Swimming upstream throughout the turmoil: Evidence on firm growth during the great recession

Economic downturns significantly impact on industry and firm dynamics. During a slowdown, increased competitive pressure makes less efficient firms more likely to exit (the cleansing hypothesis). However, evidence on Italian manufacturing firms during the Great Recession contrasts with this view. In fact, a not negligible subset of firms grew considerably during the crisis, increasing intra-industry heterogeneity. In this paper, we study these swimming upstream firms (SUFs) and we obtain two results. First, SUFs exhibit a high capability accumulation profile (innovation, intangibles investments and internationalization). Second, the impact of endogenous capability accumulation does not vanish after controlling for exogenous factors.     

Forecasting the UK economy: Alternative forecasting methodologies and the role of off-model information

How did DSGE model forecasts perform before, during and after the financial crisis, and what type of off-model information can improve the forecast accuracy? We tackle these questions by assessing the real-time forecast performance of a large DSGE model relative to statistical and judgmental benchmarks over the period from 2000 to 2013. The forecasting performances of all methods deteriorate substantially following the financial crisis. That is particularly evident for the DSGE model’s GDP forecasts, but augmenting the model with a measure of survey expectations made its GDP forecasts more accurate, which supports the idea that timely off-model information is particularly useful in times of financial distress.     

Total factor productivity growth in Central and Eastern Europe before,during and after the global financial crisis

This article presents growth accounting results for 11 EU countries from Central and Eastern Europe for the years 1996–2016. Its contributions include the estimation of new capital stock series and adjustment for the utilisation of capital stock. Before the crisis, growth in total factor productivity (TFP) was the main contributor to output growth in Slovenia, Hungary and Slovakia, while capital deepening was more important in the Czech Republic, Croatia and Poland. During the global financial crisis the contributions of TFP and capital growth differed markedly across the countries, reflecting the very diverse dynamics of the crisis. After the crisis the contribution of TFP growth has been negligible in all of the sample countries coinciding with generally weak output growth. The results are generally robust to changes in estimation methods and parametrisations, but some assumptions regarding the construction of the capital stock series are critical for the results.     

Measuring connectedness of euro area sovereign risk

We introduce a method for measuring the default risk connectedness of euro zone sovereign states using credit default swap (CDS) and bond data. The connectedness measure is based on an out-of-sample variance decomposition of model forecast errors. Due to its predictive nature, it can respond to crisis occurrences more quickly than common in-sample techniques. We determine the sovereign default risk connectedness using both CDS and bond data in order to obtain a more comprehensive picture of the system. We find evidence that there are several observable factors that drive the difference between CDS and bonds, but both data sources still contain specific information for connectedness spill-overs. In general, we can identify countries that impose risk on the system and the respective spill-over channels. Our empirical analysis covers the years 2009–2014, such that the recovery paths of countries exiting EU and IMF financial assistance schemes and the responses to the ECB’s unconventional policy measures can be analyzed.     

Trustee reputation in securitization: When does it matter?

We consider the role of trustees–who are nominated to protect the interests of investors–in securitization pricing and whether investors rely on them to mitigate risks. In particular, we examine the effect of trustee reputation on initial yield spreads of European mortgage‐backed security (MBS) issuances between 1999 and the first half of 2007. We find that engaging reputable trustees led to lower spreads during the credit boom period prior to the 2007–2009 financial crisis. Our findings suggest that trustees’ reputation was considered by investors to be more important when risk assessment became more challenging.     

Liar’s Loans,Mortgage Fraud,and the Great Recession

ABSTRACT

This paper contributes to research on misrepresentation in private residential mortgage-backed securities by using new data on losses from foreclosure to estimate higher than expected losses associated with income overstatement and adverse selection in no/low documentation loans, using full documentation loans as a counterfactual. Overall, no/low documentation loans account for $350 billion of the $500 billion lost from 2007 to 2012. No/low documentation loans lost an additional $5200 per loan, implying $97 billion of total no/low documentation losses were higher than expected. I also find underwriting exceptions differentially predict loss by documentation type, which provides evidence consistent with originator-led adverse selection.     

