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排序方式: 共有763条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Jed Friedman 《Economics of Transition》2004,12(2):333-366
One feature common to many post‐socialist transition economies is a relatively compressed wage structure in the state‐owned sector. We conjecture that this compressed wage structure creates weak incentives for work effort and worker skill acquisition and thus presents adverse consequences for the entire transition economy if a substantial portion of the labour force works in the state sector. We explore firm wage incentives and worker training, as well as other labour practices and outcomes, in a transition setting with matched firm and worker data collected in one of the largest provinces of Vietnam – Ho Chi Minh City. The Vietnamese state sector exhibits a compressed wage distribution in relation to privately owned firms with foreign ownership. State wage practices stress tenure over worker productivity and their wage policies result in flatter wage–experience profiles and lower returns to education. The state work force is in greater need of formal training, a need that is in part met through direct government financing. In spite of the opportunities for government financed training and at least partly due to inefficient worker incentives, state firms, by certain measures, exhibit lower levels of labour productivity. The private sector comparison group to state firms for all of these findings is foreign owned firms. The internal labour practices of foreign firms are more consistent with a view of profit‐maximizing firms operating with no political constraints. This is not the case for Vietnamese de novo private firms that exhibit much more idiosyncratic behaviour and whose labour practices are often indistinguishable from state firms. The exact reasons for this remain a topic of on‐going research yet we conjecture that various private sector constraints, including limited access to formal capital, play an important role. 相似文献
2.
KENNETH J. KLASSEN JEFFREY A. PITTMAN MARGARET P. REED STEVE FORTIN 《Contemporary Accounting Research》2004,21(3):639-680
We provide evidence on the impact of tax incentives and financial constraints on corporate R&D expenditure decisions. We contribute to extant research by comparing R&D expenditures in the United States and Canada, thereby exploiting the differences in the two countries' R&D tax credit mechanisms and generally accepted accounting principles. The two tax incentive mechanism designs are consistent with differing views of the degree of financial constraints faced by firms in these economies. Our sample also allows us to explore the effects of capitalizing R&D on Canadian firms. Employing a matched design, we document relations between tax credit incentives and R&D spending consistent with both Canadian and U.S. public companies responding as though they are not financially constrained. We estimate that the Canadian credit system induces, on average, $1.30 of additional R&D spending per dollar of taxes forgone while the U.S. system induces, on average, $2.96 of additional spending. We also find that firms that capitalize R&D costs in Canada spend, on average, 18 percent more on R&D. Collectively, this evidence is important to the ongoing debates in both countries concerning the appropriate design of incentives for R&D and is consistent with the assumptions found in the U.S. tax credit system, but not those found in the Canadian system. 相似文献
3.
家族集团中,在企业家通过本期产出水平来确定子公司经理人所应上缴的产出分配收益的情况下,经理人会通过调整自己的努力水平,间接控制自己在下期的上缴额度,从而导致激励效率损失.但是,如果企业家能收取固定的产出分配收益,并确定高额违约金,就能够有效地规避子公司经理人代理问题. 相似文献
4.
基于知识型组织员工人力资源的独有特征,提出一种新的人性假设——“价值人”假设,即知识型组织中员工是工具价值与自我价值二维存在的统一体。在“价值人”假设条件下,知识型组织员工管理模式应从传统的“命令-控制”型向“引导-激励”型转变,运用激励的制度安排来激发员工的工作热情。 相似文献
5.
A. D. Rikun 《Environmental and Resource Economics》1992,2(6):593-604
This paper examines a scheme of economic incentives for environmental protection, in which spatially differentiated pollution taxes are in use in compensating the pollution abatement costs. A simple mathematical model is described which determines an incentive system that encourages polluters to reduce the discharges to an acceptable level of ambient quality standards in a cost-effective manner. It is shown that the vector of pollution charges has to be proportional to the marginal abatement cost vector, but is smaller than the latter in magnitude. It is demonstrated that a necessary incentive effect may be achieved even if the total pollution charge is much lower (about three times) than the total abatement costs. It is also estimated how this charge incentive system reconciles conflicting criteria of cost-effectiveness and of equity. These conclusions are verified by numerical experiments with real data. 相似文献
6.
