政府信用建设的基本架构与设想

“通过制定、发布和实施标准，达到统一”是标准化的实质，“获得最佳秩序和社会效益”则是标准化的目的。制定行业标准是为了规范行业内企业行为。并方便社会公众对业内行为规范的识别和监督。     

小水电站状态检修可行性分析

长期以来,小水电站的检修工作同大中型水电站的要求一样,执行的是原水利电力部颁发的《发电厂检修规程》中规定的,按检修周期检修。这种规定是一种比较保守、盲目的检修模式。它的不合理表现在到期必修上,不但造成人、财、物、时的大量浪费,可能还会把好的设备拆坏。状态检修就是该修必修,修必修好,它所强调的是该字,它反应了状态检修将更具有针对性、更具有科学性。提高了电站的经济效率,保证了民营资本的利益最大化。     

解读会计信息产权

会计信息外部性的存在带来会计信息供求的冲突,解决此冲突的规则就是会计信息产权。会计信息产权需要界定才能发挥其应有的效能,会计信息产权的界定取决于对企业所有权分享、管制和道德等因素,企业所有权分享下的会计信息产权界定是初始的界定,无法完成初始界定时可采用管制方式进行强权界定,道德是会计信息产权界定不可缺少的因素。国企改革所滋生的各种问题的根源在于会计信息产权畸形性,欲抑制其畸形,正确处理国企所有权的分享问题的同时,建立“共同治理”的机制和“相机治理”机制是必不可少的。     

中国股市财富效应静态和动态实证分析

本文利用2002—2008年的月度数据,利用协整分析、误差修正模型等现代计量经济方法和状态空间模型研究了中国股市财富效应问题。研究结果认为:从长期均衡关系看,我国股市财富效应是显著存在;从短期动态关系看,我国股市财富波动对全社会消费支出波动具有负影响但不显著;从股市财富的边际消费倾向的动态过程看,我国股市财富效应始终存在,但挤出效应同样显著。     

How perceived empowerment HR practices influence work engagement in social enterprises – a moderated mediation model

Abstract

Drawing insights from the group engagement model and self-determination theory, our research explored the role of perceived empowerment human resource (HR) practices in the hybrid organizational form of social enterprise in China. Based on two studies, this paper developed and examined a moderated mediation model, linking perceived empowerment HR practices, identification motivation, work engagement, and authority work value. Specifically, in Study 1 we found perceived empowerment HR practices increased employees’ work engagement through enhancing employees’ identification motivation. In Study 2, we adopted a two-wave design to duplicate and extend this mediation model. A moderator, employees’ authority work value, was found to weaken both the mediation relationship, and the positive relationship between perceived empowerment HR practices and identification motivation. This study broadens the understanding of what social enterprises look like in alternative contexts, while providing an opportunity to explore how a HRM mechanism and its boundary condition function in large social enterprises in China.     

Stochastic costly state verification and dynamic contracts

I consider a dynamic costly state verification environment in which a risk-averse agent enters into a contract with a risk-neutral principal. The agent has random income which is unknown to the principal but can be verified at a cost. The principal can commit to executing random verifications.I extend the standard recursive methods to study the problem and show that it is optimal to set verification probabilities strictly less than 1. If the agent׳s absolute risk aversion declines sufficiently slowly, the principal will use verification regardless of its cost. If the agent's income is verified then he would get consumption and continuation utility strictly higher than if his income were not verified.