消费者风险承担和回避特征的差异研究

文章以消费者对风险的估计和承受力为基本维度进行实证研究,发现风险估计乐观程度和风险承受力有程度差异且为同向关系,因而存在风险承担型和风险回避型的两类消费者,在我国市场环境下风险回避型者的比例还高于风险承担型者.这些结论对于分析感知价值和感知风险理论的诊断力以及企业营销活动具有重要意义.     

共享型领导对员工建言行为的影响 ——员工权力感的中介作用

本文探讨了共享型领导对员工建言行为的影响,以及员工权力感的中介效应和差错风险承担、角色自我效能感的调节作用,丰富了员工建言行为、共享型领导的相关理论并给出了相应的实践建议。以上海多家企业中的员工以及其直属上级领导作为研究对象,通过194对领导-下属有效调查问卷分析得出了以下结论:①共享型领导对员工的促进性建言与抑制性建言都有显著的正向预测作用;②员工权力感在共享型领导与员工建言行为之间存在中介作用;③差错风险承担在员工权力感与促进性建言之间存在调节作用,角色自我效能感在员工权力感与抑制性建言之间存在调节作用。本文在此研究结果的基础上进行讨论并给出相关管理建议。     

CEO背景特征对公司风险承担的影响研究

以我国沪、深两市上市公司为研究对象,深入研究了CEO背景特征对公司风险承担的影响。研究表明:CEO年龄越大,越为保守和回避风险,倾向于降低公司风险承担;CEO任期越长,其专用性人力资本和管理防御程度越高,公司风险承担水平越低;CEO教育程度与公司风险承担显著负相关,当CEO在其他单位兼职时,公司风险承担水平相对较低。而CEO性别、职称对公司风险承担并没有显著的影响。文章为我们更好地理解上市公司的风险承担行为及CEO等高管的选拨与任命具有一定的启示意义。     

The relationships between CEO characteristics and strategic risk-taking in family firms

Abstract

We examine the influences of chief executive officer (CEO) personal characteristics on family firms’ strategic risk-taking. Building on upper echelons theory, we investigate the influences of CEO family relationships, the CEO professional education, other career experiences, tenure, and career horizon have on the risk level a company takes. By analyzing a sample of 107 Italian family firms listed on the Milan Stock Exchange, we find that company’s risk-taking significantly and negatively relates to CEO family relationship and professional education, but positively to CEO career horizon. This provides support to the argument that such CEO personal characteristics are key factors in explaining differences in risk-taking among family firms. Further, our analysis of control variables shows that family firms’ risk-taking relates positively to board size and negatively to company size. These results suggest that company and board characteristics also significantly influence the risk levels taken by a company.     

Millionaire investors: financial advisors,attribution theory and gender differences

To date little attention has been paid to how social cognitive bias can influence how financial advisors interpret and respond to the needs of millionaire investors, and if this varies depending on the gender of the investor. This research investigates whether experienced professional financial advisors who work with millionaire investors make different attributions for the control and knowledge that investors have of their investments, and if they make different investment portfolio recommendations to equivalent male and female investors. Using methodology novel to finance, this vignette-based study that controls for gender finds evidence that professional financial advisors judge millionaire female investors to have less control over their investment portfolios relative to men. Empirical results also show that female advisors judge women to be less knowledgeable about investments than men. Despite such perceptual differences, advisors recommend equally risky portfolios to male and female investors. These results have implications for wealth management institutions and the monitoring of financial advisors for millionaire individuals.     

Catch me if I fall: Cross-national differences in willingness to take financial risks as a function of social and state ‘cushioning’

Knowledge about the existence and source of national differences in willingness to take risks plays a vital role in ensuring successful communication, collaboration, and understanding across countries, from the personal to the organizational and political/social domain. The current study investigates differences in financial risk-taking willingness between countries as a function of social and state ‘cushioning’, i.e. the extent of a person’s social support network and the state’s social-safety support network. The study compares large-scale household data and self-reports on willingness to take financial risks across three countries differing in their state support networks: Austria, Italy and the United States. Results show that personal social support network size influences risk-taking willingness (social cushioning). Furthermore, and most notably, we find evidence of an interactive relationship between social and state cushioning. High state cushioning renders the influence of social cushioning on financial risk-taking willingness less important. Contributions to management and business practice as well as theory on the influence of personal distance to financial support on risk-taking willingness are discussed.     

CONTROLLING BANKERS' BONUSES: EFFICIENT REGULATION OR POLITICS OF ENVY?

The positive relationship between bank CEO compensation and risk-taking is a well-established empirical fact. The global banking crisis has resulted in a chorus of demands to control bankers' bonuses and thereby curtail their risk-taking activities in the hope that the world can avoid a repeat in the future. However, the positive relationship is not a causative one. In this paper we argue that an implicit too-big-to-fail policy provides the incentive for banks to take excessive risks and design compensation packages to deliver high returns. A credible no-bailout policy will have a better chance of curbing excess risk-taking than controlling bankers' compensation.     

Risk-taking behaviour and ownership in the banking industry: The Spanish evidence

This paper analyses the determinants of risk-taking in Spanish financial intermediaries, with special emphasis on the ownership structure and size of the different entities. On the one hand, the specific legal configuration of Spanish Savings banks may lead them to differ from Commercial banks in their risk behaviour. In particular, they may invest in riskier projects. Nevertheless, other theories indicate that greater stockholder control in Commercial banks may induce them towards greater risk-taking in certain situations. In this paper we test these hypotheses with a dynamic panel data model (1993–2000) for Spanish Commercial banks and Savings banks. We analyse whether differences in risk behaviour are related to different ownership structures or to other factors such as the size of the entity.     

Re-exploring the nexus between monetary policy and banks' risk-taking

In this paper, we analyse the link between monetary policy and banks' risk-taking behaviour. Some theoretical and empirical studies show that monetary easing increases banks' appetite for risk related to asset valuation and the search for higher yield. However, the low interest rate environment that began in 2010 is casting doubt on these findings. Our study adds to analyses of the monetary risk-taking channel considering non-linearity, especially testing threshold effects in this channel. Using a dataset of US banks, we find that the impact of low interest rates on banks' risk behaviour depends on the previous monetary regime, that is on the deviation of monetary rates from the Taylor rule. We complement the literature on the Taylor rule and provide arguments that extend the use of the Taylor rule by Central Banks to financial stability purposes.