Determinants and value of enterprise risk management: empirical evidence from Germany

Enterprise risk management (ERM) has become increasingly relevant in recent years, especially due to an increasing complexity of risks and the further development of regulatory frameworks. The aim of this paper is to empirically analyze firm characteristics that determine the implementation of an ERM system and to study the impact of ERM on firm value. We focus on companies listed at the German stock exchange, which to the best of our knowledge is the first empirical study with a cross-sectional analysis for Germany and one of the first for a European country. Our findings show that size, international diversification and the industry sector (banking, insurance, energy) positively impact the implementation of an ERM system, and financial leverage is negatively related to ERM engagement. In addition, our results confirm a significant positive impact of ERM on shareholder value.     

第一大股东持股对资本结构选择的影响研究

本文调查了上海证券交易所A股非金融业上市公司（2003—2005数据）,从风险分散化的角度考察了股权结构（第一大股东持股）对资本结构（公司负债）的制度影响。作者发现,第一大股东持股对公司资产负债率均具有显示的负向影响;即使在控制了公司其他主要特征（资产规模、资产结构、盈利能力和市场价值）的影响之后,第一大股东持股对公司负债的负向效应仍然显著。这意味着,第一大股东持股越高,他们减少公司财务杠杆的动机就越强。该经验结果支持了本文风险分散化的理论预期：第一大股东具有显著的通过降低公司负债回避风险的融资倾向和管理动机。作者还观察到。作为法人（或非国有股东）的第一大股东比作为国有股东的第一大股东具有更强烈的动机降低公司债务。这一发现为风险分散化的理论解释提供了进一步的经验证据。本文的研究表明,股权集中化的公司可能会偏离最优财务决策的轨道。     

大股东资金占用和公司绩效：来自其他应收款的证据

在具体考察大股东资金占用的经济后果和制度成因时,首先发现其他应收款比重不仅对公司经营绩效（EPS和ROE）具有显著且较强的负面影响,还对公司盈利能力（盈利概率）具有显著且较强的负面影响。结果表明,大股东通过其他应收款账户对上市公司的占款行为会对上市公司的经营绩效和盈利能力造成不利影响,并会损害其他中小股东的利益以及公司长远发展的后劲。另外还发现,第一大股东持股对其他应收款比重具有显著较强的非线性影响：当第一大股东的控股地位较弱时,第一大股东具有较强的激励效应去改善公司绩效,并减少对上市公司资金的无效占用;当第一大股东的控股地位较强时,第一大股东具有较强的动机和能力去攫取私人利益,并增加对上市公司的资金占用。     

Uncertainty during tender offers and the measurement of shareholder wealth effects

Uncertainty concerning the ultimate outcome of tender offers may affect the measurement of changes in shareholder wealth. The uncertainty regarding the outcome of tender offers is measured by estimating the probability of acceptance of tender offers during the period when the tender offers are outstanding. The estimated probability of acceptance of tender offers implies that the amount of uncertainty prior to knowledge of the ultimate outcome is substantial and affects the measurement of expected equity gains. The uncertainty-adjusted measure of the change in shareholder wealth indicates that previous studies may have underestimated the gains expected to result from tender offers.     

控股股东所有制性质变更对公司业绩的影响——基于中国上市公司的实证研究

利用我国上市公司截面数据,研究了控股股东所有制性质的改变对上市公司业绩的影响,结果发现,第一,总体上,控股股东所有制性质在国家股、国有法人股以及私有股之间的变更对公司业绩没有显著性影响。第二,同控股股东的国家股或私有股性质相比,控股股东变更为国有法人股更可能改善公司业绩。所谓"国有资本所有者缺位"主要体现在国家股所有者缺位。第三,控股股东的私有性质对公司业绩没有显著影响,这可能是私有控股股东隐瞒利润的结果。     

Corporate Governance When Managers Set Their Own Pay

This paper presents a model of the firm in which the manager has discretion over his own compensation, constrained only by the threat of shareholder intervention. The model addresses two main questions. How does shareholder power affect managers' compensation and their incentives to maximise firm value? And what is the optimal level of shareholder power? Expectedly, the model shows that increasing shareholder power leads to lower managerial pay. Greater shareholder power, however, also weakens the manager's incentives to maximise value and may even lead to lower profits for shareholders. There might, thus, be too much, as well as too little, shareholder power. The model characterises the optimal level of shareholder power and yields predictions about the relation between shareholder power, managerial pay, performance and firm characteristics.     

Shareholder Empowerment and Board of Directors Effectiveness*

We develop a model to examine implications of empowering shareholders to replace directors. We find that shareholder empowerment functions as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it can weaken ineffective boards' incentive to hold on to their position. On the other hand, it can induce both effective and ineffective boards to behave strategically to avoid a potential dismissal. As a result, empowerment does not necessarily increase firm value; in some cases, empowerment exacerbates the agency problem it is intended to address. Giving shareholders the power to set board compensation (have a “say on pay”) can mitigate these problems. However, even when empowerment benefits (harms) the shareholders, firm value may decrease (increase). Finally, we discuss empirical and policy implications of the main findings.     

Shareholder coordination and corporate innovation

We show that greater shareholder coordination, as proxied by the geographic proximity between institutional investors, is positively related to corporate innovation outcomes. This relationship is driven by coordination among dedicated and independent institutions who have strong monitoring incentives and is more pronounced among firms with lower blockholder ownership and greater information asymmetry where there is greater benefit to monitoring. We propose that shareholder coordination promotes corporate innovation through a reduction in managerial agency problems. Overall, our results are consistent with the notion that greater shareholder coordination enables diffuse shareholders to monitor managers more effectively and enhances corporate innovation.     

上市公司股权代理成本影响因素研究综述

企业代理成本的存在直接影响企业的价值,对代理成本进行准确计量并找出关键的影响因素进行控制是管理问题之一。文章从影响代理成本的因素入手对已有文献进行总结。