上市公司管理层股权激励研究的近期进展

基于坚实的理论基础和丰富的数据支持,有关管理者股权激励问题的研究获得迅速发展。对股权激励问题开展研究不仅有助于更有效合理地设计管理层股权激励契约、缓和委托代理问题,还有利于充分揭示股权激励实施过程中可能产生的负面影响。本文对近年来海外研究上市公司管理层股权激励的进展进行综述,主要包括管理层股权激励的理论基础、股权激励的业绩效应、股权激励对公司盈余管理,以及股东价值和债权人价值的影响等方面的内容,以期为我国加强这方面的研究与实践探索提供参考。     

注重实施激励机制 提升护理质量

通过运用激励机制对护士进行激励,有效提高了护理质量、护理管理水平、提升了护护、医护、护患关系的满意度,增强了护士凝聚力,打造了高素质的护理队伍。     

我国公益性捐赠的税收政策缺陷分析

税收激励是鼓励公益性捐赠的重要方式,有效的税收优惠政策可以实现社会财富的再分配,促进社会公益事业的发展。     

新形势下会计变更为上市公司带来了什么

本文列举了从2001～2004年以来发生会计变更的上市公司.对上市公司的会计变更与会计报表收益之间的关系进行了描述以及对变更方式进行了归纳,并对会计变更的动机进行了详细的解析.最后浅谈了对上市公司会计变更的启示.     

Let the evidence speak again! Financial incentives are more effective than we thought

In this essay, the authors rejoin the debate about financial incentive effectiveness. They (a) briefly review the state of the literature in 1998, (b) highlight new meta‐analytic findings and update conclusions regarding the financial incentives–performance relationship, (c) address the myth that financial incentives erode intrinsic motivation, (d) provide explanations for the presumed failure of financial incentives and (e) offer some concluding thoughts and suggestions for future research.     

银行卡平台营利性质对投资激励的影响

构建了基于双边市场理论的投资策略模型,分析了银行卡平台营利性质对平台投资者的投资激励的影响,发现在差异化营利市场条件下,非营利性银行卡平台具有更强的投资激励效应。同时,利用2002～2011年全球主要银行卡公司财务数据对投资激励效应的性质和强度进行了实证检验。在一定程度上解释了现实经济中非营利性银行卡平台的融资规模高于营利性银行卡平台的原因。     

高管激励与研发支出:内生性考察

高管激励与研发支出显著正相关,但二者是否存在内生性问题?基于2009—2011年中国制造业上市公司数据的实证研究发现,高管激励和研发支出之间存在内生性问题,OLS回归法会导致系数估计不具有一致性。利用联立方程模型则发现,高管股权激励和研发支出之间存在双向因果关系,高管报酬激励与研发支出之间并不存在因果关系。这表明高管激励和企业研发支出决策之间存在相互影响。     

Contribution-proportional remuneration rule for employee inventions and its effects on effort and investment incentives

The practice of the Japanese court in case of a dispute between the employer and employee regarding the amount of remuneration for an employee invention has been to order that the additional profit from the invention be divided proportionally to their respective input contributions. We show that, if the employer’s investment and employee’s effort are weakly complementary, this rule causes the share effect (excessive incentives on the part of each party to expend investment or effort in order to increase his/her share of the surplus) to dominate the probability effect (insufficient incentives arising from the fact that each party obtains only part of the increase in the expected surplus), and thus leads to excessive investment and effort relative to the joint-payoff-maximising levels. If the court cannot capture the employer’s investment as fully as the employee’s effort, the employer’s investment may be too low compared to the joint-payoff-maximising level.     

A Graphical Approach to the Standard Principal-Agent Model

An obstacle to the teaching of principal-agent theory is the technical complexity and intractability of the general model. Even in academic studies strong assumptions are often imposed so as to derive an analytical solution. The author describes a graphical approach to the standard principal-agent model. Characterizing equilibrium in the contract space defined by the incentive parameter and insurance component of pay under a linear contract, this approach provides a simple and intuitive method for analyzing the principal-agent problem, which can be easily understood by students of economics with basic knowledge of algebra and differentiation. The approach has shown to be convenient and rich for comparative statics analyses.     

Ex post participation constraint in a principal–agent model with adverse selection and moral hazard

This paper analyzes optimal contracting when an agent has private information before contracting and exerts hidden effort that stochastically affects the output. Additionally, the contract is constrained to satisfy the agentʼs ex post participation. We highlight three features of this model. First, the agent faces countervailing incentives. Second, the separation of types is never optimal. Third, the optimal constant bonus rewarding success is distorted downward below its efficient level.