Risking Other People's Money: Experimental Evidence on the Role of Incentives and Personality Traits

Decision-makers often face incentives to increase risk-taking on behalf of others (e.g., they are offered bonus contracts and contracts based on relative performance). We conduct an experimental study of risk-taking on behalf of others using a large heterogeneous sample, and we find that people respond to such incentives without much apparent concern for stakeholders. Responses are heterogeneous and mitigated by personality traits. The findings suggest that a lack of concern for others’ risk exposure hardly requires “financial psychopaths” in order to flourish, but it is diminished by social concerns.     

National culture and bank risk-taking: Contradictory case of individualism

Previous studies have reported a positive association between the cultural dimension of individualism and bank risk-taking. We hypothesize that this association is likely to be confounded by the omitted effects of corporate governance. Given the indicative evidence that such confounders are less likely to affect listed banks, we test this association for a global sample of 467 commercial listed banks from 56 countries. Our results show that the association between individualism and bank risk-taking is negative. This result is consistent with the cushioning hypothesis, the idea that people take on more risk in collectivist societies because they expect to receive help from the members of their social networks in the case of failure.     

Gambling and credit: an individual and household level analysis for the UK

We explore the relationship between gambling and the use of credit at the individual and household levels using representative pooled cross-section data from the UK Expenditure and Food Surveys (EFS) (2001–2007). Gambling and the use of credit are shown to be positively correlated at the household level. We find that both the incidence and amount of gambling vary according to household income and the positive association between gambling and credit is stable across household income. It is also apparent that there is strong intra-household correlation in both gambling activity and the use of credit, with stronger relationships in lower income households.     

我国上市公司经营者激励扭曲的内在机理

借助信息经济学理论对我国经营者激励扭曲问题进行研究,并利用上市公司的数据对激励扭曲内在机理进行实证分析,结论显示:出资者和经营者的信息不对称导致了二者的风险和收益不对称,市场中不同类型经营者之间信息不对称导致市场激励的失衡,形成了“激励过度”和“激励不足”并存,降低了公司盈利能力和市场竞争力。构建风险收益对称安排的“激励性契约”,有助于优化配置经理人资源,改善我国上市公司的整体业绩。     

金融资产投资、杠杆率与企业风险承担——基于非金融企业的视角

本文以2007~2018年我国A股非金融上市公司为研究样本,运用动态面板系统广义矩估计法,研究杠杆率在金融资产投资与企业风险承担之间的中介效应影响,分析金融资产投资、杠杆率、企业风险承担三者之间的传导链条。研究发现:杠杆率在金融资产投资与企业风险承担水平之间发挥了部分中介效应;金融资产投资增加会直接导致企业风险承担水平上升,同时也会通过提高杠杆率间接地提升企业风险承担水平。本研究丰富了实体企业金融投资后果的相关文献,为实体企业的投资决策以及风险管理提供了参考,也为监管部门去杠杆防风险提供了经验证据。     

货币政策、金融杠杆与银行风险承担

本文利用16家上市商业银行从2014年第四季度到2018年第三季度的季度面板数据,采用差分广义矩估计(DGMM)方法实证分析了货币政策和杠杆率对银行风险承担的影响。结果表明:第一,货币调控在金融稳定方面并非风险中性,它与银行风险承担呈现显著的负相关关系,即货币政策放松会相应提高银行的风险承担水平。第二,杠杆率作为资本充足率的有益补充是有效的,银行杠杆水平越低则其风险承担水平也越低,杠杆率监管会减缓或抑制货币政策对银行风险承担的影响,这也为2018年我国“宽货币紧信用”现象提供了合理解释。根据研究结论,本文就完善并协调货币调控、宏观审慎和微观监管提出政策建议。     

战略引资会降低银行风险承担吗？--基于中国商业银行的实证研究

基于异质性视角构建动态面板数据模型,对战略引资与银行风险承担行为之间的关系进行估计,结果表明,战略引资有利于中资银行引进先进的理念和风险控制技术,完善公司治理机制,对银行风险承担具有显著抑制作用;不同银行对战略引资会作出异质反应,随着资本充足率的提高,战略引资对银行风险承担行为的抑制效果增强。因此,加快落实与境外战略投资者的长期深层次合作是后金融危机时代中国商业银行的重要议题。     

政治关联会影响企业风险承担吗?--来自民营上市公司的经验证据

本文研究了政治关联以及政治关联层级对我国民营上市公司风险承担水平的影响,结果发现：政治关联降低了民营上市公司风险承担水平,且政治关联层级越高,民营上市公司风险承担水平越低。本文的研究深化了对民营企业政治关联所带来的经济后果的认识,同时对加快市场化进程和转变政府职能具有一定的启示意义。     

管理层薪酬激励与公司风险承担间的关系--基于动态内生性的经验研究

本文以2002—2011年716家上市公司为样本,在动态内生性的框架下,运用动态面板的System GMM估计方法,以动态性视角研究了管理层薪酬激励与公司风险承担间的关系。研究发现：管理层薪酬激励与公司风险承担间存在动态内生性问题,不仅当期管理层薪酬激励对当期公司风险承担有显著的影响,而且前期管理层薪酬激励也对当期公司风险承担有显著的影响,并且两种薪酬激励方式对公司风险承担的影响方向相反。此外,前期公司风险承担对当期管理层薪酬有反馈效应。