大股东控制、公司治理与资本结构的选择——基于2002年上市公司的实证检验

本文以2002年沪深股市1170家上市公司为样本,考察了大股东控制的公司资本结构的选择行为,以及公司治理结构是否能够遏制大股东的偏好。结果发现,资产负债率与第一大股东持股比例显著负相关,即大股东控制的上市公司会更多地选择权益资本融资而不是负债融资。在第一大股东治理结构下,独立董事、审计委员会、外部审计等公司治理机制均失去应有的监控功能。     

顾客生命周期价值及其对股东价值的贡献

介绍了顾客生命周期价值和股东价值的概念，分析了顾客生命周期价值的构成及股东价值的实现途径，在此基础上设计了概念性的理论分析框架，揭示了顾客生命周期价值与股东价值之间的关系。     

上市公司大股东控制下的资本配置行为研究——基于控制权收益视角的实证分析

基于控制权收益①驱动公司资本配置行为的理论阐释,结合我国上市公司特有的股权结构及其导致的控制权分配格局,文章从固定资产投资和股权投资两个方面,对形成我国上市公司控制权收益的资本配置行为进行了实证研究。研究结果表明:(1)控制权收益水平与资本配置规模显著正相关;(2)控制权收益水平越高,则增加等量控制权收益所需的资本配置规模就越大;(3)较固定资产投资而言,通过股权并购方式取得控制权收益的代价较低,但控制性股东占有被并购公司控制权收益的比例也较低;(4)上市公司资本配置行为在形成控制权收益的同时并没有通过提高公司业绩而增加控制权的共享收益,资本配置决策在很大程度上是大股东控制下的自利行为。     

利益相关者治理模式的理论与现实分析

随着传统的"股东至上"的公司治理模式的内在缺陷越来越突出以及人力资本作用的加强和地位的上升,现代公司治理模式越来越偏离"股东至上"的逻辑,而越来越青睐于利益相关者理论。利益相关者理论认为股东并不是公司唯一的所有者,债权人、管理者、雇员等利益相关者都拥有公司的剩余索取权和控制权,公司的经营目标应该是利益相者利益最大化而并非股东财富最大化。论文对利益相关者理论进行探讨,提出其相应的公司治理模式,并据此模式对现实进行了分析。     

The impact of high-quality firm achievements on shareholder value: Focus on Malcolm Baldrige and J. D. Power and associates awards

Marketing managers face increasing pressure to justify any strategic action with financial metrics that facilitate comparative evaluations with alternative options. Using event study method, the authors focus attention on the impact of high-profile quality achievement awards on the stock prices of the award-winning firms. Two types of awards are investigated: the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award (MBNQA) and J. D. Power and Associates Awards (JDPAA). Previous event studies found no major impact of MBNQA announcements on the stock price of MBNQA winners; in contrast, this study’s results show that these awards generate significant shareholder value for MBNQA winners. With respect to the JDPAA, the authors— analyses did notfind any such impact in the Automotive, Travel, and Finance categories. Multiple regression analyses suggest that firms with higher amounts of intangible assets are more likely to create shareholder value. Implications of the results for different decision horizon perspectives are derived. Siva K. Balasubramanian (siva@cba.siu.edu) is the Henry J. Rehn Professor of Marketing in the College of Business Administration at Southern Illinois University, Carbondale. His research investigates the impact of marketing strategies on shareholder value, new product diffusion, marketing communications, and methodological issues in measurement. His publications have appeared in theJournal of Marketing, theJournal of Marketing Research, theJournal of Consumer Research, theJournal of the Academy of Marketing Science, theInternational Journal of Research in Marketing, theJournal of Advertising, theJournal of Current Issues and Research in Advertising, theJournal of Consumer Affairs, Review of Agricultural Economics, theJournal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, AgBioForum, and theBritish Food Journal. Ike Mathur (imathur@cba.siu.edu) is a professor of finance at Southern Illinois University (SIUC). He has served as interim dean for the College of Business and chair of the Department of Finance, all at SIUC. He is the author or coauthor of more than 100 articles and 14 books. He has published in theJournal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, the Journal of Banking and Finance, theJournal of International Money and Finance, theJournal of Futures Markets, Economic Letters, the Journal of International Business Studies, the Journal of Business Research, theJournal of Business, theJournal of Advertising, theJournal of Advertising Research, and the Journal of Macromarketing. He serves on the editorial board of a number of journals and is the editor of theJournal of International Financial Markets, Institutions & Money, and theJournal of Multinational Financial Management. Ramendra Thakur (ramendra@siu.edu) is an assistant professor at Utah Valley State College. His research interests are in customer relationship management, e-commerce, high-tech marketing, and marketing models. He has published in theMarketing Management Journal, the International Journal of E-Business Research, and theJournal of Website Promotion. In addition, his scholarly works have been published in several national and international conference proceedings. He is also on the editorial board ofIndustrial Marketing Management.     

