The election cycle in the inflation bias: evidence from the G-7 countries

This paper derives and evaluates empirical implications which separate the naive voters view [Nordhaus, W.D., 1975. The political business cycle. Review of Economic Studies 42, 169–190.] from the rational-voters view [Barro R., Gordon, D., 1983. Rules, discretion, and reputation in a model of monetary policy. Journal of Monetary Economics 12, 101–121.] under rational expectations. The observational equivalence of the two approaches obtained under a natural rate vanishes as output persistence is introduced. An analysis of inflation in the G-7 countries reveals election patterns supporting the joint hypothesis that demand shocks persist and that monetary policy courts retrospective voters. Patterns turn weaker as central banks become more independent, but do not disappear. Reducing inflationary bias not only requires more central bank independence, but as well less persistence.     

长城机在cdBASEⅢ状态下直接作图

本文介绍了利用 GWBIOS3.00提供的系统图形驱动文件 GRD.SYS,在cdBASEⅢ状态下直接作图的方法及常用命令格式。     

The Timing and Persistence of CRA Compliance Ratings

We evaluate supervisory practices in enforcing the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) by examining whether or not supervisors consider observable, bank-specific characteristics in (1) scheduling CRA compliance examinations and (2) determining whether, and for how long, a given CRA rating persists. Failure to confirm such a relationship would be consistent with criticism that the evaluation criteria are so vague that supervisors can essentially assign any rating they want for compliance purposes. Analysis of a sample of several thousand commercial banks, observed over a relatively stable regulatory regime, indicates that both examination scheduling and the persistence of examination ratings are associated with residential loan levels, a presumed cornerstone of the CRA, as well as other financial, regulatory and market factors. We conclude that CRA enforcement during this period reflected, at least in part, objective evaluation criteria.     

Are Banks Affiliated with Bank Holding Companies More Efficient Than Independent Banks? The Recent Experience Regarding Japanese Regional BHCs

Few studies have investigated whether Japanese banks affiliated with bank holding companies are more efficient and profitable than independent banks. The present paper tests this hypothesis by using both a stochastic frontier approach and a market valuation approach. First, our results suggest that banks affiliated with bank holding companies are not more cost-efficient than are independent banks. Because of the brief history of Japanese BHCs, it is fair to conclude that the formation of regional bank holding companies has not achieved efficiency gains so far. Second, we find that banks affiliated with bank holding companies are more profit-efficient than are independent banks. This is particularly apparent when the establishment of the bank holding companies increases market power in regional markets. This supports the Financial Services Agency’s policy to increase the profitability of regional banks through bank consolidation. Finally, based on standard event study methodology, we find that the market did not regard news about the establishment of bank holding companies as significant events.JEL Classification: G21     

中资银行海外拓展及市场准入研究

全面理解各国对外资银行的准入监管法规是中资银行构建海外网络、拓展境外业务的重要前提。本文在分析中资银行开展跨国经营的内在动因和外部条件的基础上,以WTO框架下与各国银行业开放相关的服务贸易谈判为背景,着重对中资银行境外分支机构申请设立和开业登记遇到的准入限制、业务监管限制两大方面进行了分析,并就中资银行如何应对东道国的监管限制提出了建议。     

银行监管的理论研究

银行体系自身具有内在的脆弱性;自然垄断、外部效应和信息不对称等问题又导致金融市场的失灵;银行业在经营中必然存在一定的道德风险。上述原因使得银行监管成为一种必要,有效的监管有利于防范金融风险的发生。     

加入WTO中小商业银行市场定位的战略选择

我国中小商业银行市场定位存在同质同构现象严重、缺乏战略规划等问题。加入WTO后,外资银行的涌入将从业务范围、经营管理机制等方面对我国中小商业银行形成冲击。因此,我国中小商业银行应实行混业经营、发展网络银行等,以应对外资银行的冲击。     

住房按揭贷款的风险防范

由于住房按揭贷款具有周期长、易受行业景气状况和其他因素影响等特点,随着贷款的增加,风险也在积聚,防范住房按揭贷款风险任务在加重。因此,要适度控制贷款规模和投放速度,严格遵照有关政策规定,规范发放有关贷款,避免增加风险,同时加强风险防范措施。     

试论民营银行准入初期的制度安排和技术约束

本文针对民营银行准入初期的构架设计,提出过渡性模块的制度安排和技术约束,包括体制上制度性安排的管理系统;机制上市场性经营的约束范围;监管上政策性修正的可行分析,以求民营银行的准入、运作、监管、发展和退出存有制度的运作空间和机制的持续作用。     

Bank Capital and Risk: Is Voluntary Disclosure Enough?

This paper considers whether banks have an incentive to disclose accurate information concerning their risk and capital adequacy. State-of-the-art capital regulation relies on quantitative capital requirements, bank supervision, and public disclosure of information to the markets. Is voluntary regulatory disclosure of risk information sufficient to achieve policy objectives? The game-theoretic model of this paper suggests that voluntary disclosure can be usefully supplemented with other regulatory tools, in particular with direct supervision and financial market discipline.