Team production,endogenous learning about abilities and career concerns

This paper studies career concerns in teams where the support a worker receives depends on fellow team members׳ efforts and abilities. In this setting, by exerting effort and providing support, a worker can influence her own and her teammates׳ project outputs in order to bias the learning process in her favor. To manipulate the market׳s assessment, we argue that in equilibrium, a worker has incentives to help or even sabotage her colleagues in order to signal that she is of higher ability. In a multiperiod stationary framework, we show that the stationary level of work effort is above and help effort is below their efficient levels.     

Deregulating Network Industries: Dealing with Price-quality Tradeoffs

This paper examines the effects of introducing competition into monopolized network industries on prices and infrastructure quality. Analyzing a model with reduced-form demand, we first show that deregulating an integrated monopoly cannot simultaneously decrease the retail price and increase infrastructure quality. Second, we derive conditions under which reducing both retail price and infrastructure quality relative to the integrated monopoly outcome increases welfare. Third, we argue that restructuring and setting very low access charges may yield welfare losses, as infrastructure investment is undermined. We provide an extensive analysis of the linear demand model and discuss policy implications.     

股票期权激励契约合理性及其约束性因素——基于中国上市公司的实证分析

股权激励是完善上市公司治理的重要环节。设计适合中国上市公司特征的股权激励方案并规避其所带来的风险是使其发挥作用的关键。本文以2006—2008年公布与实施股票期权激励方式的中国上市公司为样本,对股票期权激励契约的合理性特征及其内生约束性因素进行了理论探讨与实证检验,研究表明,激励期限与绩效条件是体现股票期权契约合理性的关键要素,除外部法律与监管约束之外,大股东、债务融资与独立董事等内生性因素对两者具有显著的约束作用,进一步证实了公司内部治理机制的互补效应假说,为上市公司股票期权契约的设计与实施提供有益参考。     

税收分成如何影响企业创新——来自我国上市工业企业专利申请量的证据

基于我国1081家上市工业企业的面板数据,采用市级政府企业所得税分成率衡量税收分成。研究发现,税收分成与企业创新间呈显著的“倒U”型关系,即随着税收分成程度的提高,其对政府的“征税激励”将超过“税基保护激励”,导致税收分成对企业创新的影响从促进转为抑制。进一步考察企业所有制和行业性质对这一非线性关系的调节作用,结果显示：国有企业曲线的形态更加陡峭、转折点发生左移、创新整体水平更低;高科技企业的曲线更加陡峭、转折点发生右移、创新整体水平更高。     

CEO背景特征对公司风险承担的影响研究

以我国沪、深两市上市公司为研究对象,深入研究了CEO背景特征对公司风险承担的影响。研究表明:CEO年龄越大,越为保守和回避风险,倾向于降低公司风险承担;CEO任期越长,其专用性人力资本和管理防御程度越高,公司风险承担水平越低;CEO教育程度与公司风险承担显著负相关,当CEO在其他单位兼职时,公司风险承担水平相对较低。而CEO性别、职称对公司风险承担并没有显著的影响。文章为我们更好地理解上市公司的风险承担行为及CEO等高管的选拨与任命具有一定的启示意义。     

Non-grant microfinance,incentives and efficiency

I show that charging interest on funds provided by donors or investors to microfinance institutions (MFIs) can increase efficiency, the total number of loans and borrower welfare, compared to grant or concessionary funding. In a setting in which MFIs supply costly non-contractible effort, putting a price or raising the price of loanable funds strengthens the MFIs’ incentives to put effort in credit administration or monitoring, to extend more loans, and/or reduce overhead costs. This theoretical result is robust to several variations of the benchmark model allowing for an endogenous lending rate, motivated MFIs and endogenous overhead costs.     

The reverse tragedy of the commons: an exploratory account of incentives for under-exploitation in an open innovation environment*

This paper presents an empirical account of a phenomenon that we refer to as the ‘reverse tragedy of the commons’ in open innovation. The name signifies the ‘under-exploitation’ of intellectual property (IP) under weak appropriability. The name is this graphic because the tragedy is costly, and can also render IP effectively worthless and block innovation in the short to medium term. We propose that the tragedy is borne out of the interaction between enterprise characteristics, a competitive setting and the framework that is set by the policy intervention. This finding is pertinent to policy-makers with regard to the design of research, development and innovation instruments, as well as managers who must determine how to implement open practices in innovation.     

经济全球化下的国际税收竞争与税收优惠

本文从经济全球化入手,论述了经济全球化、税收国际化、国际税收竞争与税收优惠的关系,主张纵向研究国际税收竞争,从国民经济发展的全局出发审视利用税收优惠手段参与国际税收竞争的利与弊.     

The Research about Earnings Management Incentives of Listed Companies in China

This paper overviews earnings management incentive of listed companies and finds the incentives of cost in transactions with stockholders, a comparative performance advantage and a rational response to that market behavior which is anticipated. This paper tells us that even if there were no agency problems, earnings management should exist all the time.     

制度变迁、管理层股权激励和公司投资——来自股权分置改革的经验证据

本文基于股权分置制度变迁的视角,通过考察管理层股权激励对公司投资决策的影响,检验管理层股权激励的有效性及内在机理。实证结果表明,股权分置改革显著改善了管理层股权激励的治理效应,降低了因管理层自利行为而导致的过度投资。此外,有微弱的证据表明,股改后国有公司管理层的股权激励缓解了公司投资不足。上述研究对解决由公司内部人控制而产生的投资过度及投资不足等代理问题具有重要的现实意义,也为从制度层面研究公司投资行为和治理机制提供了一个有益的视角。