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501.
Luiz Ricardo Kabbach-de-Castro Henrique Castro Martins Eduardo Schiehll Paulo Renato Soares Terra 《Journal of Business Finance & Accounting》2023,50(7-8):1402-1438
We examine the role of country-level legal investor protection (i.e., shareholder and creditor protection) on firm investment–cash flow sensitivity (ICFS). Using underexplored research data on investor protection across 21 countries and working with a conservative empirical design, we extend prior literature on the relation between investor protection and ICFS and provide new evidence on how these country-level attributes interact to explain a firm's ICFS. We find that either the strong legal protection of minority shareholders or the strong legal protection of creditors reduces the sensitivity of investment to internal cash flow. However, in countries with strong levels of both minority shareholder and creditor protection, ICFS increases. Our results remain robust after controlling for several alternative explanations. The results support the argument that overregulation arises when policymakers increase investor protection at levels that lead firms to avoid external sources of finance, hampering firm investment. Our findings suggest that countries face a regulatory trade-off such that increasing investor protection (either shareholder or creditors protection) enhances financial markets efficiency, but excessive regulation can indeed lead to financial markets inefficiencies. 相似文献
502.
《The British Accounting Review》2022,54(6):101057
We propose and test the incentive view—that the margin call pressure and ownership-control discrepancy associated with insider share pledging increase investors’ perceived risk, and thus also the cost of equity capital, in an emerging market. Using a controlling shareholder share pledging sample for Chinese listed firms, we find that firms with share pledging have a cost of equity capital that is 23.7 basis points higher than firms without share pledging. Further, share pledging increases the cost of equity capital through the information risks and agency conflicts channels. Cross-sectional analyses show that share pledging has a stronger effect on the cost of equity capital in non-state-owned enterprises, firms without monitoring of multiple large shareholders, firms with controlling shareholders assuming the position of chairperson, and firms with a weak institutional environment. In addition, using the global financial crisis and the outbreak of the coronavirus (COVID-19) as quasi-natural experiments, we disentangle the potential confounding effect of firm fundamentals and show that share pledging is positively associated with the cost of equity capital. Overall, the results are consistent with our incentive view that share pledging increases the cost of equity capital in an emerging market. 相似文献
503.
Trung K. Do Xuan Vinh Vo Tuan-Vinh Le 《Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting》2023,34(1):97-126
We examine the environmental impact of the staggered adoption of universal demand laws by 23 U.S. states between 1989 and 2005. Universal demand laws impede derivative lawsuits and thus undermine shareholder oversight of corporate environmental performance. We find that weakened litigation rights for shareholders are positively associated with the release of toxic chemicals by firms. The effect is stronger for firms with weak governance, and environmental mismanagement by firms after the passage of the laws lead to poorer financial performance. Overall, our findings imply that derivative lawsuits by shareholders are not frivolous, as is often asserted. Rather, they act as an effective mechanism of corporate governance. 相似文献
504.
基于持股权与控制权非对等配置逻辑,文章以2009—2019年A股国有上市企业为研究主体,实证检验非国有股东超额委派董事对企业现金持有水平的影响。研究发现,非国有股东超额委派董事显著提高参股国企的现金持有水平,且随着超额委派比例增加更加显著;进一步地,该正向作用在中央层级企业及市场化进程较高地区表现更为显著;明晰其作用机理,发现其通过抑制超额持现所致的过度投资行为、迫使无效耗散的现金尽快回流进而提高持现水平;此外,非国有股东超额委派董事和超额委派比例均有助于优化现金二次配置,促使企业将超额现金用于发放现金股利及进行创新投入,并最终提升现金持有价值和企业价值。文章结论不仅印证和延伸混改推进过程中非国有资本在高层治理维度所发挥的积极作用,更为进一步深化混合所有制改革及完善中小股东保护体系提供借鉴。 相似文献
505.
Investors tend to litigate large stock price declines, i.e., file ‘stock-drop lawsuits’. However, it is less clear whether the ex-ante threat of security class actions can deter stock price crashes in the first place. To answer this question, we exploit the 1999 ruling of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that discourages security class actions as a quasi-exogenous shock, and find that reducing the threat of security class actions leads to a significant increase in stock price crash risk measured by negative skewness of stock returns. We reveal that the main effect is partially driven by a reduction in the timeliness of bad news disclosure and worsened earnings quality, which is consistent with the view that bad news hoarding serves as the key factor in the formation of a stock price crash. Our overall findings highlight the importance of security class actions in deterring the occurrence of firm-level negative tail events on the financial market. 相似文献