出口退税是一项稳健的贸易政策吗?

出口退税作为一项被WTO允许的政策工具,为许多国家的政府所使用。本文在一个国际多市场寡头模型之中,研究出口退税的稳健性。主要结论如下:(1)如果本国政府的目标是最大化国家福利,那么,出口退税不是一项稳健的贸易政策;(2)如果本国政府关心收入分配,对于国家福利的不同组成部分赋予不同的权重,那么,如果政府过于关注本国企业利润,而不是本国消费者剩余和出口退税成本,出口退税就会成为一项稳健的贸易政策;(3)本国政府过于关注本国企业利润的一个可能原因是,本国企业可以通过政治捐献去游说政府,制定对于自己有利的政策。那么,如果相对于国家福利而言,政府过于关注政治捐献,出口退税就会成为一项稳健的贸易政策。     

我国战略性贸易政策实践

本文对改革开放以来我国的战略性贸易政策实践进行了分析。虽然我国政府从未明确提出要实行战略性贸易政策,但是通过和日本经济高速增长时期的战略性贸易政策相比较,可以发现,在我国广泛推行的产业政策中,战略性贸易政策早就存在。只是由于产业组织政策失效所导致的市场竞争程度低下,使得我国战略性贸易政策的实施效果很不理想。因此,协调产业政策和竞争政策,打破地方保护,建立国内统一大市场就成为我国今后战略性贸易政策成功的关键。     

THE THEORY OF ENDOGENOUS MARKET STRUCTURES

Most market structures are neither perfectly or monopolistically competitive: they are characterized by a few large firms that are engaged in strategic interactions in their production and investment decisions and whose number is endogenous. The theory of endogenous market structures analyzes markets in partial and general equilibrium where strategies affect entry and entry affects strategies, and exogenous primitive conditions on technology and preferences affect the equilibrium. We discuss applications to industrial organization, international trade, business cycle theory, international finance, growth and implications for welfare and for competition, trade, fiscal and monetary policy.     

中国卷烟行业竞争态势分析

我国卷烟企业长期存在生产规模小、分布范围散、销售区域性强等的特点,卷烟行业始终处于一种"优不胜、劣不汰"的低水平均衡。本文从博弈的角度解释了这种现象的产生原因,并分析了我国卷烟行业的市场竞争类型,提出建立寡头垄断市场是重组卷烟企业的目标。     

有效需求波动、国有商业银行调整刚性与外资银行经营规模的选择

本文建立了一个有效需求水平不确定情况下的两阶段混合寡占博弈模型．前瞻性地讨论了国有商业银行的经营规模表现出调整刚性的情况下，外资银行经营规模的选择、其实际想要吸收的均衡存款量与选定经营规模之间所存在的关系．以及这种关系将会带来怎样的宏观经济与社会福利后果等问题。研究发现：（1）当实际中的有效需求水平越低时，外资银行经营规模的“产能”过剩；（2）当实际中的有效需求水平越高时，外资银行经营规模的“产能”不足。这一发现具有实施促进经济增长、有效控制居民收入差距政策方面的理论含义。     

Playing away to win at home

This paper presents a model of the interaction between two rival firms based in the same country. Each firm must decide how to serve a foreign market (export or foreign production) and how much to invest in a corporate-wide asset that reduces production costs and/or augments the willingness-to-pay for their product. In this scenario, the firms’ foreign direct investment decisions are interdependent. Furthermore, strategic motives for FDI relate to a firm's domestic, as well as foreign, market profits. One possibility is that a firm sets up overseas production even though its foreign market profits would be higher by exporting.     

世界大豆贸易格局的演变及对我国的启示

20世纪80年代以后,世界大豆出口市场上形成美国、巴西与阿根廷的寡头垄断格局,我国由1996年前的净出口国和最大生产国之一转为如今世界最大的净进口国。本文对这种贸易格局的演变和原因以及这些寡头的策略行为进行了分析,并针对我国长期与短期策略选择进行了探讨。     

Climate change policy, market structure, and carbon leakage

The 1997 Kyoto Protocol on climate change obliges the industrialized countries to initiate the international effort of abating anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. If such an initiative is to be taken, the associated competitive effects may lead to significant relocation of developed countries' energy-intensive production. This paper examines this issue. I adopt an oligopolistic structure combined with increasing returns to scale production technologies to represent the strategic interaction among the firms producing energy-intensive products. This representation is then embedded within a multi-regional computable general equilibrium model, which in turn is used for quantifying these relocational effects. The results suggest that significant relocation of energy-intensive industries away from the OECD may occur, depending on the type of market structure, with leakage rates as high as 130%, in which case GHG control policies in the industrialized countries actually lead to higher global emissions.     

On pure-strategy Nash equilibria in price–quantity games

This paper examines the existence and characteristics of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in oligopoly models in which firms simultaneously set prices and quantities. Existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium is proved for a class of price–quantity games. If the demand function is continuous, then the equilibrium outcome is similar to that of a price-only model. With discontinuous demand and limited spillover, there are rationing equilibria in which combined production falls short of market demand. Moreover, there might again be an equilibrium reflecting the outcome of a price game. Competition in price and quantity thus yields Bertrand outcomes under a variety of market conditions.     

Production-location decision and free entry oligopoly: A correction

This paper shows that there is no interior solution in Mai–Hwang's 1992 oligopolistic location model with free entry when the production function exhibits constant or decreasing returns to scale. The comparative static results of the impact of a demand change on the location decision only apply to the case where the production function exhibits increasing returns to scale. It re-examines the impact of a demand change on the location decision of an oligopolistic firm and corrects the propositions derived by [C.C. Mai, H. Hwang, Production-location decision and free entry oligopoly, Journal of Urban Economics 33 (1992) 252–271. Reprinted in: M.L. Greenhut, G. Norman (Eds.), The Economics of Location, vol. I: Location Theory, Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 1995].