Understanding the accumulation of bank and thrift reserves during the U.S. financial crisis

The level of aggregate excess reserves held by U.S. depository institutions increased significantly at the peak of the 2007–2009 financial crisis. Although the amount of aggregate reserves is determined almost entirely by the policy initiatives of the central bank that act on the asset side of its balance sheet, the motivations of individual banks in accumulating reserves differ and respond to the impact of changes in the economic environment on individual institutions. We undertake a systematic analysis of this massive accumulation of excess reserves using bank-level data for more than 7000 commercial banks and almost 1000 savings institutions during the U.S. financial crisis. We propose a testable stochastic model of reserves determination when interest is paid on reserves, which we estimate using bank-level data and censored regression methods. We find evidence primarily of a precautionary motive for reserves accumulation with some notable heterogeneity in the response of reserves accumulation to external and internal factors of the largest banks compared with smaller banks. We combine propensity score matching and a difference-in-differences approach to determine whether the beneficiaries of the Capital Purchase Program of the Troubled Asset Relief Program accumulated less cash, including reserves, than non-beneficiaries. Contrary to anecdotal evidence, we find that banks that participated in the program accumulated less cash, including reserves, than nonparticipants in the initial quarters after the capital injection.     

An unlikely Phoenix: The recovery of Argentina’s monetary and financial system from its ashes in the 2000s and its lessons

The study discusses the recovery of the Argentine financial system after the crisis of the so called convertibility regime of the 1990s. The Argentine macroeconomic regime established in 1991 and based on the hard peg of the peso to the dollar at a 1 to 1 parity ended in a multiple crisis in 2001–2. Beyond the default on the public debt, the crisis also involved the breakdown of the domestic financial system, and an almost complete isolation of the country from the international financial markets as a consequence of the default. Under such a deep crisis and the consequent uncertainty, the recovery of the solvency of the financial institutions was an almost insurmountable enterprise. However, with a gradualist approach (contrary to the advice of the International Monetary Fund) and a degree of “regulatory forbearance,” the financial and monetary authorities were able to recover the health of the financial system, which became much more resilient to shocks, even if its development has been very slow and, as a consequence, the contribution of domestic credit to the economic expansion of the 2000s can be considered almost negligible.     

Consumer response to economic crisis and lessons for marketers: The Turkish experience

Private consumption is the largest component of gross domestic product (GDP). It has a substantial impact on the speed of recovery from an economic crisis. This paper aims to examine the behavior of consumers, firms, and government in Turkey in response to the recent global economic crisis. Turkey was one of the few countries that emerged from the economic downturn relatively quickly. The demographics of consumers, the solidity of financial sector, and the government policies led to a speedy recovery from the crisis through an increase in consumption expenditures. During the initial shock, consumers switched to cheaper goods and decreased consumption expenditures in total. The government emphasized that the impact of crisis would be limited. The opening of credit lines, the temporary reduction in value-added tax and special consumption tax on certain commodities, aggressive marketing campaigns, and a rosy future drawn by chambers of commerce and NGOs in specific promotional activities were influential in increasing consumption. This paper discusses the consumer response to and the marketing lessons derived from this experience.     

Tainted portfolios: How impairment accounting rules restrict security sales

Contrary to claims that fair value accounting exacerbated banks’ securities sales during the recent financial crisis, we present evidence that suggests – if anything – that the current impairment accounting rules served as a deterrent to selling. Specifically, because banks must provide evidence of their ‘intent and ability’ to hold securities with unrealized losses, there are strong incentives to reduce, rather than increase, security sales when market values decline to avoid ‘tainting’ their remaining securities portfolio. Validating this concern, we find that banks incur greater other‐than‐temporary impairment (OTTI) charges when they sell more securities. We then find that banks sell fewer securities when their security portfolios have larger unrealized losses (and thus larger potential impairment charges), and these results are concentrated in banks with homogenous securities portfolios, expert auditors, more experienced managers, and greater regulatory capital slack. Overall, our results suggest that – contrary to critics’ claims – the accounting rules appear to have reduced banks’ propensity to sell their securities during the financial crisis.