Double Moral Hazard,Monitoring, and the Nature of Contracts 总被引:8,自引:0,他引:8
Pradeep Agrawal 《Journal of Economics》2002,75(1):33-61
generalized double-sided moral-hazard model, with risk-averse parties who mutually monitor each other (to get a reasonable idea of outcome/effort).
The model considers trade-off between monitoring costs and moral hazard costs, which are endogenously determined by the extent
of monitoring.
Using this model, we formally prove a generalized version of Coase's conjecture – that the optimal contract minimizes the
agency and risk costs. We then show how varying assumptions about the feasibility or cost of monitoring of the outcome or
the worker's effort lead to different contracts being optimal. The analysis is then used to explain the nature of contracts
observed in practice under many different situations. We will give an explanation as to why industrial workers typically work
under wage contracts, while share contracts are common in agriculture and will explain why profit sharing is more common for
senior managers than for the production workers.
Received September 19, 2000; revised version received October 30, 1997 相似文献
7.
In the mid-nineties FIFA decided to increase from two to three the number of points assigned to the winning team of a soccer
match played under traditional round-robin national leagues. Since a game of soccer can be regarded as a contest, FIFA's measure
provides an interesting case-study for analysing how a change in the system of rewards (from a zero to a non-zero sum rule)
may affect the contestants' equilibrium behaviour. In this paper we try to assess, both theoretically and empirically, whether
FIFA's new point rule has changed soccer towards a more offensive game, in which teams adopt more risky strategies. In particular,
we evaluate the “na?ve hypothesis” according to which the measure would induce every team to play always more offensively,
and we explore the extent to which the change in teams' behaviour may be affected by quality differentials between teams.
Our most important hypothesis is that when the asymmetry between opposing teams is large enough, an increase in the reward
for victory induces the weaker team to play more defensively, rather than the opposite. By looking at a subset of matches
held in the Portuguese first division league, which approximate the conditions of our model, we find support for this hypothesis.
First version received: July 1999/Final version received: May 2001 相似文献
8.
This paper examines the effects of introducing competition into monopolized network industries on prices and infrastructure
quality. Analyzing a model with reduced-form demand, we first show that deregulating an integrated monopoly cannot simultaneously
decrease the retail price and increase infrastructure quality. Second, we derive conditions under which reducing both retail
price and infrastructure quality relative to the integrated monopoly outcome increases welfare. Third, we argue that restructuring
and setting very low access charges may yield welfare losses, as infrastructure investment is undermined. We provide an extensive
analysis of the linear demand model and discuss policy implications. 相似文献
9.
司法公正与法官激励是当前司法领域中所面临的最为紧迫而关键的问题.本研究运用博弈论来模拟现实的审判过程.通过分析基于个人效用最大化的法官最优选择的基础上来研究法官的法律遵从度、工作勤勉程度、工资收入、外部干预(如贿赂)、司法权的有效配置等重要因素对法官裁判的影响,进而解决社会所获得的公正执法水平.对于不同法律遵从度的法官而言,贿赂、工资等因素的影响是不同的.提高法官法律遵从度并调整法官与社会之间的效用关系,从制度上实现司法权的有效配置,对于实现司法公正至关重要.这为解决当前司法领域所存在的问题提供了理论依据和方法. 相似文献
10.
Various theoretical models show that managerial compensation schemes can reduce the distortionary effects of financial leverage. There is mixed evidence as to whether highly levered firms offer less stock‐based compensation, a common prediction of such models. Both the theoretical and empirical research, however, have overlooked the leverage provided by executive stock options. In principle, adjusting the exercise prices of executive stock options can mitigate the risk incentive effects of financial leverage. We show that the near‐universal practice of setting option exercise prices near the prevailing stock price at the date of grant effectively undoes most of the effects of financial leverage. In a large cross‐sectional sample of Canadian option‐granting firms, we find evidence that executives' incentives to take equity risk are negatively rather than positively related to the leverage of their employers. 相似文献