale household data and self-reports on willingness to take financial risks across three countries differing in their state support networks: Austria, Italy and the United States. Results show that personal social support network size influences risk-taking willingness (social cushioning). Furthermore, and most notably, we find evidence of an interactive relationship between social and state cushioning. High state cushioning renders the influence of social cushioning on financial risk-taking willingness less important. Contributions to management and business practice as well as theory on the influence of personal distance to financial support on risk-taking willingness are discussed.     

CONTROLLING BANKERS' BONUSES: EFFICIENT REGULATION OR POLITICS OF ENVY?

The positive relationship between bank CEO compensation and risk-taking is a well-established empirical fact. The global banking crisis has resulted in a chorus of demands to control bankers' bonuses and thereby curtail their risk-taking activities in the hope that the world can avoid a repeat in the future. However, the positive relationship is not a causative one. In this paper we argue that an implicit too-big-to-fail policy provides the incentive for banks to take excessive risks and design compensation packages to deliver high returns. A credible no-bailout policy will have a better chance of curbing excess risk-taking than controlling bankers' compensation.     

Risk-taking behaviour and ownership in the banking industry: The Spanish evidence

This paper analyses the determinants of risk-taking in Spanish financial intermediaries, with special emphasis on the ownership structure and size of the different entities. On the one hand, the specific legal configuration of Spanish Savings banks may lead them to differ from Commercial banks in their risk behaviour. In particular, they may invest in riskier projects. Nevertheless, other theories indicate that greater stockholder control in Commercial banks may induce them towards greater risk-taking in certain situations. In this paper we test these hypotheses with a dynamic panel data model (1993–2000) for Spanish Commercial banks and Savings banks. We analyse whether differences in risk behaviour are related to different ownership structures or to other factors such as the size of the entity.     

Re-exploring the nexus between monetary policy and banks' risk-taking

In this paper, we analyse the link between monetary policy and banks' risk-taking behaviour. Some theoretical and empirical studies show that monetary easing increases banks' appetite for risk related to asset valuation and the search for higher yield. However, the low interest rate environment that began in 2010 is casting doubt on these findings. Our study adds to analyses of the monetary risk-taking channel considering non-linearity, especially testing threshold effects in this channel. Using a dataset of US banks, we find that the impact of low interest rates on banks' risk behaviour depends on the previous monetary regime, that is on the deviation of monetary rates from the Taylor rule. We complement the literature on the Taylor rule and provide arguments that extend the use of the Taylor rule by Central Banks to financial stability purposes.