刍论公司章程限制股东表决权制度的架构

通过首次对表决权限制制度进行分类,并梳理章程限制表决权的架构.发现,新公司法提供了较之以往更大的自治空间,使得章程制定者能够考虑采取恰当的措施去限制表决权的滥用行为,提高公司治理水平.     

Largest shareholder and dividend policy around the world

This paper examines the interaction between the largest shareholder and dividend policy in a sample of 8,279 listed firms drawn from 37 countries. We find that firms are more likely to pay dividends when profitability is high, debt is low, investment opportunities are limited or when the largest shareholder is not an insider. Further, the magnitude of dividend payout tends to be smaller when the largest shareholder is either an insider or a financial institution. It is also apparent that largest shareholding and dividend payout are related and that, consistent with the extant literature, legal system does matter in dividend policy decisions.     

基于股权结构的超级多数条款设计——对解决我国上市公司“大股东控制”问题的探索

“大股东控制”是制约我国上市公司治理水平的重要因素。为了提高上市公司治理水平,委托投票制度、特别事项超级多数条款、累计投票制度、关联股东回避制度、网络投票制度以及类别股东投票制度等一系列制度先后被引入。这些制度设计在一定程度上起到了积极作用。然而其效果比较有限。我们认为,针对特殊的股权结构,应当制定与之相匹配的投票制度,才能体现股东平等的原则。本文从法定投票通过率和股东控制权的关系出发,通过构造一个动态联盟博弈模型,设计了一项“针对股权结构的超级多数条款”的投票制度。从公平角度设计的该制度有助于化解当前我国证券市场的“大股东控制”问题。     

CEO并购补偿会影响股东财富吗?

目标公司CEO的并购补偿是否会影响股东财富?以2009~2021年被收购的2946个目标公司为样本采用实证研究法探究了目标公司CEO并购补偿对股东财富的影响。研究发现:CEO并购补偿对股东财富的影响在不同预期协同效应下具有显著差异,预期协同效应较高时降低了目标公司股东财富,预期协同效应较低时,提高了目标公司股东财富。当目标公司存在盈余管理时,CEO并购补偿对目标公司股东财富的负面影响更加显著。进一步分析了不同协同效应下目标公司CEO并购补偿对股东财富影响的作用机制,目标公司发放并购补偿的程度及CEO留任可能性是其主要原因。文章丰富了国内以目标公司为视角研究并购中CEO薪酬与股东代理问题的文献,为规范目标公司CEO在并购中的行为、提高股东财富提供了理论支持与经验证据。     

From hybrids to hierarchies: shareholder wealth effects of joint venture partner buyouts

This study examines the parent firm performance implications of joint venture (JV) partner buyouts, which involve the conversion of a hybrid governance structure to an internal unit within the firm's hierarchy. Transaction cost theory, as developed and applied in the international literature and market entry research, is extended to the post‐entry investment setting to isolate sources of value creation or dissipation from the governance changes effected by JV partner buyouts. The evidence complements recent research on JV longevity and its determinants. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.